A copy of the historical file MEPO - 38/77

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.25.043387

I note you seek access to the following information:

Further to my previous recent requests I'd like to ask for a copy of the historical file MEPO 38/77 which, according to the National Archives catalogue, is retained by the Met.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

- Section 23(1) - Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters
- Section 31(1)(a) - Law Enforcement
- Section 40(2)(3) - Personal Information

Reason for decision

To provide information which identifies how the police conduct their enquiries and gather intelligence, would allow criminals to have a better understanding of how the MPS prevents and detects crime. Disclosure of police methodologies in regards to how they share/receive and record intelligence, as well as the focus of their activities and as such, areas of interest, would compromise the MPS’s ability to prevent and detect crime and apprehend and prosecute offenders. Therefore, it is for this reason that Section 31(1)(a)(b) of the Act is engaged.

In addition, disclosure of some of the requested documentation would identify whether information had been supplied by, or related to, bodies dealing with security matters. In order to protect this information Section 23(1) has therefore been applied.

Finally, Section 40(2)(3) of the Act is engaged as to disclose personal information contained within a document would publicly reveal name of an officer below the rank of Chief Superintendent who was based in Special Branch after 1950. The MPS does not disclose the names of officers under FOIA, unless there is a public interest in doing so, especially when based in a specialist unit. This information, which could be allow an individual to be identified, would breach the right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

Section 23(1) - Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters - Information held by a public authority is exempt information if it was directly or indirectly supplied to the public authority by, or relates to, any of the bodies specified in subsection (3).

Section 31(1)(a) - Law Enforcement - A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed are considered suitable for open publication.

This is because, under the Act any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual. Therefore, for any disclosure made the MPS has no control over what use is made of that information.

Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant disclosure of information which identifies how and with whom SB officers gathered, shared and recorded information could be of use to those with a criminal intent to gain an understanding of the operational techniques employed by officers within the MPS when conducting an investigation and what areas the police would have an interest.

Police forces work in conjunction with other agencies and information is freely shared in line with information sharing protocols. Modern-day policing is intelligence led and this is particularly pertinent with regard to law enforcement. Therefore, to disclose information of this nature could undermine this partnership approach.

Whilst it is noted that the timeframe of this file dates back to the late 1920s and early 30s, the resulting disclosure of information would still be harmful as it would allow members of the public to define and identify the type of investigative processes used by the MPS. As such, there remains the possibility that the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS may be compromised by releasing information relating to investigative tactics. There are significant risks associated with providing information in relation to any aspects of an investigation, whether it be historical or current, as to provide such details would reveal how investigations are conducted, in particular gathering and sharing police intelligence, which would provide criminals of today with an insight to how the police operate, and people who wish to harm the citizens of London with the opportunity of disrupting police activity.

The prevention and detection of crime is the foundation upon which policing is built. As such, the Police Service is charged with enforcing the law and through the prevention of crime, protecting the communities we serve. The MPS will never divulge information that is held if to do so would place the safety of an individual(s) at risk, or undermine the policing purpose in the effective delivery of operational law enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by various groups or individuals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of operational techniques used in this highly sensitive area.

In order to counter criminal and/or terrorist behaviour, it is vital that the police and other relevant authorities have the ability to work together. Therefore, to release information would compromise and undermine the MPS’s law enforcement capabilities in its ability to prevent and detect crime. Disclosure would be harmful to future investigations if information relating to how the MPS gathered, recorded and shared its intelligence were placed in the public domain. It is noted that this relates to a historical Special Branch file, however, the MPS must be cautious as to what information it discloses, as this may have an impact on present day policing. Were this to occur, there may be a requirement for a full review of police tactics and a possible increase in costs to the public purse.

Section 40(2)(3) - Personal Information - Under Section 40(2) and (3) of the Act, Public Authorities are able to withhold information where its release would identify any living individual and breach the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA). I have applied this exemption due to the name of an officer, based in Special Branch, being contained within documentation would constitute personal data which, if released, would be in breach of the rights provided by the DPA.

The six principles of the DPA govern the way in which data controllers must manage personal data. Under principle one of the DPA, personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully. I consider that the release of the officer’s name constitutes personal data. The release of this information would be unfair as the person concerned would have no reasonable expectation that the MPS would make this information publicly available.

In reaching my decision, I have, in each case, given due regard to the condition at Article 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(e) of the GDPR. Condition one of the GDPR requires that consideration is given to whether consent for disclosure has been given whilst Condition six requires that consideration is given to performance of a public task in the public interest.

Having considered both conditions, I have established that no consent is present or would likely be received to release this information.

Disclosure

Please find below a pdf containing the documentation held within MEPO 38/77, some of which have been redacted as per the exemptions above.