Covid enquiry related information

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.24.034845

I note you seek access to the following information:

Since the beginning of the national covid enquiry lead by Baroness Hallet, which minsters of government have used a vehicle provided for ministerial/senior civil servant use to travel to and from the enquiry by yourselves?

Further to the above what is the total cost to date to provide such a service to the minister/civil servant(s)?

Finally have any non current former ministers of government been provided with a vehicle you have access to and what cost to date has been accrued for these persons to use said vehicle to travel to/from the national covid enquiry?

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) and in addition, the MPS can neither confirm or deny whether it holds any further information relating to this request as the duty in Section 1 (1) (a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 24(2) – National Security
Section 31(3) – Law Enforcement
Section 40(5) – Personal Information

Reason for decision

Further to the above what is the total cost to date to provide such a service to the minister/civil servant(s)?

Finally have any non current former ministers of government been provided with a vehicle you have access to and what cost to date has been accrued for these persons to use said vehicle to travel to/from the national covid enquiry?

With regards to the costs incurred, unfortunately this information is not held. I would like to take opportunity to explain why the information sought is not held by the MPS. Using an example of car mileage which can be linked to costs, the records pertaining to a vehicle’s mileage is detailed in the relevant log book. However, this is not recorded for every journey undertaken when the PM is in situ and as such, it would not be possible to determine which journeys were or were not relevant to the PM.

The recording of information in regards to a vehicle’s mileage ensures compliancy with the MPS Driver Policy and maintenance schedules.

Section 24(2) – National Security & Section 31(3) – Law Enforcement - NCND - FOIA is considered to be a release to the world as once the information is published the public authority, in this case the MPS, has no control over what use is made of that information. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant it could be of use to those who seek to cause harm to any person in receipt of protection for whatever reason. To confirm or deny that the MPS have provided any non current former ministers of government with a vehicle to travel to/from the national COVID inquiry would give an inference as to who may or may not be in receipt of some form of police protection, which would enable those who sought to threaten the safety of such individuals to calculate who was most at risk and whom was in receipt of some type of protection.

The effect of this information being available to the applicant, and more importantly those who might wish to cause harm to those in receipt of protection, and these could include terrorists, criminals and fixated individuals, would be detrimental to those in receipt of protection.

To ensure that those in receipt of protection are not subject to additional threat and to ensure the safety of the members of the public attending events, where these individuals are present, would require a review and in all likelihood an increase in the number of protection officers employed and a full review of the protection arrangements. This would increase the costs to the public purse.

Confirmation or denial of any further information being held, which would identify whether any form of protection exists for specific individual(s), along with any other information already in the public domain, could be used to try and work out how resources are allocated within the Royalty and Specialist Protection Command. This would allow those within the criminal fraternity to gain an understanding of how much security and the number of officers who are allocated to those who may or may not be receiving protection.

In addition, those with the necessary criminal intent, inclination and capacity could use the information to begin to try and map costs for protection across forces. This would then provide them with an operational advantage over the MPS and other forces as the information can indeed be viewed as operational 'intelligence' and operationally sensitive. To confirm or deny that any form of protection is afforded to any other individual, other than those which have been publicly stated by the MPS, would have a negative effect on the safety of those being protected, should the release of information be used and manipulated to try and attack the protected individuals and establishments, for example through mapping protection across forces.

To confirm or deny that this protection exists may lead to an attack on establishments within locations where one force is viewed to lower costs per year on protection, as these locations may be viewed as a 'weak/vulnerable target' with less policing resources allocated to protection duties. Such an occurrence would harm individuals as well as result in the allocation of additional policing resources due to a FOI disclosure.

It remains the case that the publication of any information relating to an individual who might or might not receive protection could potentially lead to harm to that individual, particularly if that information relates to the security arrangements and the movements for that individual or formed any part of a protection package that might or might not be provided. Disclosure of this information damages the need to ensure protection arrangements remain covert, purely in the interests of operational sensitivity.

It is important to note that the UK does face a serious and sustained threat from violent extremists and this threat is greater in scale and ambition than any of the terrorist threats in the past. Government reports suggest that at any one time the police and security agencies are contending with many terrorist plots, terrorist groups or networks and individuals who are judged to pose a threat to the well-being of the UK and or UK interests. While the plots may not necessarily all be directed at attacks on the protected individuals, the MPS bear in mind that an attack on members of government or significant individuals afforded protection would be of national significance to our country. To provide information regarding security arrangements for protected individuals is likely to place them at serious risk due to their prominence across the globe.

