MEPO 38/82 file

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.25.0042216

I note you seek access to the following information:

Could I now request MEPO 38/82?

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 31(1)(a) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)(3) - Personal Information.

Reason for decision

To provide information which concerns how the police shared and recorded intelligence, would allow criminals to have a better understanding of how the MPS operates when conducting its investigations and the areas of interest. By releasing this information would compromise the MPS’s ability to prevent and detect crime. Therefore, it is for this reason that Section 31(1)(a) of the Act is engaged.

Finally, Section 40(2)(3) of the Act is engaged as to disclose personal information contained within a document would publicly reveal the name of an officer below the rank of Chief Superintendent who was based in Special Branch (SB) after 1950. The MPS does not disclose the names of officers under FOIA, unless there is a public interest in doing so, especially when based in a specialist unit. This information could allow an individual to be identified, which would breach the right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

Section 31 - Law Enforcement - A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under the Act, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant disclosure of information which identifies how and with whom SB officers shared information within the MPS could be of use to those with a criminal intent to gain an understanding of the operational techniques employed by officers within the MPS, when conducting an investigation and what areas of the police would have an interest. Disclosure would therefore compromise the MPS’s ability to accomplish its core function of law enforcement.

It would not be wise to disclose how the police gathered and shared intelligence. Whilst is it noted that this is a historical file, if the MPS were to disclose how information were shared in the past and this were to be still in existence in some other form, there remains the possibility that the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS may be compromised by the releasing of this information.

The MPS is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we service. Modern-day policing is intelligence led and information of this nature needs to be treated with extreme sensitivity as it could have a detrimental effect on the operational effectiveness of the MPS. There are significant risks associated with providing information in relation to any aspects of an operation, whether it be historical or current, as to provide such details would reveal how investigations are carried out in regard to the recording and sharing of police intelligence. This would provide criminals of today with an insight to how the police operate, and people who wish to harm the citizens of London with the opportunity of disrupting police activity. This could be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public and might require the MPS to actually have to increase the amount of officers available to them thus increasing the cost to the public purse.

It is not in the public interest to disclose information that may compromise the service's ability to accomplish its core function of law enforcement.

Release would have the effect of compromising our law enforcement role, in our ability to prevent and detect crime. The police are reliant upon the different methods available to record and share intelligence gathered. By disclosing details relating to this would allow the public to identify the type of instances when police intelligence would be shared and with whom. This would technically be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain, which would enable those with the time, capacity and inclination to try and map strategies used by the MPS over time and may assist them in their criminal endeavour.

This would result in more crime being committed, with the strong possibility of members of the public being placed at risk. Additionally, MPS resources and its ability to operate effectively and efficiently would directly be affected as this information, could be manipulated by those with criminal intent to operate in those areas.

The Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. The Police Service will never divulge information that is held if to do so would place the safety of an individual(s) at risk or undermine the policing purpose in the effective delivery of operational law enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by various groups or individuals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police investigations and operations in this highly sensitive area.

To release information would compromise and undermine the MPS’s law enforcement capabilities in its ability to prevent and detect crime. Disclosure would be harmful to future investigations if information relating to how the MPS gathered, recorded and shared its intelligence were placed in the public domain. It is noted that this relates to a historical SB file, however, the MPS must be cautious as to what information it discloses, as this may have an impact on present day policing. Were this to occur, there may be a requirement for a full review of police tactics and a possible increase in costs to the public purse.

Section 40 - Personal Information - Under Section 40(2) and (3) of the Act, Public Authorities are able to withhold information where its release would identify any living individual and breach the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA). I have applied this exemption in that a named officer in Special Branch is contained within a document would constitute personal data which, if released, would be in breach of the rights provided by the DPA.

The six principles of the DPA govern the way in which data controllers must manage personal data. Under principle one of the DPA, personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully. I consider that the release of the officer’s name constitutes personal data. The release of this information would be unfair as the person concerned would have no reasonable expectation that the MPS would make this information publicly available.
In reaching my decision, I have, in each case, given due regard to the condition at Article 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(e) of the GDPR. Condition one of the GDPR requires that consideration is given to whether consent for disclosure has been given whilst Condition six requires that consideration is given to performance of a public task in the public interest.
Having considered both conditions, I have established that no consent is present or would likely be received to release this information.
When this exemption is applied, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to consider whether release of information is in the public interest or demonstrate what harm would result from disclosure.

Disclosure

Please find below 4 pdfs containing all the documentation held within MEPO 38/82, which has been redacted as per the exemptions above