Training by MPS to law enforcement of third countries

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.24.035868

I note you seek access to the following information:

Amnesty International and the Omega Research Foundation are currently undertaking a research project exploring the nature, scope and regulation of transfers of law enforcement equipment, weaponry and associated training that could be used for torture and other ill-treatment. As part of this research we are examining potentially relevant activities of the UK police forces and policing organisations offering security and justice assistance to foreign entities. We are also examining the range of law enforcement equipment and weapons acquired by all UK police forces.

We would like to submit this information request as follows:

Training conducted by Metropolitan Police Service to law enforcement officials of third countries

1. We would be grateful if you could provide a list of all the places of detention, police forces, security forces and military forces from non-UK countries to which Metropolitan Police Service personnel have provided training, from 1 January 2019 till 31 December 2023.
2. Please provide details on the foreign entity listed to receive the training,
3. the dates of the training conducted
4. and details of the training provided.
5. Please specify for any training involving the use of equipment,
6. the type of law enforcement equipment and weapons (e.g. handcuffs, leg restraints, other restraints (please identify), Taser, chemical irritant sprays, batons, launchers firing single kinetic impact projectiles, launchers firing multiple kinetic impact projectiles etc.) that the foreign law enforcement officials were being trained in.
   
   Please disaggregate this data according to training provided by calendar year.
   
   
7. Please also highlight whether such training has been conducted in the UK or in a third country.
   
   Acquisition of law enforcement equipment and weapons by Metropolitan Police Service
8. We would be grateful if you could provide details of the law enforcement equipment and weapons that has been acquired by Metropolitan Police Service from 1 January 2019 till 31 December 2023.
9. Please specify the type of law enforcement equipment and weapons acquired during this period (e.g. handcuffs, leg restraints, other restraints (please identify), Taser, chemical irritant sprays, batons, less lethal launchers, single kinetic impact projectiles, multiple kinetic impact projectiles etc.);
10. the date or dates of the acquisition of each equipment/weapon type;
11. the amount (i.e. number of items)
12. and cost (in pounds sterling) of each equipment/weapon acquisition;
13. the purposes for which each equipment/weapon type was acquired and
14. the company/country from the equipment/weapon was acquired. 

Please disaggregate this data according to training provided by calendar year.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act)

In respect of Question One (1) to Seven (7), some information held has already been placed into the public domain under a previous FOIA response. The MPS is not required by statute to re-release the information requested and so this data is exempt from disclose by virtue of the following exemption;

• Section 21 (Information accessible by other means)

I have provided the answers disclosed again in this response today in the Section 16 element of this response letter for your ease of reference.

In respect of Questions Eight (8), Nine (9), Ten (10), Eleven (11), Thirteen (13) and Fourteen (14), the MPS is happy to disclose information held today.

The MPS is unable to disclose Question Twelve (12), as the cost of each item is commercially confidential information and so its exempt by virtue of the following exemption;

• Section 43(2) – Commercial Interests
• Section 31(1)(a) - Law Enforcement

Additional partial NCND

The MPS is also required to engage a partial NCND, and so can neither confirm nor deny that it holds the information you have requested, by virtue of the following exemptions;

• Section 23(5) – National Security
• Section 24(2) – Information related to security bodies
• Section 27(4) – International Relations
• Section 31(3) – Law Enforcement

Reason for decision

In regard to the engagement of the above listed exemptions, please note this response should not be taken as an indication of whether or not further information is held, other than what the MPS have confirmed is and is not held within this response to your questions.

When deciding to neither confirming nor deny whether any other information is held a key consideration are the possible detriment that the release of that information may have on future acquisition of law enforcement resources. For example, confirming if information is held may adversely impact on resource procurement as it would potentially inform individuals in relation to the capacity, tactical abilities and capabilities of the MPS or other bodies in this field.

