MEPO 38/51 – A L Morton

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.24.040633

I note you seek access to the following information:

I would l like access to the following document please:

MEPO 38/51
Arthur Leslie MORTON: Marxist historian: record file (1929-1987)

This file currently has an open description at the National Archives
https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C10881738

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 23(1) and Section 24(1) in the alternative
Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)(3) - Personal Information.

Reason for decision

Information has been exempted as to do so would disclose the nature of police enquiries conducted, evidence gathered and recorded all of which are exempt subject to Section 31(1)(a)(b) of the Act.

In addition, disclosure of some of the requested documentation would either identify issues relating to national security or information which had been supplied by or relate to a security body. In order to protect this information, Section 23(1) and Section 24(1) in the alternative has therefore been applied.

Finally, Section 40(2)(3) of the Act has been invoked, as to disclose personal information contained with the documents would publicly reveal the names of officers below the rank of Chief Superintendent who were based in Special Branch after 1950. The MPS does not disclose the names of officers under FOIA, unless there is a public interest in doing so, especially when based in a specialist unit. This information, as well as the disclosure of specific individuals of interest, as well as current residential addresses, would breach the right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

Section 23 - Information supplied by, or concerning, certain security bodies and Section 24 - National Security – Sections 23(1) and Section 24(1) exemptions can be applied together by a public authority in order to withhold information that provides information that would undermine national security or reveal the extent of any involvement of the security bodies by the disclosure of these records. Applying these two exemptions in the alternative means that either one or both of the exemptions applies to information contained within the document, however, it would be inappropriate to confirm which in fact applies.

In considering whether or not this information should be disclosed, I have considered the potential harm that could be caused by disclosure.

Based on this definition national security encompasses a wide spectrum and it is our duty to protect the people within the UK. Public safety is of paramount importance to the policing purpose and must be taken into account in deciding whether to disclose the information or not and therefore I find it is not in the public interest to release the requested information.

To disclose this information would allow interested parties to gain an upper hand and awareness of policing decisions used to safeguard national security. As you may be aware, disclosure under FOIA is a release to the public at large. Therefore, to release the information you have requested into the public domain could potentially be misused proving detrimental to national security.

In this current environment, where there is a possibility of increased threat of terrorist activity, providing any details that could assist any terrorist or extremist faction would undermine the safeguarding of national security.

The public interest is not what interests the public but what will be of greater good if released to the community as a whole. It is not in the public interest to disclose information that may compromise the service's ability to accomplish one of its core functions of national security.

To release any policing arrangements of this nature would render Security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.

The strongest reason favouring disclosure for Section 24 is this would allow the general public to know the decisions made to safeguard their security. The strongest reason favouring non-disclosure is to do so would allow those with a criminal intent to gain an awareness of policing decision, therefore rendering them ineffective. This would dramatically weaken the MPS’s ability to safeguard national security in the fight against terrorism on a local, national and international scale. Therefore, it for these reasons I have determined that the balance test favours non-disclosure.

Section 31 - Law Enforcement - In considering whether or not this information should be disclosed, I have considered the potential harm that could be caused by disclosure.

FOIA is considered to be a release to the world as once the information is published the public authority, in this case the MPS, has no control over what use is made of that information. To disclose the requested information would identify police operational intelligence, investigative tactics used during the course of enquiries conducted and how this had been recorded. Such a disclosure would be harmful to future investigations, if information relating to how the MPS conducts an operation were disclosed. It is noted that these investigative tactics were employed from the 1930s onwards, however, the basis of the methods adopted is still applicable to present day policing. Therefore, by revealing this information, this would enable any member of the public to define and identify the type of investigative tactics used by the MPS when planning and undertaking operations of this type. Even though these tactics have evolved over time, they are still based on tactics that were used over a considerable number of years and to disclose details of operational techniques used would provide the public with an insight to how the police operate, which would provide the people who wish to harm the citizens of London with the opportunity of disrupting police activity.

This could be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public and might require the MPS to actually have to increase the amount of officers available to them thus increasing the cost to the public purse.

The public interest is not what interests the public but what will be of greater good if released to the community as a whole. It is not in the public interest to disclose information that may compromise the service's ability to accomplish its core function of law enforcement.

Release would have the effect of compromising law enforcement tactics as by confirming which tactics have been used in an operation would hinder the prevention and detection of crime. More crime would be committed and the general public would be placed at risk. This would ultimately deter individuals from assisting the police.

Disclosure would technically be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain which would enable those with the time, capacity and inclination to try and map strategies used by the MPS.

The MPS is reliant upon the techniques used during operations and the public release of the modus operandi employed during these operations would prejudice the ability of the MPS to conduct policing of a similar nature.

Additionally MPS resources and its ability to operate effectively and efficiently would directly be affected as this information, could be manipulated by those with criminal intent to operate in those areas.

After weighing up the competing interests for Section 31 I have determined that the balance of the public interest favours non-disclosure. Whilst there is a public interest in ensuring transparency and accountability of the MPS and its operations, particularly in relation to the spending of public funds and decision-making with regards to operational planning and intelligence gathering. There is a stronger public interest in maintaining the security and confidentiality of policing information.

Disclosure would ultimately allow criminals to have a better understanding of the type of techniques and tactics used when conducting police operations and thus how to ensure their crimes go undetected and therefore evade capture and prosecution. If this were to occur on an increasing level, the fear of crime in communities would rise due to the safety of the public being at risk. To alleviate concerns more police resources would be necessary, which would add to cost of the public purse.

Section 40 - Personal Information - Under Section 40(2) and (3) of the Act, Public Authorities are able to withhold information where its release would identify any living individual and breach the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA). I have applied this exemption in that the name of Special Branch officers contained within documentation dated from the 1950s, would constitute personal data which, if released, would be in breach of the rights provided by the DPA.

The six principles of the DPA govern the way in which data controllers must manage personal data. Under principle one of the DPA, personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully. I consider that the release of these officer and staff names that are recorded within the requested documentation constitutes personal data. The release of this information would be unfair as the persons concerned would have no reasonable expectation that the MPS would make this information publicly available.

In reaching my decision, I have, in each case, given due regard to the condition at Article 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(e) of the GDPR. Condition one of the GDPR requires that consideration is given to whether consent for disclosure has been given whilst Condition six requires that consideration is given to performance of a public task in the public interest.

Having considered both conditions, I have established that no consent is present or would likely be received to release this information. This exemption is both absolute and class based. When this exemption is applied, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to consider whether release of information is in the public interest or demonstrate what harm would result from disclosure.

Disclosure

Please find below the disclosed documentation held within MEPO 38/51