Call outs to Princess Gate, SW7

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.034360

I note you seek access to the following information:

REQUEST 1:
Number and frequency of police callouts to Princes Gate (SW7 2QQ) in calendar years

REQUEST 2:
Information on police resources currently assigned to Embassy of The Islamic Republic of Iran and Embassy of Ethiopia on Princes Gate (SW7 2QQ)

Clarification -

Request 1 - Please provide a time frame e.g. 5 calendar years -
Could we please have the past 18 months’ worth of data you have for call outs in this area?

Request 2 – Please clarify what you mean by ‘information on police resources currently assigned’ -
We are seeking information with respect to the amount of police resource allocated to the ongoing management of protestors and security of the Embassy of The Islamic Republic of Iran and Embassy of Ethiopia – including the number of officers typically stationed, any response measures in place for protests (including number of officers), and the ongoing costs associated with these measures.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose information relevant to Request 1. However, information for the second part of your request has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 24(1) – National Security
Section 27(1)(a)(c) – International Relations
Section 31(1)(a) – Law Enforcement

Reason for decision

To provide any information relating to the amount of police resource allocated to the ongoing management of protestors and security of any embassy, which includes any associate costs, could undermine any policing activity and be harmful to national security. This would hinder both the prevention and detection of crime, as well as the UK’s relationship with other countries/states.

In view of the rationale above the following exemptions are engaged:

Section 24(1) – National Security - is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security.

Section 27(1)(a)(c) – International Relations - Information is exempt information if disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice relations between the United Kingdom and any other State, and the interests of the United Kingdom abroad

Section 31(1)(a) – Law Enforcement - Information which is not exempt information by virtue of section 30 is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice - the prevention or detection of crime,

To disclose any information held relating to policing around the Embassy of The Islamic Republic of Iran and Embassy of Ethiopia would identify what security arrangements might be in place, which would compromise the MPS’s operational tactics and capabilities and therefore cause operational harm.

Disclosure of this information would technically be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain, which would provide those with a criminal intent valuable intelligence on how the police operate which would compromise our law enforcement functions by hindering our ability to detect and prevent crime. This could also result in a risk of physical harm to a range of individuals, including those based in the embassies, members of the public and police officers.

Release would likely impact on police resources. The MPS are likely to need to adapt their tactics and strategies for protest management and/or any other security arrangements etc., if we disclosed what information were held. This would hinder the MPS’s ability to operate effectively and efficiently, as it would allow those with criminal/terrorist intent to use this to manipulate to their advantage so that they may operate in these locations.

The disclosure of information, which relates to security measures, may cause harm to embassy staff and possibly members of the public, as it may be deemed a vulnerable target. This could have a detrimental effect on the UK government’s relationship with these countries and likely have an impact too with other states or international organisations. This may cause them to reconsider their affinity with the UK. Consequently, this could lead to a lack of trust and undermine law enforcement agreements in the future. It could also influence the sharing of information provided during the course of political and diplomatic exchanges.

It remains the case that the publication of any information relating to policing arrangements, which includes costs, could potentially lead to harm to individuals based within these Embassies, particularly if that information relates to the security costs.

A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under the Act, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual.

With this in mind, it must be noted that the threat of terrorism cannot be ignored and it should be recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK faces a sustained threat from violent terrorists and extremists. Since 2006, the UK Government has published the threat level, based upon current intelligence and that threat is currently categorised as ‘substantial’.

Therefore, in consideration of the ramifications of this threat level, it would not be wise to disclose any information that exists, as it would negatively impact our ability to conduct any further operations of this nature. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by a terrorist attack, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the role performed by officers especially in relation to ensuring the security of others.

The disclosure of information that undermines the operational integrity of our operational activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both national security and law enforcement. It remains our position that under FOIA the MPS will not disclose information pertinent to your request. This would be counter effective to the safeguarding of national security and increase the risk of crime, if the MPS does not take a consistent approach to requests of this nature. Any escalation of criminal activity could have a detrimental effect on national security and public safety.

In addition, the British Government develops and maintains a robust relationship with other nation states which can promote mutual interest in trade, defence, environmental issues, human rights and the fight against terrorism and international crime. As such, there is a need to ensure that this type of relationship continues and does not ultimately compromise the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS and allows us to continue to provide an efficient policing service.

In the current environment of an increased threat of terrorist activity, disclosing any information held relating to protest management, security arrangements and associated costs could assist an extremist, terrorist faction or fixated individual who have the relevant time and know-how, which would put people’s lives at risk. Any failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public might require the MPS to actually have to increase the amount of officers available to them, thus increasing the cost to the public purse.

The release of information relating to policing arrangements of this nature would render security measures less effective. In order to safeguard national security, there is a need for the MPS to protect information, as to release it would likely have a detrimental effect on policing resources, particularly in the sensitive area of national security.

This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infrastructure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public. To counter this, a full review of security measures would be needed and additional costs would be incurred.

The effective conduct of international relations depends upon maintaining trust and confidence between Governments. To disclose what policing arrangements are in place at specific embassies would likely prejudice or undermine international relations between the UK and these other countries, should this negatively impact on their staff. Any disclosure of information which could be considered by staff to cause a threat cannot be in the public interest.

To disclose what information is held in respect of this part of the request, law enforcement tactics would be compromised, which would hinder the prevention and detection of crime. This would result in more risk to the public and consequently require the use of more police resources. It can be argued that there are significant risks associated with providing any information, since they may reveal the relative vulnerability of what we may be trying to protect.

To confirm what information the MPS holds would allow those with a criminal intent vital intelligence as to whether a building was subject to extra security measures, to what extent and therefore the level of resistance that they may or may not encounter. This could also allow them to submit multiple FOIA requests relating to other embassy buildings to gain an understanding of which were not subject to any additional security measures and therefore vulnerable to an attack. This would consequently hinder the ability of law enforcement bodies to protect embassy staff, the general public in the immediate vicinity and police officers.

Therefore, MPS resources and its ability to operate effectively and efficiently would directly be affected as this information, could be manipulated by those with criminal intent to operate in those areas.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police Service will not divulge if to do so has the potential to place the safety of the public at risk, undermine National Security or law enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the MPS is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat from those with a criminal or terrorist intent, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of police operations in this highly sensitive area.

The Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. As much as there is a public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. Any disclosure of information which includes policing arrangements and associated costs, could be used to identify the deployment of resources and therefore prejudice our ability to conduct similar operations. This would therefore be sensitive information of intelligence value.

Any disclosure of information which leads to an increased risk of harm to the general public, would result in a loss of public confidence in the MPS. Similarly, any disclosure of information which has the ability to threaten the safety of embassy staff is likely to be detrimental to the UK’s relationship with these countries and others, which would consequently affect the UK's international abilities relating to its overseas citizens, consular and commercial interests.

Therefore, having carefully considered the arguments for and against disclosure, I have found that the balancing test favours non-disclosure of information relevant to the second part of your request.

Disclosure

REQUEST 1 - Number and frequency of police callouts to Princes Gate (SW7 2QQ) in calendar years

Request 1 - The table below showing the 18 months’ worth of call-out data to the location of Princes Gate (SW7 2QQ)

Dates	Total Call-outs
01/06/2022 - 31/11/2023	80