Redacted correspondence with New York Police Dept

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.24.041841

I note you seek access to the following information:

Please provide any correspondence with the NYPD, and/or the New York's mayor office regarding the New York "car chase" involving Doria Ragland, and the Duke and Duchess of Sussex on Tuesday 16 May 2023.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 27(1)(a)(c) - International Relations
Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)(3) - Personal Information.

Reason for decision

Section 27 - International Relations & Section 31 - Law Enforcement - A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under the Act any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual. Therefore, for any disclosure made the MPS has no control over what use is made of that information.
To disclose the requested information would enable those who sought to threaten the safety of certain individuals an understanding of what security arrangements may be in place. The effect of this information being available to the applicant, and more importantly those who might wish to cause harm to VIPs, and these could include terrorists, criminals and fixated individuals, would be detrimental to those who are the target of individuals with criminal intent. To ensure that these individuals are not faced with any additional threat and to ensure safety of the members of the public attending events where these individuals are present, would require a review and in all likelihood an increase in the number of police officers employed and a full review of the arrangements that have been made.
The British Government develops and maintains a robust relationship with other nation states, which can promote mutual interest in trade, defence, environmental issues, human rights and the fight against terrorism and international crime.

Any disclosure of information which would be detrimental to the United Kingdom’s (UK) relationship with the USA, would in all likelihood result in other countries or international organisations reconsidering their affinity with the UK.

This would consequently affect the UK's international abilities relating to its overseas citizens, consular and commercial interests. It could also influence the sharing of information provided during the course of political and diplomatic exchanges.

Disclosure of the requested information could lead to a lack of trust and undermine law enforcement agreements in the future. Therefore, it would not be in the best interests of the public to possibly disrupt relations between the UK and the US, or any other country, due to information being released which may not give the whole picture and may in fact give a misleading view of policing events.

Finally, disclosing correspondence which contains the contact details e.g. email address and work location for the head of RaSP would provide persons intent on disrupting the work of the MPS with information that would assist them to do so. In this regard, a person with this intent would be likely to use this information to make inappropriate contact with this senior member of staff and/or send them vast amounts of unsolicited correspondence. This would not only disrupt their work but also cause disruption to the work of the MPS, in hindering the ability to prevent crime.

The effective conduct of international relations depends upon maintaining trust and confidence between Governments. To release information relating to correspondence with another country’s police force may undermine relations between the UK and this country. Any disclosure of information could lead to a lack of trust. If the United Kingdom does not maintain this trust and confidence, its ability to protect and promote UK interests through international relations will be hampered.

To release information which may concern any security arrangements in place would lead to law enforcement tactics being compromised, and would ultimately hinder the prevention and detection of crime. Security arrangements and tactics are re-used and have been monitored by criminal groups, fixated individuals and terrorists. The decision to afford protection is provided based on a number of factors and in a number of forms after careful evaluation of the threat and risks posed to those individuals by operational experts in this field of policing. It therefore follows that anything that would negate the benefits of that protection would place individuals at risk. This would be the individuals receiving protection, the police officers providing the protection and any member of the public in the vicinity of these individuals.

To disclose the contact details within this correspondence would provide persons intent on disrupting the work of the MPS and RaSP, with information that would assist them in this endeavour. This would therefore likely compromise the effective delivery of the Command’s law enforcement functions.

The most persuasive reasons for disclosure is the MPS’s commitment to transparency in our partnership approach with other overseas law enforcement agencies. The MPS recognises that there is a public interest in the security arrangements of public figures, including The Duke and Duchess of Sussex.

However, this needs to be weighed against the strongest negative reasons, in that the Police service will not divulge information which would compromise and undermine law enforcement, as well as hinder international relations. Any disclosure which has the possibility of being harmful to current or future security operations would in all likelihood prejudice the ability to prevent and detect crime and apprehend and prosecute offenders, which cannot be in the public interest.

In addition, by releasing contact details, such as a member of staff’s work location and email address, which has the potential to result in a disruption to their work activities, would also therefore cause disruption to the MPS.

Section 40(2)&(3) - Personal Information - of the Act provides that any information to which a request for information relates, is exempt information if the first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) is satisfied. The first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) states that personal information is exempt if its disclosure would contravene any of the data protection principles. If the disclosure of the requested personal data would not contravene the data protection principles, the disclosure must also not contravene Sections 3A(b) and 3B of the Act.

There are six principles that are set out in Article 5(1)(a) of the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) that dictate when the processing of personal data is lawful. The first principle requires that any processing of personal data must be lawful, fair and transparent. Under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR, the disclosure of personal data is considered to be lawful if:

a. There is a legitimate interest in the disclosure of that personal data.
b. The disclosure of the personal data is necessary to meet that legitimate interest.
c. The disclosure would not cause unwarranted harm to the data subject.

Signature of Chief of Intelligence, New York City Police Department (NYCPD) and Chief Superintendent for Royalty and Specialist Protection

The requested letters contain the signatures of John Hart, Chief of Intelligence in NYCPD and Richard Smith, Chief Superintendent for Royalty and Specialist Protection. Having considered the legitimate interest test in respect of this personal data, I have found that:

a. The disclosure of the signature of the Chief of Intelligence of the New York City Police Department would demonstrate that he, in this role, endorsed the letter to the Chief Superintendent of RaSP, Richard Smith.

b. The disclosure of the signature of the Chief Superintendent of RaSP would demonstrate that he, in this role, endorsed the letter to the Chief of Intelligence of the New York City Police Department, John Hart.

c. Signatures are a unique personal identifier that are used by individuals in all aspects of their personal lives. The disclosure of the signature of John Hart, the Chief of Intelligence in NYCPD and Richard Smith, the Chief Superintendent of RaSP is not necessary to meet the legitimate interest identified at point a and b, as the place in which this signature was present, is evident within the disclosed record. It is accordingly clear that the signature of the Chief of Intelligence at NYCPD and the Chief Superintendent of RaSP was present within the requested letters.

The provision to refuse access to information under Section 40(2)(a)(b) and (3A)(a) of the Act is both absolute and class based. When this exemption is claimed, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to demonstrate what that harm may be in refusing access to information.

Disclosure

Please find below a redacted copy of a letter dated 18 September 2023 and another dated 10 October 2023.