Email correspondence relating to a platform by Cenotaph in Whitehall on 15 October 2023

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.033356

I note you seek access to the following information:

Please advise what, if any, permission, consent or comment your office made on any request to set up a platform by the Cenotaph in Whitehall on 15 October 2023.

Please provide copies of any email correspondence relating to this matter.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section S40(2) & S40(3A)(a) – Personal Information (in regards to redacted named individuals and personal information connected to them)

Section 31(1)(a) - Law Enforcement (in respect of redacted call sign data)

Reason for decision

It is important to note that a Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under Freedom of Information, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world and not just to one individual. Recently the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was been introduced across the European Union (EU) and the European Economic Area (EEA).

In respect of the United Kingdom, GDPR was enshrined in UK law through the Data Protection Act 2018. The MPS, like all UK public authorities are obliged to comply with the Data Protection Act 2018 and this includes the protection of personal data. Information captured by your request, can fairly be considered "personal data" and sensitive, with a clear identifiable link.

In most cases, personal data is exempt from disclosure under the remit of the Freedom of Information Act. Where an individual is requesting third party personal data the MPS must ensure that any action taken adheres to the principles of GDPR/ the Data Protection Act 2018.

To clarify, the Freedom of Information Act only allows disclosure of personal data if that disclosure would be compliant with that law. The disclosure of the information you have requested must be carefully managed in order to ensure that there is no prejudice to any person in any possible way, however remote.

The Section 40(2) (Personal Information) exemption is an absolute and class-based exemption and if a request for information relates to third parties, it is absolute under Section 40(2) if disclosure would not adhere to the principles of GDPR/ the Data Protection Act 2018. There is therefore no requirement to either evidence harm in disclosure or conduct a public interest test.

Section 40(2)(3A)(a) – Personal Information - of the Act provides that any information to which a request for information relates, is exempt information if the first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) is satisfied. The first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) states that personal information is exempt if its disclosure would contravene any of the data protection principles. If the disclosure of the requested personal data would not contravene the data protection principles, the disclosure must also not contravene Sections 3A(b) and 3B of the Act.

There are six principles that are set out in Article 5(1)(a) of the General Data Protection Regulations (UK GDPR) that dictate when the processing of personal data is lawful. The first principle requires that any processing of personal data must be lawful, fair and transparent. Under Article 6(1)(f) of the UK GDPR, the disclosure of personal data is considered to be lawful if:

a. There is a legitimate interest in the disclosure of that personal data.
b. The disclosure of the personal data is necessary to meet that legitimate interest.
c. The disclosure would not cause unwarranted harm to the data subject.

The requested records contain the following types of personal data that I consider exempt under the Act:

1. Personal information relating to a living individual

Having considered the release of the identified personal data, the MPS has found, having considered the legitimate interest test, that, whilst there is a slight element of public interest in the recorded information, the information requested is uniquely personal to an individual in the context of their personal life.

The disclosure of the requested information under FOIA legislation is not necessary to meet a legitimate interest, particularly when considering the distress that is likely to be caused with the disclosure of personal information via a FOIA request if they were to self-identify themselves or be identified.

There is also no reasonable expectation that the specific information you have requested should be disclosed under FOIA into the public domain irrespective of the role of the individual in this case.

Legitimate interest in the information does not outweigh the interests and rights of the individual.

The provision to refuse access to information under Section 40(2)(a)(b) and (3A)(a) of the Act is both absolute and class based. When this exemption is claimed it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to demonstrate what that harm may be in refusing access to information.

Section 31(1)(a) - Law Enforcement - The MPS is required to establish the nature of the prejudice/harm that would result from disclosure and where prejudice/harm is established but not certain, determine the likelihood of it occurring. The MPS has considered the potential harm that could be caused by disclosure.

The MPS approach and information held regarding use of call signs better identifies the skills and capabilities of a particular unit, which could be of intelligence value to a person or persons with criminal or malicious intent.

The public release of the Met’s current call signs, should a criminal gain access to a police radio, inform the offender of the location and capability of MPS assets and/or the information that has been relayed to them. This would likely disrupt local policing and assist the offender to avoid detection.

The release and publication of the Met’s call sign information within the requested information would provide persons intent disrupting the work of the MPS and/or evading detection by police, with information that would assist them in this endeavour.

