MEPO 38/83 - General strike: emergency regulations

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.24.038454

I note you seek access to the following information:

Could I now put in a request for MEPO 38/83 - 'General strike: emergency regulations'

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 31(1)(a) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)(3) - Personal Information.

Reason for decision

To provide information, which concerns how the police gather intelligence, would allow criminals to have a better understanding of how the MPS prevents and detects crime. Such a disclosure would prejudice the MPS’s ability to carry out it law enforcement role. Therefore, it is for this reason that Section 31(1)(a) of the Act is engaged.

Section 31 - Law Enforcement - A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under the Act, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant any information disclosed in relation to this request could be of use to those with a criminal intent to gain an understanding of how the MPS gathers intelligence to support an operation. Disclosure would therefore compromise the MPS’s ability to accomplish its core function of law enforcement.

It would not be wise to disclose any information relating to intelligence gathering, as it could be harmful to future investigations and policing in general if details around police techniques were disclosed. The investigative tactics employed are still applicable to present day policing. By disclosing these details would allow members of the public to define and identify the investigative tactics used by the MPS when undertaking operations of this type.

The MPS is charged with enforcing the law, preventing, and detecting crime and protecting the communities we service. There remains the possibility that the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS may be compromised by the releasing of information relating to investigative tactics. Modern-day policing is intelligence led and information of this nature needs to be treated with extreme sensitivity as it could have a detrimental effect on the operational effectiveness of the MPS. There are significant risks associated with providing information in relation to any aspects of an operation, whether it be historical or current, as to disclose such details would provide criminals of today with an insight to how the police operate, and people who wish to harm the citizens of London with the opportunity of disrupting police activity.
This could be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public and might require the MPS to actually have to increase the amount of officers available to them thus increasing the cost to the public purse.

The public interest is not what interests the public but what will be of greater good if released to the community as a whole. It is not in the public interest to disclose information that may compromise the service's ability to accomplish its core function of law enforcement, through preventing and detecting crime.

The MPS is reliant on a number of techniques to support an operation, with intelligence gathering paramount to it. Any release of information which would allow those with a criminal intent to understand how the police might have received information and their likely response, would likely compromise any similar types of operations.

Therefore, to release this information has a potential to disrupt police activity and ultimately require the need for additional police resources.

The Police Service will never divulge information held if to do so would undermine the policing purpose in the effective delivery of operational law enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by various groups or individuals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the flow of intelligence in this highly sensitive area.

As much as there is a public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced, it will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. To release information would compromise and undermine the MPS’s law enforcement capabilities in its ability to prevent and detect crime. Disclosure would be harmful to future operations, if information relating to how intelligence may have been gathered were disclosed. It is noted that although the documentation is dated in the 1920s, the subject matter is still of historical interest and could be used as a basis to understand where and how intelligence is received.

Any release of information which would highlight a possible reason for the police’s response to an incident would allow criminals to identify how intelligence may have been gathered. This is likely to disrupt future operations and any tactics employed. The result of which would be a requirement for a full review of police tactics and possible increase in costs to the public purse.

Section 40(2)(3) of the Act is also engaged as the name of a Special Branch officer below the rank of Chief Superintendent is listed within the documentation. The MPS does not disclose the names of officers under FOIA, unless there is a public interest in doing so, especially when based in a specialist unit and after 1950. This information, could allow an individual to be identified, would breach their right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

Section 40 - Personal Information - Under Section 40(2) and (3) of the Act, Public Authorities are able to withhold information where its release would identify any living individual and breach the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA). I have applied this exemption in that the name of an officer in Special Branch contained within documentation would constitute personal data which, if released, would be in breach of the rights provided by the DPA.

The six principles of the DPA govern the way in which data controllers must manage personal data. Under principle one of the DPA, personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully. I consider that the release of this officer’s name that is recorded within the requested documentation constitutes personal data. The release of this information would be unfair as the person concerned would have no reasonable expectation that the MPS would make this information publicly available.

In reaching my decision, I have, in each case, given due regard to the condition at Article 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(e) of the GDPR. Condition one of the GDPR requires that consideration is given to whether consent for disclosure has been given whilst Condition six requires that consideration is given to performance of a public task in the public interest.
Having considered both conditions, I have established that no consent is present or would likely be received to release this information.

This exemption is both absolute and class based. When this exemption is applied, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to consider whether release of information is in the public interest or demonstrate what harm would result from disclosure.

Disclosure

Please find below 2 pdfs which contain the disclosed documentation held within MEPO 38/83.