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Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.033510
I note you seek access to the following information:
I am writing to you to request the following information from Metropolitan Police Service about the use and deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV).
Please may you provide me with answers to the following:
1. Do you use UAV’s at crime scenes? If so what type of scenes, Arson, missing persons, etc. and how many times have they been used in the last two years?
2. Do you use your own UAV’s or subcontract UAV services from an outside body/Police force? If so which company/body do you use and what type of UAV?
3. Have you ever used UAV’s to help search for clandestine graves or missing persons?
4. How many staff do you have trained to deploy a UAV? What has been the cost of staff training?
5. Are your UAV operators police officers or staff?
6. If the answer is yes to any of the above what has been the approx. cost internally and externally?
Clarification:
Thanks for the reply, please can I get costs for each question.
I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemption:
Section 21 – Information reasonably accessible by other means
In addition, the Metropolitan Police Service can neither confirm nor deny whether any other information is or is not held relevant to this request as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 23(5) - Information supplied by, or concerning, certain security bodies
Section 24(2) - National Security
Section 31(3) - Law Enforcement
Reason for decision
Some questions separately and disclose some of the requested information. Some data relevant to Question 1 has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure.
In addition, I am pleased to inform you that some information relevant to this question is already in the public domain. The MPS has published a drone policy document on our website where the use of UAVs has been referenced, see link below – pages 29 and 38.
hUse drones policing policy guidance documents
In relation to the application of the above exemption, some information relating to UAV deployments has also been redacted within the document. This is because to disclose information on all the operations where drones were used overtly and thus the circumstances for their deployment could allow criminals to employ either tactical or technical counter measures to undermine their operational capability. This would disrupt the MPS’s ability to prevent and detect crime and as well as the apprehension and prosecution of offenders. It would assist in identifying specific operations and jeopardize any which may be planned in the future, thus undermining our law enforcement functions. Therefore, for these reasons Section 31(1)(a)(b) of the Act is engaged.
With regards to your query for costs relating to the following:
Question 1 - UAV deployments
Question 3 - Searches
Question 5 - Costs for officers/staff
The searches failed to locate any information relevant to your request, therefore, the information you have requested is not held by the MPS.
I would like to take this opportunity to advise why this type of response is being issued. In regards to the cost of UAV deployments and therefore their assistance with searches (Questions 1 and 3), the MPS does not have an individual cost code for work specifically conducted in regards to all its policing operations. There are a number of factors which would need to be taken into consideration when determining overall costs, which includes staffing numbers and their deployment. There is no single mechanism for tracking the number of officers deployed and staff may be working on different investigations at the same time, rather than one specific operation. Any additional equipment used during the course of the operation, e.g. UAV usage, may not always be recorded for cost purposes, especially if part of the normal policing function. As these are not ordinarily recorded, it is therefore not possible for this to be broken down into different categories to determine what costings relate to UAVs.
In regards to Question 5, an officer and staff’s sole duty does not entail operating UAVs, they will also undertake other roles within their area of business. In addition, each police employee receives a unique salary based on their individual rate of pay as they progress through the pay spine of their respective grade/rank. Rates of pay also differ based on any applicable allowances and the pension scheme to which each employee is aligned. The MPS also makes individual national insurance contributions and pension contributions for each employee. Accurate employee costs per investigation can therefore only be calculated based on individual rates of pay/costs and the time they have spent performing duties in connection with that investigation. Therefore, this cannot accurately be calculated owing to the absence of reliable data as set out above.
Section 31 - Law Enforcement - A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because under the Act, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual. The use of drones is a rapidly developing technique, which can be used by the police service as a whole in a variety of ways to combat crime.
Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, to provide details concerning the operations where drones were overtly deployed would reveal the capabilities of these resources and give important information to criminals. The release of this information would allow criminals to identify our operational planning, which they would then be able to use to their advantage when planning criminal acts and thus allow these to continue, along with an awareness of whether their activities could be detected
This would therefore both directly and indirectly impact on the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of criminals and increase the fear of crime in the community the police service seeks to serve.
Any disclosure of information which would hinder the MPS’s law enforcement functions cannot be in the public interest.
Disclosure of the information requested would compromise law enforcement tactics. Terrorists or organised crime groups etc. could target specific types of events knowing that their activities are less likely to be detected and aid their future planning. This would lead to more crime being committed and individuals being placed at risk, thus hindering the prevention and detection of crime and increasing the risk to public safety and the safety of operational teams.
For the MPS to mitigate the risk of criminals being able to exploit our use of drones to prevent and detect crime there is a need to be careful about the information that is disclosed under FOIA.
Law enforcement is of paramount importance and the Police service will not disclose information if to do so would undermine its purpose and place the safety of individual(s) at risk. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of using public money in policing operations appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by criminals or terrorists, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both the security of the country and the integrity of police investigations and operations in this area.
As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of security and law enforcement, this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. The use of drones is a police tactic that is open to police forces for the purpose of law enforcement and can assist in the prevention and detection of crime.
By providing any information relating to when the MPS had overtly deployed drones and as such, their purpose to support the policing of an operation would allow those with a criminal intent to be aware of if any offences committed had a likelihood of being detected or gather intelligence on likely future deployments.
