Items/substances detained by officers providing security in the Palace of Westminster

 

I note you seek access to the following information:

 

Could you please provide me with information on items/substances detained by officers providing security in the Palace of Westminster for the last 9 months previous to today’s date? 

 

Further to the above could you also provide a list of crimes charged against persons on the Parliamentary estate over the same timeframe? 

 

Clarification - Dear Sirs 

 

Thank you for your clarification email, please find further details to assist you 

 

Your point 1 - seizures 

Point 2 - during a search of people entering or on the grounds of the Palace of Westminster 

Point 3 - I would prefer both but happy with actual charges. I hope that clears up your points, if I can be of any further assistance please do not hesitate to ask 

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information.  Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

 

Section 31(1)(a)(b) – Law Enforcement

 

In addition, the Metropolitan Police Service can neither confirm nor deny whether it holds any further information relevant to this request as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act ) does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:

 

Section 30(3) – Investigations and Proceedings 

Section 40(5) – Personal Information

 

 

The MPS is unable to respond to requests for data covering part monthly data, as providing offence and charging data in this way would enable the possibility of crime patterns on the Parliamentary Estate to be exposed through multiple individual requests.  This would hinder the prevention and detection of crime and therefore Section 31(1)(a)(b) of the Act is engaged.  

 

Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement - A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction.  Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under the Act, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual.   Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant to provide part monthly crime data, which have resulted in charges being brought, where the location of the crime has been provided could allow for crime patterns to be identified.  

 

Whilst this data may appear harmless in itself, this pieced together with other disclosures can be used in a ‘mosaic effect’ to give a fuller picture to those wishing to evade detection and valuable intelligence to criminals.  They could use this information to identify the types of crimes which occur on the estate and are more likely to result in charges being brought. To this end it could either aid their criminal planning/activity and/or assist with the opportunity to realise whether any crimes committed had been detected and charges brought.

 

This ‘cumulative prejudice’ or the ‘mosaic effect’ whereby the information requested may be of increased significance when combined with other information obtained through other means and/or at a later date. The ‘mosaic’ effect has been described as follows: 

 

‘The “mosaic theory” describes a basic precept of intelligence gathering: Disparate items of information, though individually of limited or no utility to their possessor, can take on added significance when combined with other items of information. Combining the items illuminates their interrelationships and breeds analytic synergies, so that the resulting mosaic of information is worth more than the sum of its parts.’ - Source: David Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 Yale L. J. 628, 630 (2005).

 

Therefore, disclosure could be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public and might require the MPS to actually have to increase the amount of officers available to them, thus increasing the cost to the public purse.

 

The public interest is not what interests the public but what will be of greater good if released to the community as a whole. It is not in the public interest to disclose information that may compromise the MPS’ ability to accomplish its core functions of law enforcement.

 

Disclosure of part monthly data would compromise law enforcement by providing an insight into the nature of offences recorded at a specific location and the outcome of the police’s investigation.  This pieced with other information either requested under FOIA or already in the public domain would therefore assist offenders in gauging what type of crime is likely to go undetected at a specific location and the potential for whether their involvement in a crime was known.  Such a disclosure could increase the probability of crimes being committed, which cannot be in the public interest.

 

The Police service will not divulge information if to do so would undermine law enforcement and therefore compromise the work of the Police Service.  

 

There is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the Police Service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by various groups or individuals. However, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of crime prevention on the Parliamentary Estate. 

 

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced  this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.  The areas of police interest is a sensitive issue that reveals local intelligence. The Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve.  Any disclosure of information, which could assist an offender and prejudice the MPS’s ability to bring that perpetrator to justice, cannot be in the public interest.  

 

Additionally, the Metropolitan Police Service can neither confirm or deny whether it holds any further information relevant to this request as the duty in Section 1 (1) (a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:

 

Section 30(3) – Investigations and Proceedings 

Section 40(5) – Personal Information

 

Section 30 - Investigations and proceedings conducted by public authorities - To confirm or deny the existence of any further information relating to crimes reported as occurring on the Parliamentary Estate, would be commenting on information which might or might not form part of an investigation. This would hinder the prevention or detection of crime.  The MPS would not wish to confirm or deny that any further data is held relating to an offence which had been investigated and where the outcome to the judicial process has not yet concluded, as this would clearly undermine the law enforcement and investigative process.

 

The most persuasive reasons for confirming or denying any further information is held would be greater assurance to the public that any reported crimes to the police are investigated thoroughly and would give an indication of the level of crime that is being reported in this area. 

 

However, this needs to be weighed against the strongest negative reason, which, in this case, is to confirm or deny any further information is held would compromise and undermine the MPS’s law enforcement capabilities in its ability to prevent and detect crime.  The effectiveness of any ongoing investigations may be compromised as potential offenders would be alerted and able to identify the focus of police activity.  They could then take steps to disrupt this investigation and evade prosecution, which could ultimately lead to the need for more police resources.  

