Health and Safety Executive (HSE) - conducted by the MPS post the murder of Sgt Ratana in police custody

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.034287

I note you seek access to the following information:

Please can I obtain information in relation to the Health and Safety investigation conducted by the MPS post the murder of Sgt Matt Ratana in police custody. Specifically:

A) The H&S report compiled by the MPS which was submitted to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE).

B) The subsequent investigation report compiled by the HSE which was returned to the MPS.

C) The MPS action tracker or policy/standard operating procedure changes which were made following receipt of the HSE report.

D) Minutes of Safety meetings by MPS management board in which the HSE report was discussed.

E) A list of changes in relation to police Safety that have been made by the MPS as a result of this incident.

F) Details of how the Met has shared any of the learning from this incident nationally.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 30(1)(a) – Investigations and Proceedings Conducted by Public Authorities
Section 31(1)(a) and (b) - Law Enforcement

Reason for decision

Section 30(1)(a) - Investigations and proceedings conducted by public authorities - Information held by a public authority is exempt information if it has at any time been held by the authority for the purposes of (a) any investigation which the public authority has a duty to conduct with a view to it being ascertained - (i) whether a person should be charged with an offence, or (ii) whether a person charged with an offence is guilty of it,

The exemption provided by Section 30(1)(a) have been utilised, as the Act allows an authority to exempt information where it has, at any time, been held for the purpose of specified criminal and other investigations or proceedings; and where it relates to the obtaining of information from confidential sources and was obtained or recorded for a number of specified investigations or proceedings.

Under the Act we cannot and do not request the motives of any applicant for information. We have no doubt the vast majority of applications under the Act are legitimate and do not have any ulterior motives, however in disclosing information to one applicant we are expressing a willingness to provide it to anyone in the world. This means that a disclosure to a genuinely interested applicant automatically opens it up for a similar disclosure to anyone.

The MPS does not generally disclose information from investigations except through our Directorate of Media & Communication to the media.

Disclosure of information may cause an investigation to collapse or cause the confidence in the police to be undermined.

Information Held in Connection with Police Investigations - Information that was obtained by the MPS for the purpose of a criminal investigation, is retained upon the understanding that its use will be limited to the criminal investigation and/or any related proceedings. There is no current policy nor practice for information that was obtained and is retained for a criminal investigation, to be made available under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

By its very nature, information held relating to investigations is sensitive. The MPS does not generally disclose information from investigations except through our Directorate of Media & Communication (DMC) to the media in a careful and managed way. Therefore, those involved directly or indirectly in the investigation, would not expect the MPS to make the information requested available under the Freedom of Information Act.

It is not in the public interest to disclose any information held regarding any investigations under FOIA. It is important the MPS protect the integrity of any investigations and information is only released through DMC.

Taking the above into consideration, it would therefore be inappropriate to release this information to the general public.

The MPS is satisfied that the case is not made out for the release of the requested information and finds that the preservation of investigative matters far outweighs any disclosure in this case and is therefore satisfied that section 30(1)(a) is appropriately engaged.  

Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement - of the Act have been utilised, as the Act allows an authority to exempt information, if its disclosure under the Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice the prevention or detection of crime or the apprehension or prosecution of offenders.

Taking the above harm under section 30 (the release of the report) into considering whether or not information relating to this request (minutes of meeting held) should be disclosed. I have considered the additional potential harm under this part of the act that could be caused by disclosure.

The MPS will not provide information that we believe would prejudice law enforcement or any information that would reveal policing tactics or compromise law enforcement procedures. This would undermine the operational integrity of our activities, which would adversely affect law enforcement.

The MPS has a statutory role in investigating criminal offences and deploys a range of investigative tactics and strategies to do so. However to disclose minutes on Board Intelligence, having received a letter from the HSE, other than the material already published would be detrimental to law enforcement.

Whilst release of the requested information would reinforce the MPS commitment as an open and transparent organisation, this has to be balanced against the harm that would be caused on how the MPS would treat any information which formed part of any investigation.

The MPS acknowledges the public interest in this matter, however, when considering the harm of disclosure, the MPS has to be mindful that to release information that was obtained as part of a police investigation might reveal to others.

Our ability to gather information to perform our public service functions is paramount. Releasing further information other than the material already published would therefore have a negative impact, to enable us to conduct our roles fully.

The MPS will only disclose information concerning investigations when it considers that no harm will be caused to the investigative process or any individual involved in the investigation.

The MPS is satisfied that the case is not made out for the release of the requested information and finds that the preservation of investigative matters far outweighs any disclosure in this case and is therefore satisfied that section 31(1)(a) and (b) is appropriately engaged.

Before I explain the reasons for the decisions I have made in relation to your request, I thought that it would be helpful if I outline the parameters set out by the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) within which a request for information can be answered.