As previously explained above, in this current environment of an increased threat of terrorist activity, confirming or denying that any further information is held that could assist an extremist faction would undermine the safeguarding of national security.

Based on this definition national security encompasses a wide spectrum and it is our duty to protect the people within the UK. Public safety is of paramount importance to the policing purpose and must be taken into account in deciding whether to confirm whether any further information is held.

By confirming or denying any further policing arrangements, which refer to the personal protection of specific individuals, would render security measures less effective. Personal protection is provided by the MPS to a number of people where it is in the national interest or where intelligence (information) suggests protection is necessary. Specific protection arrangements are applied in order to safeguard national security by ensuring that appropriate safety and security is provided to key figures such as the King and the Prime Minister. The disclosure of any other information would ultimately increase the risk of harm to those afforded personal protection and to the general public within that vicinity.

Persons/groups would be able to ascertain which individuals the MPS considers to be currently at most harm, and therefore which threats or campaigns to undermine UK security the police believe to be most pertinent.

Confirming or denying that any further information is held in relation to the security or protection of individuals would lead to law enforcement tactics being compromised, which would ultimately hinder the prevention and detection of crime. Security arrangements and tactics are re-used and have been monitored by criminal groups, fixated individuals and terrorists.

Protection is provided in a number of forms after careful evaluation of the threat and risks posed to those individuals by operational experts in this field of policing. It therefore follows that anything that would negate the benefits of that protection would place individuals at risk. This would be the individuals receiving protection, the police officers providing the protection and any member of the public in the vicinity of the principal.

To confirm or deny that transportation was provided to any other individuals would thus identify who might be in receipt of protection and therefore costs exist. This would allow anyone to map protection costs and thus ultimately calculate how many officers had been assigned to protect that individual. This would then again place the individual and officers at risk in the event that they were targeted by criminals/terrorists.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police service will not divulge whether any further information is or is not held if to do so would place the safety of an individual in receipt of protection at risk or undermine National Security. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by a terrorist attack, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of police operations in the highly sensitive area of personal protection.

The public interest is defined not as what the public might find interesting, but there must be some tangible benefit to the public in the disclosure of the interest. In this case whether the request is a confirmation or denial of who was provided with transportation and as such, in receipt of some form of protection, the net result of publishing that information would be that a review would need to be conducted, plans changed to ensure that the threat level was effectively challenged and development of a new protection plan that would in all likelihood require additional resources to be provided and probably the extension of protection to those who had not been in receipt of it before the release of the requested information.

Therefore, on weighing up the competing interests, I find that the public interest favours neither confirming nor denying whether any information is held relating to this request as it could allow an assumption to be made on who might be afforded police protection.

However, no inference can be drawn from this refusal that information is or is not held.

Section 40(5A)&(5B)(a)(i) - Personal Information - Section 40 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 is designed to address information that is covered by the Data Protection Act 2018.

Under section 40(5), the MPS is not required to comply with the requirements of section 1(1) (a) i.e. the duty to inform the applicant whether or not the information is held.

In most cases Personal Data is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act as I will explain below.

To confirm or deny whether personal information exists could publicly reveal information about an identifiable individual or individuals, thereby breaching the right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act (DPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2018.

Where an individual is requesting his or her own personal data the information is always exempt. Such information can be requested under other legislation.
Where an individual is requesting third party personal data the MPS must ensure that any action taken adheres to the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 and the GDPR. To clarify, the Freedom of Information Act only allows disclosure of personal data if that disclosure would be compliant with the principles for processing personal data. These principles are outlined under section 34 of the DPA 2018 and under Article 5 of the GDPR.

Disclosure

I have decided to address each question separately.

Since the beginning of the national covid enquiry lead by Baroness Hallet, which minsters of government have used a vehicle provided for ministerial/senior civil servant use to travel to and from the enquiry by yourselves?

In relation to the first part of your request, the MPS confirms that it is responsible for the Prime Minister’s (PM) car travel and therefore, would have provided transportation.