Advice in relation to terrorist attack in 2017

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.24.037811

I note you seek access to the following information:

Please will you send me copies of all the advice your Command provided to the London Borough of Southwark Council about the security of Stoney Street following the terrorist attack at London Bridge in 2017, including the advice provided in December 2023.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 24(1) – National Security
Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)(3) - Personal Information

Reason for decision

To release all the advice provided following a terrorist attack relating to a specific area, would allow those whose intent it is to cause harm with valuable information on the preventative measures advised to be taken in the event of a further attack.

Any disclosure which increases the possibility of a terrorist attack being successful would be detrimental to national security and the measures that are in place. This would also be prejudicial law enforcement in the MPS’s ability to prevent and detect crime and hinder the apprehension of offenders.

In addition, the disclosure of documentation held would identify the names and work email addresses of MPS officers or staff within PSO who had issued advice or those within Southwark council who were in receipt of this information. By publicly revealing this information could allow an individual to be identified, which would breach the right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

Furthermore, the correspondence also contains the contact details for members of staff within PSO, which includes the previously referenced email address, their work location and telephone number. This information, if released, would provide persons intent on disrupting the work of the MPS, with information that would assist them in this endeavour.

A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under the Act, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant by providing full details relating to the MPS’s advice on security measures to be implemented in Stoney Street would reveal sensitive security and tactical information to mitigate the risk from a further terrorist attack. Disclosure would cause harm by allowing those with a terrorist intent to gain an understanding of valuable tactical assessments made to counter any terrorist threat.

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It should be recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK faces a sustained threat from violent terrorists and extremists. Since 2006, the UK Government have published the threat level, as set by the security service (MI5) based upon current intelligence. The current threat level to the UK is ‘substantial. The government website explains that ‘this means that a terrorist attack is likely’.

Indeed, recent terrorist incidents illustrate this point. Therefore, given that this request concerns security measures recommended following a terrorist attack and in consideration of the ramifications of the current threat level, it would not be wise to disclose all of the requested information, as to do so could allow interested parties to gain an upper hand and awareness of policing decisions used to safeguard national security.

Any disclosure of information could potentially be misused proving detrimental to national security. National security encompasses a wide spectrum and it is the MPS’s duty to protect the people not only within London, but also as a police force within the UK. Public safety is of paramount importance to the policing purpose and must be taken into account in deciding whether to disclose the preventative measures suggested for a specific location to limit the harm if a terrorist attack were to occur. In the current environment of an increased threat of terrorist activity, providing any details that could assist an extremist, terrorist faction or fixated individual who have the relevant time and know-how, would put people’s lives at risk.

The release of this information could be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public and might require the MPS to actually have to increase the amount of officers available to them thus increasing the cost to the public purse.

Guidance around security measures to adopt are given after careful consideration following a detailed assessment by experienced members of the MPS. By disclosing the advice given following a terrorist attack would allow those whose purpose it is to cause harm with the knowledge on what vulnerabilities may have been noted and why specific measures may be in place. This may allow them to counter this if the measures advised have not been fully adopted. Any disclosure which assists in terrorist attack planning would be prejudicial to the MPS’s law enforcement role and hinder our ability to prevent and detect crime and a likelihood of apprehending these offenders.

Finally, disclosing correspondence which contains the contact details e.g. email address, telephone number and work location for members of staff within PSO would provide persons intent on disrupting the work of the MPS with information that would assist them to do so. In this regard, a person with this intent would be likely to use this information to make inappropriate contact with these members of staff and/or send them vast amounts of unsolicited correspondence. This would not only disrupt the work of these members of staff, but also cause disruption to the work of the MPS, in hindering the ability to prevent crime.

Section 24 – National Security - By supplying any policing arrangements of this nature would render security measures less effective. In order to safeguard national security, there is a need for the MPS to protect information held as to release it would likely have a detrimental effect on policing resources, particularly in the sensitive area of national security.

Policing resources would be negatively affected should those with intent try to obtain an operational advantage over MPS resources (allocated for national security purposes) through the manipulation of disclosed information.

Section 31 - Law Enforcement - The public interest is not what interests the public but what will be of greater good if released to the community as a whole. It is not in the public interest to disclose information that may compromise the Police Services’ ability to accomplish its core function of law enforcement and thus hinder the prevention and detection of crime.

Disclosure would technically be releasing sensitive security-related measures into the public domain which would enable those with the time, capacity and inclination to try and map strategies/tactics employed to mitigate a terrorist attack. This information can be used to improve terrorist/criminal plans for causing disruption and would assist them in avoiding detection and apprehension, whilst placing individuals at greater risk. It would not be in the public interest to disclose the requested information as it may identify vulnerabilities which we are trying to protect.

The information sought relates to guidance given following a terrorist attack, which resulted in both fatalities and serious injuries to individuals. Any release of information which could result in further crimes being committed either in Stoney Street and surrounding areas or any other parts of London or across the UK, would hinder the partnership approach to law enforcement. The Police Service works in partnership with other organisations, including local councils, to protect our communities. Therefore, any disclosure which has the potential to damage that relationship cannot be in the public interest.

In addition, by releasing email addresses, work location and phone numbers assigned to staff in PSO, could result in disruption to the work performed by these individuals, if inappropriate contact was made or vast amounts of unsolicited correspondence was received. This would therefore likely compromise the effective delivery of the Command’s law enforcement functions.

The most persuasive reasons for disclosing information is that there is a public interest in keeping everyone informed about security measures and allowing for greater transparency around MPS advice and guidance to counter a terrorist threat. Following these terrorist incidents in London it is appreciated that there is an increased public interest in how the MPS works in partnership with local councils etc. to protect the citizens of London.

However, this needs to be weighed against the strongest negative reasons, which, in this case is by releasing information would undermine national security and compromise the MPS’s law enforcement capabilities in its ability to prevent and detect crime/terrorist incidents, as well as hinder the apprehension and prosecution of offenders. There is a duty to ensure public safety and by disclosing the requested information would not only be detrimental to the role performed by members of staff within the Protective Security and Operations Command, but also allow those with a terrorist intent to identify the measures that would be in place to mitigate the risk of a terrorist attack.

Consequently, a fear of crime would be realised because if terrorists were able to use this knowledge to counter these measures to potentially allow a successful attack(s), the public would be in fear of more terrorist activity occurring. There would be an impact on police resources and they would then have to revisit the types of advice issued, which may lead them to increase their resources to reassure and protect the community.

By releasing information contact details such as a member of staff’s work location and contact number or email address, which has the potential to result in a disruption to their work activities, would also therefore cause disruption to the MPS.

Consequently, any disclosure of information which would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service, and results in costs to the public purse, cannot be in the public interest.

Section 40 - Personal Information - Under Section 40(2) and (3) of the Act, Public Authorities are able to withhold information where its release would identify any living individual and breach the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA). I have applied this exemption in that names of individuals contained in email correspondence or other documentation, along with their email addresses and telephone numbers would constitute personal data which, if released, be in breach of the rights provided by the DPA.

The six principles of the DPA govern the way in which data controllers must manage personal data. Under principle one of the DPA, personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully. I consider that the release of the details of any member of staff within PSO which is below the rank of Superintendent or grade Band A, as well as those who were corresponding with these individuals constitutes personal data. The release of this information would be unfair as the person(s) concerned would have no reasonable expectation that the MPS would make this information publicly available.

Disclosure

Please find below guidance issued by the MPS relating to Stoney Street in 2021. The relevant information deemed suitable for disclosure has been extracted and converted into a PDF document.