Names of all the countries that officers from your force were deployed

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.034376

I note you seek access to the following information:

Please answer the following questions for the time period between 1 January 2023 and 31 October 2023:

1) Please can you provide me with the names of all the countries that officers from your force were deployed to, to either assist or train local law enforcement or as a response to requests from foreign governments/police forces after a major incident such as a terror attack (please specify), along with the number of officers that were deployed to each country? Please can you tell me the total cost of each deployment (with the breakdown of the costs incurred).

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Data in relation to costs of each deployment, specific countries travelled to along with the number of officers and specific reasons for deployment have all been withheld as they are exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 24(1) – National Security,
Section 27(1)(a)(c) – International Relations
Section 31(1)(a)(b) – Law Enforcement

In addition, the Metropolitan Police Service can neither confirm nor deny that it holds any other information in relation to this matter, as the duty in s1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 23(5) - Information supplied by, or concerning, certain security bodies
Section 24(2) - National Security

Reason for decision

To disclose the countries, costs and reasons for deployment would identify our operational tactics and capabilities. Disclosure would provide those whose intention it is to cause harm with valuable intelligence on how the police operate when deploying overseas which would compromise our law enforcement functions by hindering our ability to detect crime and apprehend an offender. In addition disclosure would have an adverse effect on national security and hinder international relations. As such Sections 24(1), 27(1)(a)(c) and 31(1)(a)(b) of the Act are engaged.

Section 24 - National Security - By supplying any policing arrangements of this nature would render security measures less effective. In order to safeguard national security, there is a need for the MPS to protect information held as to release it would likely have a detrimental effect on policing resources, particularly in the sensitive area of national security.

Policing resources would be negatively affected should those with intent to map and obtain an operational advantage over MPS resources (allocated for national security purposes) manipulate the disclosed information.

Section 27 - International Relations - To disclose the countries travelled to, costs and reasons for each deployment would likely prejudice or undermine international relations between the United Kingdom and the specific countries travelled to

To provide this information may hinder and undermine the partnership approach between Countries in respect of law enforcement and international cooperation.

Section 31 - Law Enforcement - By providing the requested details would mean that there is a strong possibility that the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS will be compromised, which would hinder the prevention and detection of crime and the apprehension of an offender. It can be argued that there are significant risks associated with providing this information, since it may allow conjecture as to any perceived vulnerabilities in relation to the assistance that was provided.

FOIA is considered to be a release to the world as once the information is published the public authority, in this case the MPS, has no control over what use is made of that information.

To disclose the countries travelled to, costs and reasons for each deployment would cause operational harm to the MPS and affect our ability to fulfil our core function of law enforcement. Disclosure would technically be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain and allow members of the public, which includes those with a criminal intent, to improve their plans for causing disruption and would assist them in avoiding detection and apprehension, whilst placing individuals at greater risk. This is likely to impact on police resources and may cause the MPS to consider adapting their tactics and strategies for such deployments when assisting overseas police forces.

The release of the countries travelled to, costs and reasons for each deployment could have a detrimental effect on the UK government’s relationship with the countries travelled to and therefore, other states or international organisations, would reconsider their affinity with the UK. Consequently, this could lead to a lack of trust and undermine law enforcement agreements in the future. It could also influence the sharing of information provided during the course of diplomatic and political exchanges.

A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under the Act, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual.

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It should be recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK faces a sustained threat from violent terrorists and extremists. Since 2006, the UK Government have published the threat level, as set by the security service (MI5) based upon current intelligence. With the current threat level to the UK given as ‘substantial’, the Home Office website explains that ‘this means that a terrorist attack is likely’.

In consideration of the ramifications of this threat level, it would not be wise to release details of the information requested. To do so could possibly compromise the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS. Modern-day policing is intelligence led and information of this nature, needs to be treated with extreme sensitivity as it could have a detrimental effect on the operational effectiveness of the MPS. There are significant risks associated with the release of such information as this may provide those seeking to commit criminal acts with an advantage over the MPS and other forces, as the information can indeed be viewed as operational 'intelligence' and operationally sensitive. Disclosure could have a negative effect on the MPS’s ability to undertake similar types of operations.

In the current environment of an increased threat of terrorist activity, providing any details that could assist an extremist, terrorist faction or fixated individual who have the relevant time and know-how, would put people’s lives at risk.
The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police Service will not divulge information if to do so would place the safety of the public at risk, undermine National Security or law enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police operations in this highly sensitive area.

As much as there is a public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. Any disclosure of information, which may lead to conjecture relating to MPS deployments could be used to identify the allocation of resources and therefore prejudice our ability to conduct similar operations. This is therefore sensitive information of intelligence value to a criminal or terrorist. Consequently, it is our opinion that for this reason the balancing test favours non-disclosure.

In addition, the Metropolitan Police Service can neither confirm nor deny that it holds any other information in relation to this matter, as the duty in s1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 23(5) - Information supplied by, or concerning, certain security bodies
Section 24(2) - National Security

Section 23 - Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters & Section 24 - National Security - Disclosure under the FoIA 2000 is a disclosure to the world at large. Therefore, disclosure of the information, if held, runs the risk of providing criminals with information, that when used on its own or with other information is likely to have an undesirable effect on the national security of the states concerned and the UK. This would in turn, have an impact on the ability of these states and the UK to protect itself from criminality and increases the risk to the safety of its citizens. It is also likely to have an adverse effect on law enforcement operations, both in the UK and abroad.

Confirming or denying whether any other information is held would have the effect of making security measures in international states less effective since it may highlight individual vulnerabilities in those states. It would also have the effect of making security measures in the UK less effective as international police forces may be reluctant to share information and intelligence in order to combat threats from criminals.

To confirm or deny whether any other information is held risks prejudicing national security. It is not in the public interest to compromise ongoing or future operations which protect the security or infrastructure of the UK by undermining the need to use the NCND approach to such requests consistently.

To the extent that section 24(2) applies, the Metropolitan Police has determined that in all the circumstances, the public interest in maintaining the exclusion of the duty to confirm or deny outweighs the public interest in confirming whether or not any other information is held. I can therefore neither confirm nor deny whether any other information relevant to your request is held.

No inference can be taken that any other information does or does not exist.

Disclosure

We can inform you that for the period requested 49 officers were deployed to countries to either assist or train local law enforcement or as a response to requests from foreign governments/police forces.