State Opening of Parliament

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.034277

I note you seek access to the following information:

Please provide correspondence and records you hold relating to the application from Republic for permission to protest/use amplification equipment on Parliament Square on 7 November.

The correspondence and records would include (but not be limited to) emails/messages to and from Westminster City Council, the PoW security hub, the House of Commons authorities and the House of Lords authorities, the Home Office, as well as internal emails/messages and records relating to the application.

The request is for documents dated 1 September 2023 to today's date.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 31(1)(a)(b) – Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)(3)&(4) - Personal Information

Reason for decision

Section 40(2)(3)&(4) - Personal Information - is applicable to named individuals, signatures, email addresses, shoulder numbers, contact telephone number, reference numbers and warrant numbers.

Some of the recipients’ and senders names.

Having considered the release of each piece of identified personal data, I have found, having considered the legitimate interest test, that the staff/officers do not hold a decision-making role. The release of their name is not accordingly, necessary to demonstrate how the record was composed. The removal of the staff/officers/stakeholders’ name does not detract from the quality of the record.

In addition, some emails contain information, word documents and maps relating to MPS intelligence.

Section 31(1) - Law Enforcement - The MPS considers that disclosure of identified parts of the information contained within the relevant emails would cause operational harm to the MPS and affect its ability to fulfil our core function of law enforcement effectively in the future.

The emails make reference to police tactics, intelligence and MPS resources. This poses possible risks to security/the operation or possible obstacles/difficulties to demonstrations, which could impact on the planning and security of current and future event. Disclosure of the information also enables those who seek to partake in criminal activity, the ability to plan criminal action by taking into account exactly what type of action can potentially put an additional strain on police resources.

To enable the public to be better informed about the intelligence, capabilities and resources available to the MPS when formatting their strategies and tactics, would greatly impact on police resources and future planning. Whilst the majority of demonstrators are peaceful, there are some who would seek to obtain tactical and strategic detail within these documents to improve on their plans to avoid being detected and apprehended at a demonstration during or after disorder. Some demonstrators will often do all they can to cause a breach of the peace, by trying to evade the police at demonstrations. To disclose the exempt information contained within the relevant emails is likely to impact on police resources, should the MPS continually have to change their considered plans of action, tactics and methodology as a result of an FOIA disclosure.

Disclosure of that information would place the public at greater risk at future demonstrations, if the MPS disclosed the sensitive detail contained within the relevant emails.

It is considered that disclosure would hinder the ability of the MPS to prevent crime or breach of the peace at future demonstrations if the public become aware of the resources and capabilities available to the MPS at specific points in time. This information can be used to try and evade future detection at demonstrations. This is particularly so if the public are aware of what type of intelligence and resources the MPS are likely to have available and use, as it also indicates what information they are unlikely to obtain and decisions they may take in a given difficult circumstance.
In addition, the section 31 exemption applies to the disclosure of the email addresses of senior members of staff, this would provide persons intent on disrupting the work of the MPS, with information that would assist them to do so. In this regard, a person within this intent would be likely to use this information to make inappropriate contact with senior members of staff or send them vast amounts of unsolicited correspondence. This would tie up the resources of these senior members of staff and cause disruption to the work of the MPS.

The relevant emails contain discussions as regards the policing of sensitive issues namely the policing of public order events.
It is not in the public interest to disclose the withheld information which contains law enforcement tactics and methodology. The tactics and methodology could be utilised when planning for future protests and demonstrations made by this and other organisations. It is also not in the public interest to disclose information that demonstrates the capabilities and intelligence available to the MPS at specific points in time.

The withheld information would assist those planning to commit acts of violence. Disclosure of the type of intelligence and capabilities available to the police at a specific point in time would enable individual's intent on committing criminal activity to circumvent methods deployed to keep the peace. This in turn hinders the ability of the MPS to prevent and detect crime when planning for future demonstrations, which would not be in the interest of the public.

There are likely to be individuals who seek to obtain tactical and strategic details. This information can be used to improve their criminal plans on avoiding detection and apprehension at a demonstration, whilst placing individuals at greater risk. It would not be in the public interest to disclose the exempt information as it is likely to impact on the MPS.

The MPS considers that disclosure of sensitive operational information would place the public at greater risk at future demonstrations and would place the public at greater risk of unlawful behaviour if would-be criminals are provided the sensitive tactical and intelligence. This is contrary to the public interest.

It would not be in the public interest to provide law enforcement tactics around these large-scale demonstrations.

The strongest reason favouring disclosure is that it would enable MPS openness and transparency, this could enhance public confidence.

Disclosure would hinder the ability of the MPS to prevent and detect crime at future demonstrations, if they become aware of the resources and capabilities available to the MPS. This information can be used to try and evade future detection at demonstrations. This is particularly so if the public are aware of what type of intelligence and resources the MPS are likely to have available and use, as it also indicates what information they are not likely or unlikely to obtain and decisions they may take in a given difficult circumstance.

For all of the above reasons the MPS considers that in all the circumstances of this case, the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosure.

Disclosure

Please find below redacted emails dated 1 September to 27 November 2023 (the date of your FOI request).