Use of facial recognition technology
Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.033534
I note you seek access to the following information:
I write to request information and records, regarding the use of facial recognition technology at protests.
Questions 1-6 relate to the period January 2022-October 2023.
1. Has the MPS deployed live facial recognition at any protests?
a. If so, please provide dates and locations for each deployment.
2. Has the MPS used any form of retrospective facial recognition at protests?
a. If so, please give an indication of the number of instances on which RFR was deployed.
3. Has the MPS deployed operator initiated facial recognition at protests?
a. If so, please provide dates and locations for each deployment.
4. Has the MPS deployed any type of facial recognition in conjunction with body-worn video at protests?
a. If so, please provide dates and locations for each deployment.
5. Where live facial recognition has been used at a protest:
a. How many images were on the watch list used in each instance?
b. From where were these images taken?
c. How many of those on the watch list were not wanted for arrest in each instance?
d. For what other reasons were these people included?
6. At each deployment, how many alerts were generated?
a. How many times did police officers consider the match sufficiently credible to stop individuals and perform an identity check?
b. Following an identity check, how many stops were verified as correct matches?
Questions 7-10 relate to the period from November 2023 onwards.
7. Does the MPS plan to deploy live facial recognition in the policing of protests?
8. Does the MPS plan to use retrospective facial recognition in the policing of protests?
9. Does the MPS plan to deploy operator initiated facial recognition in the policing of protests?
10. Does the MPS plan to deploy any type of facial recognition in conjunction with body-worn video in the policing of protests?
Decision
I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 31(1)(a)&(b) - Law Enforcement
Reason for decision
The Section 31 Exemption has been applied in relation to Question 2 part A. This is because the MPS will not release details of the number of instances which Retrospective Facial Recognition (RFR) was deployed at protests into the public domain as this would give criminals an enhanced knowledge of our operational capabilities and highlight policing tactics as this would be detrimental to law enforcement.
It is important to note that a Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself and any information disclosed are considered suitable for open publication, that is, once access to information is granted to one person under the Act, it is then considered public information and must be communicated to any individual should a request be received. Any information released under the Act is also published on the MPS website.
Section 31(1)(a)&(b) of the Act provides that any information is exempt if its disclosure under the Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice the prevention or detection of crime or the apprehension or prosecution of offenders.
As this is a prejudice-based and qualified exemption, I am required to provide you with evidence of harm in releasing this information. I am also required to carry out a Public Interest Test in order to determine the potential harm that could be caused by disclosing the information requested.
It is not in the public interest to disclose information that may compromise law enforcement and render current tactics and methodologies useless. The MPS has a duty to protect any potential covert uses of these tactics and methodologies now and in the future.
You have requested the number of instances on which RFR was deployed at protests.
This information is bespoke for each deployment based on intelligence which the MPS cannot release as this risks revealing sensitive policing tactics that may have to be reused in the future. It could also show how much (or not) the system is being used. Once this information is released, it is then considered to be useless as it will also be released into the public domain.
As explained above, a Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because under the Act, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to one individual. Once the information is published the MPS has no control over what use is made of it.
Whilst not questioning the motives of any applicant, providing information that we believe could prejudice law enforcement or reveal policing tactics would compromise law enforcement. This would hinder the MPS’ ability to prevent and detect crimes and would allow criminals to gain knowledge about capabilities. Such criminals will be able to determine vulnerabilities and specifically target those force areas where they see a potential area to exploit. This would undermine the operational integrity of our activities, which would adversely affect law enforcement.
Any disclosure of this information would render current tactics and strategies useless and more resources would have to be utilised which will increase the cost to the public purse.
It cannot be in the public interest to disclose information that is likely to increase the public purse and compromise the MPS’ ability to accomplish its core functions of law enforcement. The MPS is reliant upon policing intelligence and the public release of the information requested would compromise law enforcement.
Having considered your request, I accept that there is a public interest in transparency when any request is made for police information. The public interest favouring release must be balanced against any associated risk and/or prejudice that would be caused by disclosure. Having carefully considered this, I have found that the public release and publication of the information requested would provide persons intent on disrupting the work of the MPS with information that would assist them in this endeavour.
The MPS considers that the benefit that would result from the information being disclosed does not outweigh the harm arising from its disclosure.
Disclosure
Q1 - Has the MPS deployed live facial recognition at any protests?
Q1a - If so, please provide dates and locations for each deployment.
The MPS have published the deployment location for overt LFR deployments and the purpose someone is on a watch list at the below link:
LFR - Deployment Records
Q2 - Has the MPS used any form of retrospective facial recognition at protests?
Q2a - If so, please give an indication of the number of instances on which RFR was deployed.
This information is in the public domain already.
Please note that we use retrospective facial recognition at protests for the purpose of identifying those that are suspected of committing offences that require investigation and not for people who exercise their democratic rights to protest lawfully.
For part A – This information is exempt under S31, please see above.
Q3 - Has the MPS deployed operator initiated facial recognition (OIFR) at protests?
a. If so, please provide dates and locations for each deployment.
Please see the below link which includes our statement about OIFR on our website - Live Facial Recognition | Metropolitan Police
Q4 - Has the MPS deployed any type of facial recognition (FR) in conjunction with body-worn video at protests?
Q4a - If so, please provide dates and locations for each deployment.
Please see the below link which explains our uses of FR - Live Facial Recognition | Metropolitan Police
Q5 - Where live facial recognition has been used at a protest:
Q5a - How many images were on the watch list used in each instance?
Q5b - From where were these images taken?
Q5c - How many of those on the watch list were not wanted for arrest in each instance?
Q5d - For what other reasons were these people included?
The MPS have published the deployment location for overt LFR deployments and the purpose someone is on a watch list at the below link:
LFR - Deployment Records
Q6 - At each deployment, how many alerts were generated?
Q6a - How many times did police officers consider the match sufficiently credible to stop individuals and perform an identity check?
Q6b - Following an identity check, how many stops were verified as correct matches?
The MPS have published the deployment location for overt LFR deployments and the purpose someone is on a watch list at the below link:
LFR - Deployment Records
Questions 7-10 relate to the period from November 2023 onwards.
Q7 - Does the MPS plan to deploy live facial recognition in the policing of protests?
Q8 - Does the MPS plan to use retrospective facial recognition in the policing of protests?
Q9 - Does the MPS plan to deploy operator initiated facial recognition in the policing of protests?
Q10 - Does the MPS plan to deploy any type of facial recognition in conjunction with body-worn video in the policing of protests?
At the time of this request questions 7 – 10 fall outside the act as they are asking about future information and not information held.