Reported crimes at royal residences September 2022 to October 2023

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.033563

I note you seek access to the following information:

In order to assist you with this request, I am outlining my query as specifically as possible.

For the time period 9 September 2022 to 8 September 2023 and the period between 9 September 2023 to 25 October 2023, please could you disclose the following information:

1) The number of reported crimes at or outside Buckingham Palace
2) The number of reported crimes at or outside Kensington Palace
3) The number of reported crimes at or outside St James’s Palace
4) The number of reported crimes at or outside Clarence House
5) For each of the first four requests, please could you provide a brief summary of each reported crime (i.e the details written in the MO field of the crime report)
6) For each of the first four requests, please could you provide the outcome of each reported crime if known (i.e. if a suspect was arrested, charged or no further action taken).

I would be interested in any information held by the force regarding my request.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

- Section 24(1) – National Security
- Section 31(1)(a)(b) – Law Enforcement

In addition, the MPS can neither confirm or deny whether it holds any further information relating to this request as the duty in Section 1 (1) (a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:

- Section 30(3) – Investigations and proceedings conducted by the public authority
- Section 31(3) – Law Enforcement
- Section 40(5) – Personal Information

Reason for decision

The MPS is unable to respond to requests which do not seek full yearly or monthly data i.e. short part-year periods or part-month data. This is because by providing offence data in this way, especially were occurring at prominent locations, would enable the possibility of crime patterns to be exposed through multiple individual requests.

In addition, to disclose a breakdown of which of the royal residences a crime had been committed in or within its vicinity, along with a summary of each crime, would negatively affect the security measures in place and therefore prejudice law enforcement.

Section 24 - National Security - It is not in the public interest to disclose the requested information as it would detrimentally affect the safeguarding of national security in respect of these buildings and individuals within them. Those planning criminal or terrorist acts are known to conduct extensive research into the levels of opposition they might encounter. Disclosure of the information requested would provide such individuals or groups with valuable information in respect of protection afforded to Royal residences.

Given current threat levels, disclosure would therefore be detrimental to the safeguarding of national security. The disclosure of additional information would also require police tactics to be reviewed, which would create an unnecessary burden on both staffing and financial resources. Such unnecessary expenditure would not be in the public interest.

Section 31 - Law Enforcement - Disclosure of part monthly data would compromise law enforcement by providing an insight into the nature of offences recorded at specific locations and the outcome of the police’s investigation. This pieced with other information either requested under FOIA or already in the public domain would therefore assist offenders in gauging what type of crime is likely to go undetected at a specific location and the potential for whether their involvement in a crime was known. Such a disclosure could increase the probability of crimes being committed, which cannot be in the public interest.

To disclose this information would compromise security arrangements by providing terrorists, criminals or fixated individuals with vital intelligence as to the levels of protection that might be afforded to royal residences and to the level of resistance that they may encounter in committing criminal or terrorist acts.

To provide this additional information would assist offenders in gauging what type of crime is likely to go undetected at a specific location and could therefore increase the probability of crimes being committed, which cannot be in the public interest.

Based on this definition national security encompasses a wide spectrum and it is our duty to protect the people within the UK. Public safety is of paramount importance to the policing purpose and must be taken into account in deciding whether to disclose specific crime location data.

To disclose the requested information would allow interested criminal parties to gain an advantage and increased awareness of policing decisions used to safeguard national security. All royal residences are considered sites of national interest. Any possible threat to these buildings or individuals within, whether that be visitors, staff or Members of the Royal Family, would be considered a threat to the prime institution of the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements and therefore a threat to national security. Disclosing at which royal residence a specific crime occurred and the type of crime would render security measures less effective and compromise the security of individuals and the buildings.

A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under the Act, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant to provide crime location data, in addition to the type of crime, could be harmful in that if specific crimes were shown to have a low detection rate. This could indicate relative vulnerabilities of security provisions at one of the locations. As a result, this would provide those intent on committing criminal or terrorist acts at those residences with valuable information as to the level of resistance they might expect to encounter. They would therefore gain an understanding of the capabilities of the Force and potential vulnerabilities could be more easily identified.

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It should be recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK faces a sustained threat from violent terrorists and extremists. Since 2006 the UK Government have published the threat level, as set by the security service (MI5) and over the last few years this has been raised and reduced based upon current intelligence. The current threat level to the UK is substantial, the Home Office website explains that ‘The threat level indicates the likelihood of a terrorist attack in the UK.

Disclosure of the requested information would prejudice the prevention of crime. To provide details of which crimes had occurred at or within the vicinity of a specific royal residence, especially if disclosing figures on a part-monthly basis, would highlight to a criminal which crimes are likely to go undetected at that location or within the immediate surrounding area. This could allow crime patterns to be identified and may encourage them to commit further similar offences or modify their criminal behaviour to reduce the probability of being apprehended.

