Information on Surge and Interceptor team
Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.24.041361
I note you seek access to the following information:
- With the introduction of the Surge & Interceptors team under the taskforce, what is the main objectives of both teams? What is the difference between them?
- What driver classification does each team hold or is it dependent from officer to officer?
- Are Surge advanced drivers?
- If so, are they IPP or TPAC and are they able to undertake a full pursuit, even after the arrival of TPAC car
- Does Surge operate with any dogs cars or carrier vans exclusive to the team?
- Does anyone in the taskforce (interceptors or surge) train in the use of firearms to be able to assist MO19 officers in a covert capacity?
Decision
I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act). In respect of Question Four (4), information held is exempt by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 31(1)(a) Law Enforcement
In respect of Question Six (6), the Metropolitan Police Service can neither confirm nor deny whether it holds the information that you requested as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 24(2) National Security
Section 31(3) – Law Enforcement
Reason for decision
Section 31(1)(a) (Law enforcement) - While we appreciate you will have no ill meaning behind your request, disclosure could be used by those with criminal intent against the MPS or the UK as intelligence in regards to resources and law enforcement tactics and methodology. It is not in the public interest to disclose tactical information that could be used to assist in the planning of criminal activity, due to an adverse FOIA disclosure.
Disclosure would lead to a loss of confidence in the MPS’ ability to protect the safety of the community (for example, following an adverse FOIA disclosure regarding law enforcement team resources, tactics and capabilities).
The risks to individuals are likely to be significant if the information is used by those with the necessary criminal intent to undermine the very purpose information is held (crime detection and prevention).
Extra security measures and policing resources may need to be put into place with the disclosure of this information regarding resources, tactics and capabilities. This is because of the risk disclosure brings in that it could be used as intelligence by those with the necessary criminal intent to undermine policing.
I have determined that the disclosure of the above information would not be in the public interest. I consider that the benefit that would result from the information being disclosed does not outweigh the considerations favouring non-disclosure.
The other information disclosed today ensures the public interest is met without placing law enforcement and the safety and security of the community in harm’s way.
I appreciate this is not the decision you would have liked for this part of your request. However, this decision has been made on the understanding that the public interest is not what interests the public but is what would be of greater interest to the public as a whole, should the information be disclosed.
Q6 - Does anyone in the taskforce (interceptors or surge) train in the use of firearms to be able to assist MO19 officers in a covert capacity?
NCND - Section 24(2) National Security and 31(3) – Law Enforcement - Any disclosure under FOI is a release to the public at large. Under the Act, we cannot, and do not request the motives of any application for information. We have no doubt that the vast majority of requests made under the Act are legitimate and the applicants do not have any ulterior motives. Whilst not questioning the motives behind this specific request, confirming or denying that information is held regarding a functioning team, would cause operational harm and affect our ability to fulfil our core function of law enforcement in the future.
It is well established that police forces use publicly available data in order to counteract criminal or terrorist behaviour. It has been previously documented in the media that many terrorist incidents have been thwarted due to intelligence gained by these means. However, given the sensitive areas in which resources may be used, including within the sphere of counter-terrorism investigations, to disclose if any particular tactics and capabilities which are or are not utilised would allow criminals and other adversaries to focus on evaluating the particular capabilities of such teams.
With this knowledge it would allow criminals and other adversaries to take steps to counteract them – be it simply adjusting how they interact and present themselves to take advantage of any strengths, weaknesses or gaps in capability they identify. Sophisticated adversaries may be able to go further and take more proactive measures to undermine our teams, and a specific confirmation allows efforts to be focused accordingly.
This detrimental effect is increased if the request is made to several different law enforcement bodies. In addition to the local criminal fraternity now being better informed, those intent on disrupting policing functions throughout the UK will be able to ‘map’ where the use of resources, tactics and capabilities, may or may not be deployed. This can be useful information to those committing (or those intent on committing or planning) crime.
Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both National Security and Law Enforcement.
Confirming or denying whether information is held would provide an insight into the Police Service’s resources, tactics and capabilities. This would enable the public to have a better understanding of the effectiveness of the police and about how the police operate. It would greatly assist in the quality and accuracy of public debate, which could otherwise be steeped in rumour and speculation. Where public funds are being spent, there is a public interest in accountability and justifying the use of public money.
Confirming or denying that any information is held regarding resources, tactics and capabilities would have the effect of compromising law enforcement tactics. It has been recorded that FOIA releases are monitored by criminals and terrorists and so to confirm or deny information is held would lead to law enforcement being undermined. The Police Service is reliant upon all manner of techniques during operations and the public release of any modus operandi employed, if held, would prejudice the ability of the Police Service to perform the functions it exists to provide.
The Police Service would not wish to reveal what resources, tactics and capabilities may or may not be used as this would undermine the law enforcement and investigative process. This would impact on police resources and more crime and terrorist incidents would be committed, placing individuals at risk. It can be argued that there are significant risks associated with providing information, if held, in relation to any aspect of investigations or of any nation's security arrangements so confirming or denying that information is held, may reveal the relative vulnerability of what we may be trying to protect.
The security of the country is of paramount importance and the MPS will not divulge whether any information is or is not held regarding business with any company, if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk, undermine National Security or compromise law enforcement.
As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. The use of resources, tactics and capabilities can be a sensitive issue that would reveal police tactics and therefore it is our opinion that for these issues the balancing test for confirming or denying whether any information is held regarding Question Six (6) is not made out.
However, this should not be taken as necessarily indicating that any information that would meet your request exists or does not exist.
Please note this response should not be taken to as an indication of whether or not the requested information is held for Question Six (6).
Disclosure
The MPS would first like to explain that TPAC stands for Tactical Pursuit and Containment.
The MPS can disclose the answer to Question One (1), Two (2), Three (3) and Five (5).
Q1 - With the introduction of the Surge & Interceptors team under the taskforce, what is the main objectives of both teams? What is the difference between them?
The Taskforce Surge Team use the callsign INTERCEPTOR, there is only one team.
The core function of this team is to provide uniform patrols, solo capability, support to BCUs focusing on community crime fighting supporting a precise and community approach to tackling and reducing crime.
Q2 - What driver classification does each team hold or is it dependent from officer to officer?
The majority of the Taskforce Surge Team are TPAC (to Tactical Pursuit and Containment) or Advanced drivers.
Q3 - Are Surge advanced drivers?
The majority of the Taskforce Surge Team are TPAC (to Tactical Pursuit and Containment) or Advanced drivers.
Q5 - Does Surge operate with any dogs cars or carrier vans exclusive to the team?
The Taskforce Surge Team do not operate with dog cars or carrier vans exclusive to them.