MEPO 38/123 - General O’Duffy and the Irish Brigade

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.25.042574

I note you seek access to the following information:

I would like to be provided with access to a historical record retained by the Metropolitan Police. This record relates to the activities of General O’Duffy and the Irish Brigade during the Spanish Civil War 1937-38 and has been catalogued by the National Archives using the reference MEPO 38/123.
The original department reference was 335/RND/302.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 23(1) - Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters
Section 24(1) - National security
Section 30(2)(b) - Investigations and proceedings conducted by public authorities
Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law enforcement
Section 40(2)(3) - Personal information

Reason for decision

MEPO 38/123 has been requested previously under FOIA and a partial disclosure provided, most recently in 2019. However, given the date of the last disclosure and this request, a further review of MEPO 38/123 was conducted to determine if additional information can be released. Following this review, it has been determined additional information is suitable for release.

Please note that where Section 30 and Section 31 have been applied this relates to different parts of information held.

The information that is exempted in this file relates to how the police conducted their duties and enquires. To provide information which concerns how the police shared and recorded intelligence, would allow criminals to have a better understanding of how the MPS operates when conducting its investigations and the areas of interest. Therefore, Section 31(1)(a)(b) of the Act is engaged.

Section 31 - Law enforcement - FOIA is considered to be a release to the world as once the information is published the public authority, in this case the MPS, has no control over what use is made of that information. To disclose the requested information would identify police operational intelligence, investigative tactics used during the course of enquiries conducted and how this had been recorded. Such a disclosure would be harmful to future investigations, if information relating to how the MPS conducts an operation were disclosed. It is noted that these investigative tactics were employed from the 1930s onwards, however, the basis of the methods adopted is still applicable to present day policing. Therefore, by revealing this information, this would enable any member of the public to define and identify the type of investigative tactics used by the MPS when planning and undertaking operations of this type. Even though these tactics have evolved over time, they are still based on tactics that were used over a considerable number of years and to disclose details of operational techniques used would provide the public with an insight to how the police operate, which would provide the people who wish to harm the citizens of London with the opportunity of disrupting police activity.

This could be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public and might require the MPS to actually have to increase the amount of officers available to them thus increasing the cost to the public purse.

Release would have the effect of compromising law enforcement tactics as by disclosing the methods being employed to mitigate the risk of criminal activity would hinder the prevention and detection of crime. More crime would be committed and individuals would be placed at risk.

Disclosure would technically be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain which would enable those with the time, capacity and inclination to try and map strategies used by the MPS.

The MPS is reliant upon the techniques used during operations and investigations and the public release of the modus operandi employed during these operations would prejudice the ability of the MPS to conduct policing of similar operations.

Additionally MPS resources and its ability to operate effectively and efficiently would directly be affected as this information, could be manipulated by those with criminal intent to operate in those areas.

To disclose how the police conducted their enquiries i.e. gathered information and recorded intelligence would allow criminals an insight into police investigations and ultimately how to evade prosecution.

In addition, Section 30(2)(b) has been engaged to prevent the disclosure of information which has been obtained from a confidential source. Section 23(1) and Section 24(1) has been engaged in the alternative to prevent disclosure of information that would either reveal the extent of any involvement of security bodies or undermine national security by disclosing these records.

Section 30 - Investigations and proceedings conducted by public authorities - Disclosing information which has been obtained in confidence could prevent others from coming forward to give valuable evidence. If it were believed that the MPS were unwilling to protect the anonymity of an individual, the public would be unwilling to provide assistance. The MPS would not wish to reveal who, what and when intelligence is recorded and the extent of their investigations as this would clearly undermine the law enforcement and investigative process. This would impact on police resources and more crime and terrorist incidents would be committed, placing individuals at risk. To disclose information received in confidence would allow those who had committed a crime to know where an investigation is directed and would lead to recognition of which individual may or may not be under investigation. This knowledge may allow others to plan their activity to better try to evade detection.

The strongest reason favouring disclosure is transparency, as this would allow the public to see all the evidence gathered by the MPS whilst undertaking enquiries relating to General O’Duffy. The strongest reason favouring non-disclosure is to release any information obtained in confidence could hinder any future police operations as individuals would be hesitant to assist the police for fear of this being made public.

I have determined that a disclosure of information pertinent to any operation, that may reveal intelligence held and who this has been received from, would undermine the role and effectiveness of any future operations as the general public would be reluctant to provide information for fear that a confidential source would not be maintained.

Section 23 - Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters - Information held by a public authority is exempt information if it was directly or indirectly supplied to the public authority by, or relates to, any of the bodies specified in subsection (3).

Section 24 - National security - Section 23(1) and Section 24(1) exemptions can be applied together by a public authority in order to withhold information that provides information that would undermine national security or reveal the extent of any involvement of the security bodies by the disclosure of these records. Applying these two exemptions in the alternative means that either one or both of the exemptions applies to information contained within the document, however, it would be inappropriate to confirm which in fact applies.

Public safety is of paramount importance to the policing purpose and must be taken into account in deciding whether to disclose the information or not.

Disclosure would allow interested parties to gain an upper hand and awareness of policing decisions used to safeguard national security. As you may be aware, disclosure under FOIA is a release to the public at large. Therefore, the disclosure of information into the public domain could potentially be misused proving detrimental to national security.

In this current environment, where there is a possibility of increased threat of terrorist or extremist activity, providing any details that could assist any terrorist or extremist faction would undermine the safeguarding of national security.

To release any policing arrangements of this nature would render Security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to either specific individuals, including those who are visiting the UK or the general public as a whole.

This would dramatically weaken the MPS’s ability to safeguard national security in the fight against terrorism on a local, national and international scale. Therefore, it for these reasons I have determined that the balance test favours non-disclosure.

Finally, Section 40(2)(3) applies to protect the names of any individuals contained within the documentation, the release of which would be a disclosure of personal information and therefore a breach of the Data Protection Act.

Section 40 - Personal information - Under Section 40(2) and (3) of the Act, Public Authorities are able to withhold information where its release would identify any living individual and breach the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA). I have applied this exemption in that the names of some individuals who are contained within this file would constitute personal data which, if released, be in breach of the rights provided by the DPA.

The six principles of the DPA govern the way in which data controllers must manage personal data. Under principle one of the DPA, personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully. Some of the requested documentation contains the names of police officers who hold a rank below Chief Superintendent. The MPS does not disclose the names of officers under FOIA, unless there is a public interest in doing so, especially when based in a specialist unit and after 1950. The release of this information would be unfair as the person(s) concerned would have no reasonable expectation that the MPS would make this information publicly available.

In reaching my decision, I have, in each case, given due regard to the condition at Article 6(1) (a) and 6(1) (e) of the GDPR. Condition one of the GDPR requires that
consideration is given to whether consent for disclosure has been given whilst Condition six requires that consideration is given to performance of a public task in the public interest.

When this exemption is applied, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to consider whether release of information is in the public interest or demonstrate what harm would result from disclosure.

Disclosure

Please find below a copy of the released publications contained in MEPO 38/123.