Referrals received over incidents related to Israel and Hamas conflict
Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.24.038731
I note you seek access to the following information:
It is also of note that multiple requests within a single item of correspondence are separate requests for the purpose of section 12. This was confirmed by the Information Tribunal in the case of Ian Fitzsimmons v ICO & Department for Culture, Media and Sport (EA/2007/0124, 17 June 2008). As such, please consider the following numbered requests as separate requests.
- How many referrals have the War Crimes Team (WCT) received over incidents related to the Israel and Hamas conflict, in the period from 8 October 2023 until 8 June 2024?
- Of these, how many related to war crimes alleged to have been committed by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF)?
Clarification - due to the subject matter of your request, this has been aggregated as per the guidance in the Act, which states the following:
Regulation 5(2) of the Fees Regulations allows you to aggregate requests if they relate “to any extent” to the same or similar information.
Decision
I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act).
With regards to Question 2, the Metropolitan Police Service can neither confirm or deny whether it holds any information relevant to this part of your request as the duty in Section 1 (1) (a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:
• Section 23(5) - Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters
• Section 24(2) - National Security
• Section 27(4) - International Relations
• Section 30(3) - Criminal Investigations
• Section 31(3) - Law Enforcement
Reason for decision
Section 23(5) - Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters - Confirming or denying whether information is held would contravene the constrictions laid out within Section 23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in that this stipulates a generic bar on disclosure of any information, if held, that is supplied by, or concerning, certain Security Bodies.
Section 24(2) - National Security - Confirmation of any policing arrangements of this nature would render security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infrastructure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public. To counter this, a full review of security measures would be needed and additional costs would be incurred.
Section 27(4) - International Relations - recognises that the effective conduct of international relations depends upon maintaining trust and confidence between governments as well as with international courts. Confirming or denying that any information is held relevant to the request would destroy that trust and confidence, which in turn would hinder international relations and affect the UK’s ability to protect and promote the country’s interests. Confirming or denying could also therefore damage relations between the United Kingdom and other states, as well as with international courts.
Section 30(3) - Investigations and proceedings conducted by public authorities - By confirming or denying whether or not an investigation is or has been conducted by the Police relevant to this request would hinder the prevention and detection of crime, now and in the future. It would also compromise law enforcement tactics, as the details of where an investigation may or may not be directed would lead to recognition of which individual or group of individuals may or may not be under investigation. The MPS would not wish to reveal who and what police intelligence is recorded about its war crime investigations as this would clearly undermine the law enforcement and investigative process. This would impact on police resources and more crimes would be committed, placing individuals at risk.
To release information, if held, may hinder and undermine the partnership approach to law enforcement in this complex area.
Section 31(3) - Law Enforcement - By confirming or denying whether or not there have been any war crime referrals submitted to the MPS attributed to the IDF would mean that law enforcement tactics would be compromised, which would hinder the prevention and detection of crime. To confirm that information were held i.e. by providing whether or not any referrals relating to the IDF had been received, might allow those who were involved to evade detection as they would be aware that they may become the focus of police activity and would go ‘underground’ or move to a different location. This would impact on police resources and ultimately add to the public purse.
In considering whether or not to confirm or deny that we hold information, I have considered the potential harm that could be caused by this disclosure.
To confirm or deny that the requested information is held would allow interested parties to gain an upper hand and awareness of policing decisions used to safeguard national security.
As can be seen, national security encompasses a wide spectrum and it is our duty to protect the people within the UK. Public safety is of paramount importance to the policing purpose and must be taken into account in deciding whether to disclose information, if held, or not. By confirming or denying whether or not any such war crime investigation was opened in relation to the IDF, could potentially be misused proving detrimental to national security.