Disclosure under FOIA may create a situation in which individuals are able to discern MPS (and the wider Police) capabilities and use this information to allow individuals to target specific areas of the UK or to conduct certain activities (including possible criminal/terrorist activities or other activities that undermine the role of the police) where they perceive the risk of effective resources to be weakest.

Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities (whether information is or is not held in this instance) will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both National Security and Law Enforcement.

Please note this response should not be taken as an indication of whether or not information in relation to the covert use of facial recognition is held or not. Please note that the absence of further disclosable information should not be taken as a confirmation that any further information exists or not.

Section 21 (1) (Information accessible to applicant by other means) - Some information requested has been identified as being accessible via other means as it is already published.

Where information is already in the public domain we are not required to re-publish the data. Instead public authorities are required to direct you to the information, which we have done in this instance.

Section 43(2) - Commercial Interests - provides that any information is exempt if its disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice the commercial interests of any person.

The MPS has claimed Section 43(2) of the Act for disclosure of commercially sensitive information. Disclosure of the requested information could be used by competitors or those with criminal intent to harm the MPS business, contracts and its finite resources.

Section 43 of the Act does not just concern the commercial interests of those businesses that the public authority uses for goods and services but also its own commercial interests.

Public disclosure would harm the Met’s ability to achieve best value in future procurement processes in this area. The MPS would not want to public disclose information regarding its expenditure and commercial information that would detrimentally impact on any future procurement process. The release of any information that would negatively influence, or impact upon, a future procurement process is not in the public interest.

To disclose the type of information you have requested would be detrimental to both the MPS and those seeking to provide goods and services to the MPS. Potential vendors provide information to the MPS as part of a confidential procurement process. Even though some details of successful bids may be published, there is the expectation that commercially sensitive terms and details that reveal the exact nature of how suppliers respond to procurements and go about their business would not be placed into the public domain.

Disclosure of the requested information would prejudice the commercial interests of the MPS because the disclosure of costings and business proposals contained in the withheld information, would set a 'benchmark' which potential service providers could use to compare their proposed responses to. This would therefore have a negative impact on the competitive nature of the tendering process.

There is a public interest in ensuring that companies are able to compete fairly. Disclosing the information could also provide competitors with an unfair advantage. Full disclosure would weaken the position of the MPS in a competitive environment by revealing market-sensitive information. This would have a harmful effect on future partnerships when entering into commercial activities.

There is public interest in openness and transparency by Public Authorities, however this does not necessarily override all other arguments. The MPS fulfils its duty for openness and transparency by disclosing as much contract information as possible by way of publication on the MPS website and by way of FOIA disclosures when deemed appropriate to do so.

The MPS will not disclose information which hinders or interferes with the tendering process and weakens the MPS position in procuring contracts.

Disclosure of the information you have requested would impact on future procurement processes by weakening the MPS' position in a competitive market. In these times of budget cuts, it is particularly pertinent for the MPS to achieve value for money for the public purse. The MPS would not be in the best bargaining position to achieve this if through disclosures under the Act, the competitive nature of the procurement process is adversely affected.

Section 31(1)(a) – Law Enforcement - While we appreciate you will have no ill meaning behind your request, disclosure could be used by those with criminal intent against the MPS or the UK as intelligence in regards to resources and law enforcement products/methodology. It is not in the public interest to disclose information that could be used to assist in the planning of criminal activity, due to an adverse FOIA disclosure.

Disclosure would lead to a loss of confidence in the MPS’ ability to protect the safety of the community (for example, following an adverse FOIA disclosure regarding service specifications and procurement).

The risks to individuals are likely to be significant if the information is used by those with the necessary criminal intent to undermine the very purpose information is held (crime detection and prevention).

Extra security measures and policing resources may need to be put into place with the disclosure of this resource procurement information. This is because of the risk disclosure brings in that it could be used as intelligence by those with the necessary criminal intent to undermine policing.

The other information disclosed today ensures the public interest is met without placing law enforcement and the safety and security of the community in harm’s way.

