MEPO 38/61 - Esmond Romilly

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.24.034868

I note you seek access to the following information:

I would like to request access to a file retained by the MPS under Section 3.4 of the Public Records Act. The file reference is MEPO 38/61. The file subject is Esmond Romilly.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Reason for decision

To provide information which concerns how the police conduct their enquiries and gather intelligence, would allow criminals to have a better understanding of how the MPS prevents and detects crime. To identify police methodologies used, the focus of police activities, as well of areas of interest, would also compromise the MPS’s ability to apprehend and prosecute offenders. Therefore, it is for this reason that Section 31(1)(a)(b) of the Act is engaged.

In addition, disclosure of some of the requested documentation would either reveal the extent of any involvement of the security bodies by the disclosure of these records or identify issues relating to national security. In order to protect this information, Section 23(1) and Section 24(1) in the alternative has therefore been applied.

Finally, Section 40(2)(3) of the Act is engaged as to disclose personal information contained with the documents would publicly reveal the names of officers below the rank of Chief Superintendent who were based in Special Branch after 1950. The MPS does not disclose the names of officers under FOIA, unless there is a public interest in doing so, especially when based in a specialist unit. This information, as well as the disclosure of current residential addresses, would breach the right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

Section 23 - Information supplied by, or concerning, certain security bodies and Section 24 - National Security - exemptions can be applied together by a public authority in order to withhold information that provides information that would undermine national security or reveal the extent of any involvement of the security bodies by the disclosure of these records. Applying these two exemptions in the alternative means that either one or both of the exemptions applies to information contained within the document.

Based on this definition national security encompasses a wide spectrum and it is our duty to protect the people within the UK. Public safety is of paramount importance to the policing purpose and must be taken into account in deciding whether to disclose the information or not and therefore I find it is not in the public interest to release the requested information.

To disclose the requested information would allow interested parties to gain an upper hand and awareness of policing decisions used to safeguard national security. As you may be aware, disclosure under FOIA is a release to the public at large. Therefore, to disclose the information you have requested into the public domain could potentially be misused proving detrimental to national security.

In this current environment, where there is a possibility of increased threat of terrorist or extremist activity, providing any details that could assist any terrorist or extremist faction would undermine the safeguarding of national security.

The public interest is not what interests the public but what will be of greater good if released to the community as a whole. It is not in the public interest to disclose information that may compromise the service's ability to accomplish one of its core functions of national security.

To release any policing arrangements of this nature would render Security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK.

Section 31 - Law Enforcement - As previously alluded to a Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under the Act, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant any information disclosed in relation to this request could be of use to those who seek to cause harm to members of the public by gaining an understanding of the operational techniques employed by officers within the MPS, when conducting an investigation. Disclosure would therefore compromise the MPS’s ability to accomplish its core function of law enforcement.

It would not be wise to disclose how the police conducted their enquiries and gathered intelligence. Disclosure would be harmful to future investigations and policing in general if details around police techniques were disclosed. The investigative tactics employed are still applicable to present day policing. By disclosing these details would allow members of the public to define and identify the investigative tactics used by the MPS when undertaking operations of this type.

The MPS is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we service. There remains the possibility that the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS may be compromised by the releasing of information relating to investigative tactics. Modern-day policing is intelligence led and information of this nature needs to be treated with extreme sensitivity as it could have a detrimental effect on the operational effectiveness of the MPS. There are significant risks associated with providing information in relation to any aspects of an operation, whether it be historical or current, as to provide such details would reveal how investigations are carried out, which would provide criminals of today with an insight to how the police operate, and people who wish to harm the citizens of London with the opportunity of disrupting police activity.

This could be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public and might require the MPS to actually have to increase the amount of officers available to them thus increasing the cost to the public purse.

The public interest is not what interests the public but what will be of greater good if released to the community as a whole. It is not in the public interest to disclose information that may compromise the service's ability to accomplish its core function of law enforcement.

Release would have the effect of compromising law enforcement tactics as by disclosing the methods being employed to mitigate the risk of a terrorist or criminal incident etc. would hinder the prevention and detection of crime. More crime would be committed and individuals would be placed at risk.

Disclosure would technically be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain which would enable those with the time, capacity and inclination to try and map strategies used by the MPS and assist them in evading capture.

The MPS is reliant upon the techniques used during investigations and the public release of the modus operandi employed during these would prejudice the ability of the MPS to conduct policing of similar investigations.

Section 40 - Personal information - Under Section 40(2) and (3) of the Act, Public Authorities are able to withhold information where its release would identify any living individual and breach the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA). I have applied this exemption in that some of the named individuals, including Special Branch officers and private addresses which are contained within documentation would constitute personal data which, if released, would be in breach of the rights provided by the DPA.

The six principles of the DPA govern the way in which data controllers must manage personal data. Under principle one of the DPA, personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully. I consider that the release of these officers and individuals’ names, as well as private addresses that are recorded within the requested documentation constitutes personal data. The release of this information would be unfair as the persons concerned would have no reasonable expectation that the MPS would make this information publicly available.

Disclosure

Please find below 2 pdfs which contain the disclosed documentation held within MEPO 38/61.