FOIA is considered to be a release to the world as once the information is published the public authority, in this case the MPS, has no control over what use is made of that information. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant it could be of use to those who seek to disrupt any police investigation as it would, by a process of elimination, enable them to identify whether a specific person or group was of interest and subject of a police investigation. Additionally, confirmation would indicate if the police had liaised with other governments. This could prejudice international relations between the United Kingdom and other states, as well international courts. It would also lead to an increase of harm to either the investigation itself or the subject of it. This could be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.
Confirming or denying whether any information is held would be of use to those who seek to disrupt police activity as it would, by process of elimination, enable individuals with the inclination to identify where specific people have or have not been subject of police investigations.
To confirm whether any information is held in respect of one piece of information and then neither confirm nor deny whether another piece of information is held, is likely to lead the public to deduce that information is held where a NCND response is applied.
Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of terrorists, extremist or criminal organisations. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these operational activities (whether information is or is not held in this instance) will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both national security and law enforcement.
To confirm or deny whether any information is held relating to a police investigation would be extremely useful to those involved in any form of criminal activity, as it would enable them to ascertain what type of person or companies may or may not be monitored in any way, enabling those with criminal intent to ascertain whether they may or may not have evaded detection. It would also enable individuals to make mosaic requests which can then provide an overall picture as to who or what organisations/groups or people may be monitored in any way. This would enable individuals to evade detection and compromise the ability of the police to safeguard national security.
It remains our position that under FOIA the MPS will not confirm or deny whether the MPS holds any information pertinent to your request. This would be counter effective to the safeguarding of national security and increase the risk of crime if the MPS does not take a consistent approach to requests regarding information held from investigations whether they be monitoring of organisations or individuals. An increase in crime which arises out of an inconsistent approach to the 'NCND' principle may lead to an escalation of criminal activity that could have a detrimental effect on national security and police intelligence.
Furthermore, the position of the MPS supports Government policy. The UK should not provide refuge for war criminals or those who commit crimes against humanity. Action should be taken to bring such individuals to justice wherever possible within the rule of law and depending on the sufficiency of available evidence. The UK Government’s view remains that prosecution is best undertaken in the country in which the alleged offences have taken place. The UK however remains committed to help other countries to prosecute offences that take place within their territory. Any release of information, if held, that would damage this work and make individuals reluctant to report such crimes would be damaging to the work in this field.
The security of the country is of paramount importance and the MPS will not divulge whether information is or is not held if to do so would undermine National Security, our law enforcement functions or the investigative process. Whilst it is recognised that there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by various groups or individuals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police investigations and operations in this highly sensitive area.
As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. Areas of interest to the police are sensitive to the extent that they reveal local intelligence. To confirm or deny the existence of the requested information would allow interested parties to gain an upper hand and awareness of policing decisions used during war crime investigations, leading to an increase of harm to either the investigation itself or the subject of the investigation.
Confirmation or denial whether a level of policing activity has or has not occurred in any specific area would enable the criminal fraternity to identify the focus of policing activity and any tactics that may or may not be deployed.
Whilst to confirm or deny that information is held, would reassure the public that any investigation had been or was being properly conducted and allow for a greater understanding of how information has been gathered, this could undermine the role and effectiveness of any future investigations. Any disclosure of information, if held, which has the potential to jeopardise an investigation, is therefore likely to prejudice law enforcement.
Therefore, after weighing up the competing interests I have determined that confirmation or denial that any referrals have been received linked to IDF war crimes would not be in the public interest. To confirm or deny that information is held regarding what areas are of interest to the MPS could be detrimental to the MPS’s future role of conducting war crime investigations.
However, this should not be taken as necessarily indicating that any information that would meet your request exists or does not exist.
In addition, this response should not be taken to as an indication of whether or not the requested information is held.
Disclosure
Q1 - How many referrals have the War Crimes Team (WCT) received over incidents related to the Israel and Hamas conflict, in the period from 8 October 2023 until 8 June 2024?
During the period 8 October 2023 until 8 June 2024, Counter Terrorism Policing War Crimes team, hosted by the MPS, were receipt of 158 referrals relating to the ongoing Israel and Hamas conflict.