I appreciate this is not the decision you would have liked for this part of your request. However, this decision has been made on the understanding that the public interest is not what interests the public but is what would be of greater interest to the public as a whole, should the information be disclosed.

Section 23(5) (Information concerning/relating to security bodies) NCND of the Act, Section 27(4) (International relations), Section 31(3) - Law enforcement and Section 24(2)(National Security) NCND

Disclosure of information, if held (other than that already available in the public domain), runs the risk of undermining international relationships, that when used on its own or with other information is likely to have an undesirable effect on the national security of the states concerned and the UK.

The effective conduct of international relations depends upon the maintenance of trust and confidence between states and international organisations. If the UK does not maintain this trust and confidence, its ability to protect and promote UK interests through international relations will be severely diminished. In this case, confirming or denying whether any information is held regarding countries who have received training or have requested training would very likely be seen as a breach of trust, which is fundamental to international relations in general. In this particular instance, is vital to the UK’s ability to continue to conduct effective relations with foreign states.

Modern day policing is intelligence led and law enforcement depends upon the development of intelligence and the gathering and security of evidence in order to disrupt criminal behaviour and bring offenders to justice. The Police Service provides training to police officers and police staff to provide them with the knowledge and understanding required for them to deliver effective operational law enforcement. Occasionally training can be provided to overseas police forces and law enforcement agencies. However, to confirm or deny whether any information is held regarding training that has been provided to overseas countries or about those who may have requested training would, in this case, undermine the process of preventing or detecting crime and the apprehension of prosecution of offenders.

Any release under FOIA is a disclosure to the world, not just to the individual making the request. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, confirming or denying that any other information is held regarding relationships between the MPS and other countries would highlight to criminals the tactical capabilities between the MPS and the relevant country. This runs the risk of providing criminals with information that, when used on its own or with other information, is likely to have an undesirable effect on the national security of the states concerned and the UK. This would in turn, have an impact on the ability of these states and the UK to protect itself from criminality and increases the risk to the safety of its citizens.

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK Government publish the threat level which is based on current intelligence and currently stands at substantial, but this can change quickly to severe if an incident occurs.

Confirming or denying that any other information is held would provide criminals, including terrorists with a greater understanding of the specific resources are available to the MPS. This awareness would reveal vulnerabilities which would ultimately compromise police tactics, operations and future prosecutions as criminals could counteract the measures used against them.

Any information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on National Security.

Confirming or denying whether any other information is or isn’t held would limit operational capabilities as individuals (including criminals/terrorist) would gain a greater understanding of the police’s methods and techniques, enabling offenders to take steps to counter them. It may also suggest the limitations of police capabilities in this area, which may further encourage criminal/terrorist activity by exposing potential vulnerabilities.

This detrimental effect is increased if the request is made to several different law enforcement bodies. In addition to the local criminal fraternity now being better informed, those intent on organised crime throughout the UK will be able to ‘map’ where or how the use of certain tactics may or may not be deployed and why. This can be useful information to those committing (or those intent on committing or planning) crime. It would have the likelihood of identifying location-specific operations which would ultimately compromise police tactics, operations and future prosecutions as criminals could counteract the measures used against them.

Any information identifying the focus of policing activity and methods could be used to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both National Security and Law Enforcement.

Please note this response should therefore not be taken to as an indication of whether or not the further information is held, other than what the MPS have confirmed is or is not held within this response for your questions.

The MPS is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. The security of the country is of paramount importance and the MPS will not divulge whether any other information is or is not held if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk or undermine National Security.

There is a public interest in the transparency of policing, providing assurance that the MPS is appropriately and effectively engaging with any threat from individuals including criminals. However, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both National Security and the integrity of the police in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of National Security. This will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.