Whilst the provision of part monthly crime data may appear harmless in itself, this pieced together with other disclosures can be used in a ‘mosaic effect’ to give a fuller picture to those wishing to evade detection and valuable intelligence to criminals. They could use this information to identify the types of crimes which occur on the estate and are more likely to result in charges being brought. To this end it could either aid their criminal planning/activity and/or assist with the opportunity to realise whether any crimes committed had been detected and charges brought.

This ‘cumulative prejudice’ or the ‘mosaic effect’ whereby the information requested may be of increased significance when combined with other information obtained through other means and/or at a later date. The ‘mosaic’ effect has been described as follows:

‘The “mosaic theory” describes a basic precept of intelligence gathering: Disparate items of information, though individually of limited or no utility to their possessor, can take on added significance when combined with other items of information. Combining the items illuminates their interrelationships and breeds analytic synergies, so that the resulting mosaic of information is worth more than the sum of its parts.’ - Source: David Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 Yale L. J. 628, 630 (2005).

Modern-day policing is intelligence led and information of this nature, needs to be treated with extreme sensitivity as it could have a detrimental effect on the operational effectiveness of the MPS. There are significant risks associated with the release of such information, as to provide the requested data would allow criminals an insight to how the police operate. It would also provide people who wish to harm visitors, staff or Members of the Royal Family and members of the public with the opportunity of disrupting police activity.

Disclosure of the requested information would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public. Additionally, it might require the MPS to have to increase the amount of officers available to them, thus increasing the cost to the public purse.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police service will not divulge information if to do so would place the safety of the public or an individual at risk or undermine national security and law enforcement and therefore compromise the work of the Police Service. Whilst there is a public interest in transparency of the use of policing resources and its effectiveness against the threat posed to the Royal Family and royal residences; and in policing operations and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by criminal or terrorists, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of police arrangements in this highly sensitive area.

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of national security this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. The strongest reason favouring disclosure is transparency. It is recognised that there is a genuine public interest in information relating to crimes which have occurred at these royal residences being disclosed and being able to measure the effectiveness of the MPS in obtaining a successful outcome. The strongest reason favouring non-disclosure is ensuring that security measures are not rendered less effective by providing additional details of crimes committed at each royal residence. In addition to this, also making sure that criminals are not provided with information which allows them to commit acts and evade capture, therefore hindering the effective delivery of operational law enforcement.

Additionally, the Metropolitan Police Service can neither confirm or deny whether it holds any further information relevant to this request as the duty in Section 1 (1) (a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 30 - Investigations and proceedings conducted by public authorities- To confirm or deny the existence of any further information relating to crimes occurring at or within the vicinity of royal residences would be commenting on information, which might or might not form part of an investigation. The MPS would not wish to confirm or deny that any further data is held relating to an offence for an ongoing investigation, as this would clearly undermine the law enforcement and investigative process.

Confirmation or denial would highlight how many investigations could be ongoing and alert possible offenders to the importance that might be placed on this area of crime. Any subsequent enquiries or investigations could therefore be compromised.

To confirm or deny what level of policing activity has or has not occurred in any specific area would enable those engaged in criminal or terrorist activity to identify the focus of policing activity and any tactics that may or may not be deployed.
Confirming or denying the existence of any further information would also reveal policing tactics regarding who was of interest to the police generally. This could be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.
Confirmation or denial that any further information is held may hinder and undermine the partnership approach to law enforcement in this complex area.

Section 31 - Law Enforcement - To confirm or deny whether the MPS has recorded any further crimes would allow criminals to have a full picture of the level of activity occurring at these locations and the opportunity to disrupt our law enforcement functions. Confirmation would identify what type of tactics may or may not be used, depending on the nature of the crime.

In order for the MPS to fulfil its law enforcement role the investigative process must not be disrupted. To disclose information, if held, would impact on future operations as it would enable targeted individuals/groups to become surveillance aware. This would help subjects avoid detection, and inhibit the prevention and detection of crime.

Any disclosure of information, if held, which could ultimately allow individuals to hinder the apprehension and prosecution of offenders cannot be in the public interest.

Confirmation or denial of any further data relating to criminal activity has the potential to disrupt law enforcement and thus a failure to protect the MPS and the public’s interests.

To ensure that the policing purpose is met, there is a need to neither confirm nor deny any further information being held relating to crimes at these locations.

The MPS has a duty to conduct investigations with a view to it being ascertained whether an offence has taken place, whether a person should be charged with an offence, or whether a person charged with an offence is guilty of it.