Knowledge of these skills and capabilities could therefore provide enable targeted malicious actions, be that some form of attack on an operational unit, or avoiding that unit.

This concern with harm in disclosure is set in the context of the current threat level, both now and possible near future events of a geo-political nature.

This methodological and resource related data could be used by those with the necessary intent to hinder the prevention of crime when is seeking to undermine police activity.

An adverse FOIA disclosure could increase criminal behaviour (if the data is used to build an intelligence picture) which in turn would impact on police resources if an adverse FOIA disclosure is used to undermine the safety of individuals. This is particularly so if further resources are required to be used to mitigate action by those who may try and used the information as intelligence in a negative way to place individuals at risk in localised areas.

Disclosure of information that enables the police to police effectively and security would likely lead to a chilling effect in terms of the erosion of trust in police, resulting in an under-reporting of crime.

The public release of the Met’s current call signs, should a criminal gain access to a police radio, would go some way towards informing offenders of the location and capability of MPS assets. This would disrupt local policing and assist the offender to avoid detection.

The release and publication of the Met’s call sign details would provide persons intent disrupting the work of the MPS and/or evading detection by police, with information that would assist them in this endeavour.

It is not in the public interest to disclose any resource intelligence that could be used by those with the necessary intent to hinder the prevention or detection of crime and use it to the detriment of the community and public at large.

Individuals may be less inclined to call the police for assistance if they believe the MPS routinely disclose methodology that lets them undertake their work safely. Public trust in how the police works, not just in relation to its handling of personal data, is vital.

An increase of crime in turn would impact on police resources if an adverse FOIA disclosure is used to undermine the safety of individuals, particularly if further resources are needed to mitigate action by those who may try and used the information as intelligence in a negative way to place individuals at further risk.

Disclosure would harm the ability of the MPS to prevent and detect crime as call signs are assigned to specific MPS units, vehicles and/or officers and are used to contact them, provide them with information and/or direct them to incidents.

Should a criminal gain access to a police radio, detailed call sign information would inform offenders of the location and capability of MPS assets and/or the information that has been relayed to them. This would be likely to disrupt local policing and assist the offender to avoid detection.

Ultimately the public release of this information would be likely the adversely affect the ability of the MPS to prevent and detect crime and apprehend those that commit offences, contrary to the public interest.

The strongest consideration favouring disclosure is to provide the public with a greater awareness of how the MPS works. The public interest favouring release must be balanced against any associated risk and/or prejudice that would be caused through disclosure.

The strongest reason favouring non-disclosure is ensuring the sensitive technical and secure resource related data is not used to undermine policing by hindering the prevention or detection of crime or undermine public confidence in the ability of the MPS to undertake its work. The public release of the Met’s current call signs, should a criminal gain access to a police radio, would go towards informing would be offenders of the location and capability of MPS assets and/or the information that has been relayed to them. This would disrupt local policing and assist the offender to avoid detection.

After weighing up the competing interests we have determined that the disclosure of the information in full would not be in the public interest. We consider that the benefit that would result from the information being disclosed does not outweigh the considerations favouring non-disclosure.

I appreciate this is not the decision you would have liked. However this decision is based on the understanding that the public interest is not what interests the public, but is what would be of greater good to the community as a whole if particular information were disclosed.

Disclosure

The MPS met with PSC on the 12 October 2023 at 1300 hours. That meeting led to the following log entry by the Silver commander:

Entry 12, 1300hrs on 12 Oct...
Stage - MPS concerns around climbing, including on the Cenotaph. PSC will have stewarding plan around this. Also stewarding plan across the front of DS. PSC still deciding the exact spot where they will have the stage. MPS explained that they will need to engage with WCC for permission to do this. MPS preference for the north side of DS, avoiding crowds against the barriers at DS. PSC concerns around number of people that could fit in this space. Reassured MPS from previous marches, can probably fit 50,000 in this space. No plan to move into P. Sq.

In addition, the MPS has been able to provide you with the following three documents:

• A redacted email from the PSC to the MPS concerning the stage which is the only email exchanged with the organisers on this point;
• An email from the company used by the PSC to set up the stage to the MPS;
• An email addressing conversations with the organisers about the stage.

Please find information disclosed to you today which does not enable the identification any living individual.