Any disclosure which hinders our capability and assists criminals cannot be in the public interest.
As such, it is for these reasons that I have determined that the balance test favours non-disclosure of the requested information.
In addition the Metropolitan Police Service can neither confirm or deny whether it holds any other information relevant to this request as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 23 - Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters- Confirming or denying whether any additional information is held would contravene the constrictions laid out within Section 23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in that this stipulates a generic bar on disclosure of any information, if held, that is supplied by, or concerning, certain Security Bodies.
Section 24 - National Security - (2) the duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that, exemption from section 1(1)(a) is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security.
Overall Harm for Sections 24 and 31 - As you will be aware, disclosure under FOIA is a release to the public at large. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, confirming or denying that any other information is held regarding the use of this specialist equipment for covert use, would show criminals what the capacity, tactical abilities and capabilities of the force are, allowing them to target specific areas of the UK to conduct their criminal/terrorist activities. Confirming or denying the specific circumstances in which the police service may or may not deploy drones, would lead to an increase of harm to covert investigations and compromise law enforcement. This would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.
The threat of terrorism cannot be ignored and it should be recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK faces a sustained threat from violent terrorists and extremists. Since 2006, the UK Government has published the threat level, based upon current intelligence and that threat is currently categorised as ‘substantial’.
The UK continues to face a sustained threat from violent extremists and terrorists. It is well established that police forces use covert tactics and surveillance to gain intelligence in order to counteract criminal behaviour. It has been previously documented in the media that many terrorist incidents have been thwarted due to intelligence gained by these means.
Confirming or denying that any other information is held in relation to the covert use of drones would limit operational capabilities as criminals/terrorists would gain a greater understanding of the police’s methods and techniques, enabling them to take steps to counter them. It may also suggest the limitations of police capabilities in this area, which may further encourage criminal/terrorist activity by exposing potential vulnerabilities. This detrimental effect is increased if the request is made to several different law enforcement bodies. In addition to the local criminal fraternity now being better informed, those intent on organised crime throughout the UK will be able to ‘map’ where the use of certain tactics and capabilities are, or are not deployed. This can be useful information to those committing crimes as it would have the likelihood of identifying location-specific operations which would ultimately compromise police tactics, operations and future prosecutions as criminals could counteract the measures used against them.
Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both national security and law enforcement.
By confirming or denying whether any other information is held would render Security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.
Confirming or denying that any other information is held regarding the covert use of drones would have the effect of compromising law enforcement tactics and would also hinder any future investigations. In addition, confirming or denying methods used to gather intelligence for an investigation would prejudice that investigation and any possible future proceedings.
It has been recorded that FOIA releases are monitored by criminals and terrorists and so to confirm or deny any other information is held concerning specialist covert tactics would lead to law enforcement being undermined. The Police Service is reliant upon all manner of techniques during operations and the public release of any modus operandi employed, if held, would prejudice the ability of the Police Service to conduct similar investigations.
By confirming or denying whether any other information is held in relation to the covert use of drones would hinder the prevention or detection of crime. The Police Service would not wish to reveal what tactics may or may not have been used to gain intelligence as this would clearly undermine the law enforcement and investigative process. This would impact on police resources and more crime and terrorist incidents would be committed, placing individuals at risk. It can be argued that there are significant risks associated with providing information, if held, in relation to any aspect of investigations or of any nation's security arrangements so confirming or denying that any other information is held, may reveal the relative vulnerability of what we may be trying to protect.
The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police Service will not divulge whether any other information is or is not held regarding the covert use of drones if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk, undermine National Security or compromise law enforcement.
Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the Police Service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by various groups or individuals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police investigations and all areas of operations carried out by police forces throughout the UK, such as extremism, crime prevention, public disorder and terrorism prevention.
As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.
The use of drones in any covert capacity is a sensitive issue that would reveal police tactics and local intelligence. Therefore, it is our opinion that for these issues the balancing test for confirming or denying whether any other information is held regarding the covert use of drones, is not made out.
However, this should not be taken as necessarily indicating that any additional information that would meet your request exists or does not exist.
Disclosure
Q1a - Do you use UAV’s at crime scenes?
Yes, UAVs are used at crime scenes. Please see above where Sections 21 and 31 has been applied.
Q1b - If so what type of scenes, Arson, missing persons, etc. and how many times have they been used in the last two years?
UAVs have been deployed 60 times in the last two years.
Q2a - Do you use your own UAV’s or subcontract UAV services from an outside body/Police force?
Yes, the MPS owns its UAVs. In addition, the services of the London Search and Rescue volunteer team are occasionally employed.
Q2b - If so which company/body do you use and what type of UAV?
Cost of UAVs is approximately £705,000 since January 2021
Q3 - Have you ever used UAV’s to help search for clandestine graves or missing persons?
Yes, UAVs have been used for searches of missing persons.
Q4a - How many staff do you have trained to deploy a UAV?
33 MPS employees are trained to deploy UAVs.
Q4b - What has been the cost of staff training?
The approximate total cost of training in the last 24 months is £19,800. This therefore does not include all training from initial commencement of an operator role.
Q5 - Are your UAV operators police officers or staff?
UAV operators are both police officers and police staff.