To confirm or deny whether the MPS hold any additional information would allow inferences to be made about the nature and extent of national security related activities which may or may not take place. This could enable terrorist groups to take steps to avoid detection, and as such, confirmation or denial would be damaging to national security. By confirming or denying any policing arrangements of this nature would render national security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure on the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.

By confirming or denying whether any other information is held would render security measures less effective and could lead to ongoing or future operations to protect the security of the United Kingdom being compromised and becoming less effective. This in turn would increase the risk of harm to the public.

To confirm or deny whether any other information is held risks prejudicing national security. It is not in the public interest to compromise ongoing or future operations which protect the security or infrastructure of the UK by undermining the need to use the NCND approach to such requests consistently.

Confirming or denying information is held in this case is very likely to compromise the ability of the UK to promote and protect its interests abroad whilst also undermining the UK’s ability to form new and mutually beneficial relationships with other states. The reduction in revenue is likely to result from states choosing not to approach the UK for further services in the future . The damage that confirmation or denial is likely to cause to the UK’s international relations in this case cannot be said to be in the public interest.

Confirmation or denial information is held in this case would compromise the forces’ ability to engage and assist overseas police forces in tackling international threats and share best practice within policing in the future. Confirmation or denial would confirm that countries had or had not taken a direct interest in, or been provided with assistance in a given time, which could infer the level of overseas criminal threats. The safety of the public is of paramount importance, and any increase in crime both in the UK and abroad which results in harm to the wider population cannot be considered to be in the public interest.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police Service will not divulge information if to do so would place the safety of the public at risk, undermine National Security.
Transparency in public office in respect of requests concerning police training, whether domestically and abroad, would inform public debate, provide reassurance and promote confidence in the police service as a whole.

Taking the above points into account the balance favours neither confirming nor denying if any other information is held.

No inferences should be drawn as a result of this response as to whether information is or is not held.

Transparency in public office in respect of requests concerning police training, whether domestically and abroad, would inform public debate, provide reassurance and promote confidence in the police service as a whole.

There is however a considerable risk that confirmation or denial information is held in this case would be seen by some as a breach of vital trust and confidence which would cause severe and lasting damage to UK relations with other states.

Where confirmation or denial would risk the safety of the public, prejudice the interests of the UK abroad, and further undermine the ability of the UK to protect and promote its interests abroad, it cannot be in the public interest.

Taking the above points into account the balance favours neither confirming nor denying information is held. No inferences should be drawn as a result of this response as to whether information is or is not held.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police Service will not divulge information if to do so would place the safety of the public at risk, undermine National Security or law enforcement.
Transparency in public office in respect of requests concerning police training, whether domestically and abroad, would inform public debate, provide reassurance and promote confidence in the police service as a whole.

There is however a considerable risk that confirmation or denial information is held in this case would be seen by some as a breach of vital trust and confidence which would cause severe and lasting damage to UK relations with other states.

Where confirmation or denial would risk the safety of the public, prejudice the interests of the UK abroad, and further undermine the ability of the UK to protect and promote its interests abroad, it cannot be in the public interest.

Taking the above points into account the balance favours neither confirming nor denying information is held.

No inferences should be drawn as a result of this response as to whether information is or is not held.

Section 16 – Duty to Advice and Assist

Question One (1) to Seven (7):

Q1 - We would be grateful if you could provide a list of all the places of detention, police forces, security forces and military forces from non-UK countries to which Metropolitan Police Service personnel have provided training, from 1 January 2019 till 31 December 2023.
Q2 - Please provide details on the foreign entity listed to receive the training,
Q3 - the dates of the training conducted
Q4 - and details of the training provided.
Q5 - Please specify for any training involving the use of equipment,
Q6 - the type of law enforcement equipment and weapons (e.g. handcuffs, leg restraints, other restraints (please identify), Taser, chemical irritant sprays, batons, launchers firing single kinetic impact projectiles, launchers firing multiple kinetic impact projectiles etc.) that the foreign law enforcement officials were being trained in.

