Current ATM crime, attacks & crime prevention from 2019 to 2022

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.033469

I note you seek access to the following information:

Initial request -
1. An overview of the current ATM crime situation in the Greater London area.

2. Data on ATM attacks, for the period spanning 2019 to 2022. We require data broken down by:
• Modus operandi employed in these attacks (e.g., explosives, uprooting, others).
• Geographic distribution by province (to enable us to create a geographical incidence map).
• Monthly incident data.
• Economic losses resulting from these attacks, including stolen funds and property damage.
• Classification of explosives used (solid, gas, etc.).
• The status of these crimes (completed or attempted).
• Any additional pertinent information, such as the nationality of suspects, arrest statistics, and behavioral characteristics of offenders, which would greatly contribute to our analysis.

3. Crime prevention:
• Insights into the crime prevention measures implemented within the Greater London area to mitigate physical attacks on ATMs.
• Identification of institutions responsible for monitoring and enforcing these preventative measures.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 23(5) - Information relating to the Security Bodies
Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(2) - Personal Information

Reason for decision

Section 23(5) - Information relating to the Security Bodies - Having considered the requested list for release, I have determined that some of the information you have requested should be withheld under section 23(5) of the Act which relates to security bodies specified in section 23(5), although it is also possible that the information relates to none of these bodies.

Confirming or denying the existence of whether any other information is held would contravene the constrictions laid out within Section 23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in that this stipulates a generic bar on disclosure of any information applied by, or concerning, certain Security Bodies.

Section 31(1)(a)&(b) - Law Enforcement - The disclosure of information which is likely to undermine the Police service’s ability to serve the public in preventing and detecting crime can only be considered as being harmful to the public by revealing geographical detail and crime prevention measures implemented within the Greater London area to mitigate physical attacks on ATMs.

It is not in the public interest to disclose any information that could be used by those with the necessary intent to hinder the prevention or detection of crime and use it to the detriment of the community and public at large.

Individuals may be less inclined to call/make contact with the police for assistance regarding their own security concerns if they believe the MPS also routinely disclose any crime prevention measures implemented to mitigate physical attacks on ATMs, in turn criminals could target less protected ATMs.

Revealing geographical detail of the policing activity into criminal groups within the Metropolitan Police area could compromise the security of those buildings. It would allow people with hostile intent to more easily work out which buildings are either high profile or have a higher security risk associated with them, which is not in the public interest.

An increase of crime in turn would also negatively impact on police resources if an adverse FOIA disclosure is used to undermine the safety of individuals. This is particularly so if further resources are used to mitigate action by those who may try and used the information as intelligence in a negative way to place individuals at risk, which is not in the public interest.

The Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of operational policing, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the safety of the MPS and the general public.

Public safety is of paramount importance and any information which would place individuals at risk, no matter how generic, is not in the public interest. The effective delivery of operational law enforcement is crucial and of paramount importance to MPS. Any disclosure would have a negative impact on law enforcement.
As much as there is a public interest in knowing that the delivery of law enforcement is appropriate and balanced, this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.

I consider that the benefit that would result from the information being disclosed does not outweigh the considerations favouring non-disclosure.

Section 40(2)&(3A)(a) - Personal Information - The public release of information that would lead to identification would be unexpected, unfair and distressing to the data subject(s). It could also lead to unwanted and unsolicited intrusion from the media and/or other interested parties. In this regard, the disclosure of information that would lead to identification would constitute a disproportionate interference with the right to privacy of the data subject(s) and be likely to cause unwarranted harm to them. Specifically:

• Economic losses resulting from these attacks, including stolen funds and property damage.
• Any additional pertinent information, such as the nationality of suspects, arrest statistics, and behavioural characteristics of offenders, which would greatly contribute to our analysis.

Q1 - An overview of the current ATM crime situation in the Greater London area.

Please note for Q1 – This information is not held by the MPS.

Disclosure

Q2 Data on ATM attacks, for the period spanning 2019 to 2022. We require data broken down by:
• Modus operandi employed in these attacks (e.g., explosives, uprooting, others).

Year/ MO	Black Box	Cutting	Drag Out	Explosives	Force	Gas	Other	Ram-Raid	Total
2019	17	10	9	1	12	4	2	1	56
2020	21	4	9		6	2	6	2	50
2021	1	1	3		3				8
2022		1	5		4		1	1	12
Total	39	16	26	1	25	6	5	4	126

• Monthly incident data.

Year/Month	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
2019	4	7	8	4	6	2	1	5		8	4	7	56
2020	19	6	8	2		1	3	1	7		1	2	50
2021			1	1	1		1			2	1	1	8
2022	1	1	1			1	1	1			3	3	12
Total	24	14	18	7	7	4	6	7	7	10	9	13	126

• The status of these crimes (completed or attempted).

14% of these ATM attacks were successful.

• Identification of institutions responsible for monitoring and enforcing these preventative measures.

There is no institution responsible for monitoring and enforcing crime prevention measures in the UK. UK police forces have their own crime prevention staff who give advice during planning permission of new ATMS only.