 

Alternatively, by confirming that any further criminal investigations have taken place, but the judicial process was still ongoing, would allow perpetrators to identify whether their involvement in a crime had been detected.  

 

Therefore, it is our opinion, after weighing up the competing interests, I believe that the balance test favours neither confirmation nor denial.

 

Section 40(5A)&(5B)(a)(i)  - Personal Information - Section 40 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 is designed to address information that is covered by the Data Protection Act 2018. 

 

Under section 40(5), the MPS is not required to comply with the requirements of section 1(1) (a) i.e. the duty to inform the applicant whether or not the information is held. 

 

In most cases Personal Data is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act as I will explain below.

 

To confirm or deny whether personal information exists could publicly reveal information about an identifiable individual or individuals, thereby breaching the right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act (DPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2018. 

 

Where an individual is requesting his or her own personal data the information is always exempt.  Such information can be requested under other legislation.

Where an individual is requesting third party personal data the MPS must ensure that any action taken adheres to the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 and the GDPR.  To clarify, the Freedom of Information Act only allows disclosure of personal data if that disclosure would be compliant with the principles for processing personal data.  These principles are outlined under section 34 of the DPA 2018 and under Article 5 of the GDPR.

 

 

Please see below for information pursuant to your request. This data was recorded on the Crime Report Information System (CRIS), which is a database where information relating to criminal activity and its investigation is recorded. The live data captured covers the period 01/12/2022 to 31/08/2023, which has been provided in line with the exemption and rationale cited above.

 

 

The definition for the collated requested data was as follows:

 

Live data was extracted from CRIS on 10/10/2023.

 

Standard Offences query was used, where the free text Venue Address matched the following phrase patterns (where a % wildcard):

 

%SW1A%OAA%

 

The returned records were reviewed and any records deemed not relevant were discarded.

 

The table below shows the items detained by police officers at the House of Parliament, SW1A 0AA.

Items detained

Bladed Article

Knife

Lock Knife

Pepper Spray

Please note the following important contextual information regarding the above weapons seized.   In the vast majority of cases these would have been found on visitors to the estate through security screening.  These visitors are usually foreign nationals having such items in their possession and unknowingly committing an offence in the UK.

 

 

In regards to this part of your request the MPS is only able to provide data on charging outcomes and People Proceeded Against (PPA) by outcome.

 

Please note that this data was originally collated based on the following criteria:

 

•Live data was extracted from CRIS on 10/01/2024.

 

• There is no standard/set way to identify crimes recorded within the Parliamentary Estate (PE).

 

• The many buildings on the PE are spread over an area of approximately 0.08 sq. miles.

 

•A .tab file polygon layer was created within MapInfo™ following the building outline of each of the relevant buildings/locations replicating an internal MPS map of the PE.

 

•This report is based on GeoCoded Notifiable Crime data extracted from within a number of building polygon shapes created in a MapInfo layer drawn around a selection of buildings/locations on Westminster Borough identified by the MPS as the PE.

 

 

 

• Generally MPS notifiable crime data is geocoded at 97-99% accuracy, depending on crime sub categories. There will be crimes that an MPS Borough owns in terms of investigations but which are actually located on a neighbouring Borough or outside the MPS boundary.

 

•In theory, the GeoCoded crime data set extracted from within the PE building polygons should have a relationship to those buildings, however after dip sampling a random number of VEN Address and CLASS Method (summary of the crime) fields, some of those crimes had occurred elsewhere or nearby.

 

• It is also possible that the location of the crime recorded on CRIS is due to it being the nearest prominent landmark to where the actual offence occurred and in some cases may have had nothing to do with that specific building location.

 

•The VEN Address Location can be prefixed with "Outside", "Opposite" or "Near" when being recorded and may or may not be available depending on the system used to extract the raw data.

 

• The way parts of Central London have been built over time, one building on top of another building/arcade of shops/tunnel/London Underground, etc., does cause some counting & accuracy issues.

The same is true for some of these PE building polygons which can be on top of public thoroughfares (such as London Underground) where other crimes have been recorded.

 

The CRIS records returned were then reviewed by PaDP and any crimes not occurring on the Estate discounted.

 

The table below lists the notifiable charged outcomes recorded by the MPS geocoded to specific locations on the Parliamentary Estate by the outcome charged date between 01/12/2022 and 31/08/2023.

Offence Sub Group Category

Violence without Injury

Shoplifting

Criminal Damage

Racially or Religiously Aggravated Public Fear, Alarm or Distress

Other Accepted Crime

The table below lists the notifiable People Proceeded Against by way of charge recorded by the MPS geocoded to specific locations on the Parliamentary Estate by the Proceedings Date between 01/12/2022 and 31/08/2023.

 

Note: There can be multiple Accused People per crime report but they are recorded on the exact same crime reports to the Charged Outcome data above

 

Offence Sub Group Category

Violence without Injury

Shoplifting

Criminal Damage