Please disaggregate this data according to training provided by calendar year.

Q7 - Please also highlight whether such training has been conducted in the UK or in a third country.

In a previous FOIA disclosure (Case reference 23/34314), the MPS provided a response on 19 December 2023 to a question for the number of police officers from foreign countries who have received training by the MPS for the years 2019 to 2023 inclusive. Please itemise by year and country of origin. This answers Question One (1) to Seven (7) of this FOIA request.

Financial Year

Current financial year:
None

In April 2022 to March 2023:
Royal Canadian Mounted Police – Bloodstain pattern course – 1 student
French Police – Bloodstain Pattern course – 1 student

In April 2021 to March 2022:
Garda Police – HOSTYDS Instructor training – 6 students

In April 2020 to March 2021:
None

In April 2019 to March 2020:
Garda Police – Mounted Unit Intermediate training – 1 student

Within that above closed FOIA request, it was explained that as for internally provided training opportunities within the MPS, we do not record whether they are delivered nationally or internationally, and the courses we do currently run are all run on MPS premises, or MPS-contracted premises, which are within the UK.

We do have some courses that are contracted out where we do not have expertise to run them in-house, or they provide accreditation that needs to be assessed and we are not an accredited centre, but the training provider does not provide us with training records that indicate the geographic location of the training.

In this instance, we are not able to provide the data requested as it is either not provided to us, or not recorded.

Disclosure

Q8 - We would be grateful if you could provide details of the law enforcement equipment and weapons that has been acquired by Metropolitan Police Service from 1 January 2019 till 31 December 2023.
Q9 - Please specify the type of law enforcement equipment and weapons acquired during this period (e.g. handcuffs, leg restraints, other restraints (please identify), Taser, chemical irritant sprays, batons, less lethal launchers, single kinetic impact projectiles, multiple kinetic impact projectiles etc.);
Q10 - the date or dates of the acquisition of each equipment/weapon type;
Q11 - the amount (i.e. number of items)

Product	Qty purchased by MPS from 01/01/2019 to 31/12/2023	Supplier
Solid Batons	1535	Chiltern Global Ltd – UK Distributor, supplier Bonowi Germany via DHL as the Met’s managed service provider for these items
Friction Lock Batons	4191	Chiltern Global Ltd – UK Distributor, supplier Bonowi Germany via DHL as the Met’s managed service provider for these items
Positive Lock Batons	29021	Chiltern Global Ltd – UK Distributor ,supplier Bonowi Germany via DHL as the Met’s managed service provider for these items
Handcuffs	22554	TCH UK Ltd – UK Distributor via DHL as the Met’s managed service provider for these items
Limb Restraints	7253	MC Products - UK Ltd - UK Distributor
Shackle Handcuffs	922	TCH UK Ltd – UK Distributor via DHL as the Met’s managed service provider for these items
Hinged Handcuffs	3120	TCH UK Ltd – UK Distributor via DHL as the Met’s managed service provider for these items
Temporary Restraint	2780	TCH UK Ltd – UK Distributor via DHL as the Met’s managed service provider for these items
Restraint System	89	MC Products - UK Ltd - UK Distributor
Torches	21550	Solon Security Ltd - UK Distributor
Taser	3204	Axon Ltd
PAVA	57,800	Deenside & Sovereign Specialist Training
Attenuating Energy Projectiles (AEP)	37,500	Primetake

All products, whilst they may be manufactured abroad, are purchased via UK based entities or companies e.g. via UK distributors.

The procurement of law enforcement equipment supports the Mayor of London’s Police and Crime plan to deliver a policing service that is better equipped to deal with crime and antisocial behaviour.

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is required by police officers to carry out their duties in inherently dangerous environments, where there are known and potential threats. The provision of PPE is a control measure and forms part of the risk management of operational threats and dangers. The MPS is legally obligated to provide appropriate PPE to control and mitigate operational risk for frontline policing.