Therefore, the most persuasive reasons for confirming or denying any further information is held would be greater assurance to the public that any reported crimes to the police are investigated thoroughly and would give an indication of the level of crime that is being reported in this area.

However, this needs to be weighed against the strongest negative reason, which, in this case, is to confirm or deny any further information is held would compromise and undermine the MPS’s law enforcement capabilities in its ability to prevent and detect crime. The effectiveness of any potential ongoing investigations may be compromised as potential offenders would be alerted and able to identify the focus of police activity. They could then take steps to disrupt this investigation and evade prosecution, which could ultimately lead to the need for more police resources.

Section 40(5A) & (5B)(a)(i) Personal Information - In most cases Personal Data is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act as I will explain below.

To confirm or deny whether personal information exists could publicly reveal information about an identifiable individual or individuals, thereby breaching the right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act (DPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2018.

Where an individual is requesting his or her own personal data the information is always exempt. Such information can be requested under other legislation.
Where an individual is requesting third party personal data the MPS must ensure that any action taken adheres to the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 and the GDPR. To clarify, the Freedom of Information Act only allows disclosure of personal data if that disclosure would be compliant with the principles for processing personal data. These principles are outlined under section 34 of the DPA 2018 and under Article 5 of the GDPR.

Section 40 is a class based absolute exemption and there is no requirement to consider the public interest in this case.

Disclosure

Please see below for information pursuant to your request. This data was recorded on the Crime Reporting Information System (CRIS), which is a database where information relating to criminal activity and its investigation is recorded. The data captured is from the period 01/09/2022 to 31/10/2023 and is provided in two tables, where applicable from 01/09/2022 - 31/08/2023 and 01/09/2023 – 31/10/2023, in line with the exemption cited above.

I would like to take this opportunity to advise that the information disclosed is based on the following:

Definition:

Live data was extracted from CRIS on 10/01/2024.

The query was filtered to match the venue address:
%buckingham%palace%
%clarence%house%
%kengsington%palace%
%st%james%palace%
%saint%james%palace%

VEN Address run for this request was filtered to include all addresses that match

Caveat:
• The data includes crimes recorded as being ‘at’ or directly ‘outside’ Buckingham Palace, Kensington Palace, St James Palace and Clarence House, those recorded as ‘opposite’ or ‘near’ have been excluded.

• Addresses were manually filtered through to ensure they matched the addresses required

No Crime – excluded
Royal Mews – excluded
Park - excluded

Q1 - The number of reported crimes at or outside Buckingham Palace
Q2 - The number of reported crimes at or outside Kensington Palace
Q3 - The number of reported crimes at or outside St James’s Palace
Q4 - The number of reported crimes at or outside Clarence House

In relation to Questions 1 - 4, the recorded total number of crimes at and outside these locations is as follows:

Time Period	Number of Crimes
01/09/2022 - 31/08/2023	350
01/09/2023 – 31/10/2023	61

Q5 - For each of the first four requests, please could you provide a brief summary of each reported crime (i.e the details written in the MO field of the crime report)

Regarding Question 5, although I am unable to provide a summary of each crime, I am able to confirm that the recorded Major Offence Category of these recorded crimes is as follows:

Category	01/09/2022 - 31/08/2023
Arson and Criminal Damage	1
Drug Offences	4
Miscellaneous Crimes Against Society	1
Possession of Weapons*	8
Public Order Offences	7
Robbery	2
Sexual Offences	7
Theft	314
Violence Against the Person	6

 

Category	01/09/2023 – 31/10/2023
Possession of Weapons*	2
Public Order Offences	1
Robbery	1
Theft	55
Violence Against the Person	2

* Please note the following important contextual information regarding the possession of weapons offences. In the vast majority of cases these are incapacitating sprays and smaller knives that have been found on visitors to Buckingham Palace through the security screening process. These visitors are usually foreign nationals having items in their possession, unknowingly committing an offence in the UK.

Q6 - For each of the first four requests, please could you provide the outcome of each reported crime if known (i.e. if a suspect was arrested, charged or no further action taken).

For Question 6, the outcomes for these recorded crimes is as follows:

Category	01/09/2022 - 31/08/2023
Charged/Summonsed	3
Charged/Summonsed Alternate Offence	1
Caution - adult	1
Community Resolution	3
Evidential difficulties victim based	15
Susp id; V supports; evidential difficulties	15
Susp id; V not support; evidential difficulties	1
Invest. complete: no susp id	310
Prosecution prev. – suspect ill	1

 

Category	01/09/2023 – 31/10/2023
Community Resolution	1
Evidential difficulties victim based	2
Susp id; V supports; evidential difficulties	2
Susp id; V not support; evidential difficulties	2
Invest. complete: no susp id	54