When a request is made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act), a public authority must inform you, when permitted, whether the information requested is held. It must then communicate that information to you. If a public authority decides that it is cannot comply with all or part of a request, it must cite the appropriate section or exemption of the Act and provide you with a suitable explanation. It is important to note that the Act is designed to place information into the public domain, that is, once access to information is granted to one person under the Act, it is then considered public information and must be communicated to any individual should a request be received.

I have considered your request for information regarding:

The Health and Safety investigation conducted by the MPS, post the murder of Sgt Matt Ratana in police custody.

QA - The H&S report compiled by the MPS which was submitted to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE).

The HSE conducted an independent investigation and the Met provided many documents. There was a separate internal Met Health & Safety review, which produced its own report, this was one of the documents submitted to the HSE.

This report, in line with your request, titled Operation Sedgebrook Health and Safety Review with Recommendations, Version 3 - is exempt from disclosure by virtue of the following exemption - Section 30(1)(a) – Investigations and Proceedings Conducted by Public Authorities

To disclose any further information other than the material already published would undermine the integrity of investigations. Its public release would also be contrary to the general expectation / understanding that police investigations are confidential.

I also considered your request:

QD - Minutes of Safety meetings by MPS management board in which the HSE report was discussed.

The MPS did not receive an investigated report from the HSE. The letter received from the HSE was considered at the MPS Risk and Assessment Board on 07/06/2022.

The minutes on Board Intelligence, is exempt from disclosure by virtue of the following exemption - Section 31(1)(a)&(b) - Law Enforcement

Disclosure

In response to your request:

QB - The subsequent investigation report compiled by the HSE which was returned to the MPS.

The HSE independently investigated the circumstances surrounding the fatal shooting of Police Sergeant Matt Ratana. The MPS did not received an investigation report from the HSE, but received a letter setting out their findings and actions required of the MPS.

The HSE required the MPS take action in four areas – the proactive supervision and monitoring of spontaneous searches, risk assessments for spontaneous searching on the street, a review of search training, and a review of risk identification and management systems. The HSE have confirmed that they are satisfied with the MPS response and action taken, which meets their requirements.

QC - The MPS action tracker or policy/standard operating procedure changes which were made following receipt of the HSE report.

Since September 2020. In regard to organisational learning, the IOPC made a recommendation for national policing to consider around the use of metal search wands.

The Met has made good progress regarding the more widespread use of hand held search wands before the IOPC concluded their investigation. We had already begun in June 2019 to use hand-held wands operationally on the streets to assist with searches. Within weeks of the incident a decision was taken to increase the screening wand capacity across the MPS and we began a roll-out of hand held search wands to vehicles used to transport suspects and other frontline operational vehicles. The Met now has a total of 4,300 wands deployed for use across the force for trained officers across custody and in vehicles, and a pool of devices for use by officers on foot/cycle patrol.

QE - A list of changes in relation to police Safety that have been made by the MPS as a result of this incident.

A number of changes have been made since September 2020.

- New searching rooms have been set up in custody suites where the existing building design makes it possible. This allows a more focused search before entering custody to improve safety for all those involved.

- All Met custody suites are equipped with the latest upgraded model of metal handheld wands
- Personal radios have been issued to all 23 custody suites making it quicker and easier to relay real-time information.

- MPS had conducted an initiative that saw experts in searches of detainees observe officers during the booking in procedure, as they came into custody, while they handled suspects, and made sure searches followed the correct procedures. Officers receive a personal debrief to increase their knowledge and confidence.

- The Met have installed the force’s first body scanner in a South London custody suite. The scanner is similar to that used in the aviation industry, but tailored to the specific needs of a custody suite. Preliminary testing has been completed and the device is being used during a three month live pilot. The introduction of the device is a further tool to improve the security of our staff and will also assist in the ongoing welfare of detainees in custody.

The body scanner is being used as part of the current triage procedure that takes place when a detainee arrives at the custody suite, and will be an additional requirement after the initial search, prior to being placed in a holding cell / being booked in.

The system being trialled within a custody environment produces an image of the detainee which is analysed by a human being – either a Dedicated Detention Officer / or police officer – and can identify a wide ranges of threats and contraband which could be a risk to the safety of the custody environment and those within it.

To our knowledge after extensive research, the Met will be the first British police force to implement this technology.

QF - Details of how the Met has shared any of the learning from this incident nationally.

The Health and Safety Executive wrote to all Chief Constables for all forces in December 2022, setting out recommendations in relation to Police Search activities and Custody Suites, which the MPS are specifically referenced as providing assistance with nationally.

Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) also shared learning nationally, which the MPS supported.

The MPS also provided the learning set out above, with the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) leads for custody and searching.