MEPO 38-78 – General Strikes – Communist Party of Great Britain(CPGB)

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.24.035409

I note you seek access to the following information:

I'm researching a book about the General Strike of 1926 in advance of it's centenary. There are a number of files on the National Archives catalogue that have been retained by the Met under Section 3(4) of the Public Records Act and I would like copies of these records. Their references in the National Archives catalogue are as follows:
MEPO 38/78 MEPO 38/79 MEPO 38/80 MEPO 38/81 MEPO 38/82 MEPO 38/83
In addition if it can be done within the cost/time limit I'd also like: MEPO 38/20 MEPO 38/24 MEPO 38/27

Clarification -
I'd like to request MEPO 38/78 in the first instance.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)(3) - Personal Information.

Reason for decision

To provide information, which concerns how the police conduct their enquiries and gather intelligence, would allow criminals to have a better understanding of how the MPS prevents and detects crime. To identify police methodologies used, the focus of police activities, as well of areas or people of interest, would also compromise the MPS’s ability to apprehend and prosecute offenders. Therefore, it is for this reason that Section 31(1)(a)(b) of the Act is engaged.

Section 31 - Law Enforcement - A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under the Act, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant any information disclosed in relation to this request could be of use to those with a criminal intent to gain an understanding of the operational techniques employed by officers within the MPS, when conducting an investigation. Disclosure would therefore compromise the MPS’s ability to accomplish its core function of law enforcement.

It would not be wise to disclose how the police conducted their enquiries and gathered intelligence. Disclosure would be harmful to future investigations and policing in general if details around police techniques were disclosed. The investigative tactics employed are still applicable to present day policing. By disclosing these details would allow members of the public to define and identify the investigative tactics used by the MPS when undertaking operations of this type.

The MPS is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we service. There remains the possibility that the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS may be compromised by the releasing of information relating to investigative tactics. Modern-day policing is intelligence led and information of this nature needs to be treated with extreme sensitivity as it could have a detrimental effect on the operational effectiveness of the MPS. There are significant risks associated with providing information in relation to any aspects of an operation, whether it be historical or current, as to provide such details would reveal how investigations are carried out. This would provide criminals of today with an insight to how the police operate, and people who wish to harm the citizens of London with the opportunity of disrupting police activity.

This could be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public and might require the MPS to actually have to increase the amount of officers available to them thus increasing the cost to the public purse.

Release would have the effect of compromising law enforcement tactics as by disclosing the methods being employed to mitigate the risk of a terrorist or criminal incident etc. would hinder the prevention and detection of crime. More crime would be committed and individuals would be placed at risk.

Disclosure would technically be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain, which would enable those with the time, capacity and inclination to try and map strategies used by the MPS and assist them in evading capture.

The MPS is reliant upon the techniques used during investigations and the public release of the modus operandi employed during these would prejudice the ability of the MPS to conduct policing of similar investigations.

Additionally MPS resources and its ability to operate effectively and efficiently would directly be affected as this information, could be manipulated by those with criminal intent to operate in those areas.

The Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. The Police Service will never divulge whether information is held if to do so would place the safety of an individual(s) at risk, or undermine the policing purpose in the effective delivery of operational law enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by various groups or individuals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police investigations and operations in this highly sensitive area.

To release information would compromise and undermine the MPS’s law enforcement capabilities in its ability to prevent and detect crime and apprehend and prosecute offenders. Disclosure would be harmful to future investigations if information relating to how the MPS conducts enquiries and how intelligence may have been gathered were disclosed. It is noted that these investigative tactics were employed from the 1920s onwards; however, the basis of some of the methods adopted is still applicable to present day policing.

Even though these tactics have evolved over time, they are still based on tactics that were used over 90 years ago. To disclose these details would allow those with a criminal intent to know how to identify what level of policing activity is likely to take place and what tactics may or may not have been employed in an investigation.
The effect of this information being available to the applicant and more importantly those who might wish to disrupt Police tactics, would be a requirement for a full review of police tactics and possible increase in costs to the public purse.
It is for these reasons I have determined that the balance test favours non-disclosure

Finally, Section 40(2)(3) of the Act is engaged as to disclose personal information contained within some documentation would publicly reveal the name of an officer below the rank of Chief Superintendent who was based in Special Branch after 1950. The MPS does not disclose the names of officers under FOIA, unless there is a public interest in doing so, especially when based in a specialist unit. This information, as well as the disclosure of current residential addresses, or information which could be allow an individual to be identified, would breach the right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

Section 40 - Personal Information - Under Section 40(2) and (3) of the Act, Public Authorities are able to withhold information where its release would identify any living individual and breach the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA).

I have applied this exemption in that some of the named individuals, including an officer in Special Branch as well as private addresses, which are contained within documentation would constitute personal data which, if released, would be in breach of the rights provided by the DPA.

The six principles of the DPA govern the way in which data controllers must manage personal data. Under principle one of the DPA, personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully. I consider that the release of these officers and individuals’ names, as well as private addresses that are recorded within the requested documentation constitutes personal data. The release of this information would be unfair as the persons concerned would have no reasonable expectation that the MPS would make this information publicly available.

In reaching my decision, I have, in each case, given due regard to the condition at Article 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(e) of the GDPR. Condition one of the GDPR requires that consideration is given to whether consent for disclosure has been given whilst Condition six requires that consideration is given to performance of a public task in the public interest.

Having considered both conditions, I have established that no consent is present or would likely be received to release this information.

This exemption is both absolute and class based. When this exemption is applied, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to consider whether release of information is in the public interest or demonstrate what harm would result from disclosure.

Disclosure

Please find attached 4 pdfs which contain the disclosed documentation held within MEPO 38/78.