Quickly exit this site by pressing the Escape key Leave this site
We use some essential cookies to make our website work. We’d like to set additional cookies so we can remember your preferences and understand how you use our site.
You can manage your preferences and cookie settings at any time by clicking on “Customise Cookies” below. For more information on how we use cookies, please see our Cookies notice.
Your cookie preferences have been saved. You can update your cookie settings at any time on the cookies page.
Your cookie preferences have been saved. You can update your cookie settings at any time on the cookies page.
Sorry, there was a technical problem. Please try again.
This site is a beta, which means it's a work in progress and we'll be adding more to it over the next few weeks. Your feedback helps us make things better, so please let us know what you think.
Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.034301
I note you seek access to the following information:
This request is made by Reprieve, a UK registered charity.
We are writing in connection with the alleged murder of British national David Barlow, his wife Emmaretia Celia Geyer and Eric Alyai in Uganda on 17 October this year. The shooting has been described by Ugandan officials as a terrorist incident.
i) We understand that the Foreign Office have been coordinating with the Ugandan authorities in the aftermath of this attack. A Foreign Office spokesperson confirmed, in a statement published by the Telegraph on 17 October 2023 that the Foreign Office had been liaising with local authorities in Uganda and were prepared to offer their support.
ii) According to Uganda Police spokesman Fred Enanga, the Uganda Police “have been working with the forensic and investigative experts from the UK” and have shared “all the necessary legal procedures and findings in Uganda, including the lines of investigation and event timelines cross-referenced with GPS data, phone records, and other recordings, […] with their counterparts in the United Kingdom.”
iii) We understand that in the weeks following the attack, three suspects have been killed by the Uganda People's Defence Force, and the alleged head of the militia group suspected of being responsible for the deaths of Mr and Mrs Barlow, Abdul Rashid Kyoto, has been arrested and charged with offences of murder, terrorism, belonging to a terrorist organisation and aggravated robbery. Uganda retains the death penalty for a number of these offences.
iv) We would be grateful if you could provide us with the following information in connection with the above:
1. Please confirm whether the Metropolitan Police Service are cooperating with the Uganda Police in this case.
2. Please confirm whether the Metropolitan Police Service are providing the Ugandan authorities with forensic support.
3. Please confirm whether the Metropolitan Police Service are providing the Ugandan authorities with investigative support.
4. Have the Metropolitan Police Service collaborated with any UK Government departments in supporting the Thai authorities’ investigation and/or prosecution? If so, please confirm which departments have been involved.
5. Have the Metropolitan Police Service acted in collaboration with any other UK police forces in connection with the Thai authorities’ investigation and/or prosecution? If so, please confirm which UK police force(s).
6. Please confirm whether legal, risk and human rights impact assessments (such as those conducted under the Overseas Justice and Security Assistance human rights guidance) were carried out in respect of any UK police cooperation with the Ugandan investigation and/or prosecution.
a.) If assessments were carried out, please provide copies of these (redacted if necessary).
b.) Please confirm whether “investigative support” refers to support for the Ugandan criminal investigation into, and/or prosecution of, the alleged perpetrators of this incident.
7. Please confirm what steps have been taken (including all assurances sought and/or received from the Ugandan authorities) to ensure that the actions of and assistance provided by UK authorities will not, directly or indirectly, contribute to:
a.) the imposition of a death sentence on any individual(s) who may be found responsible for or convicted in connection with the deaths of these individuals; and/or
b.) the mistreatment of any suspects nor the violation of any suspect’s fundamental rights, including the right to freedom from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment and the right
to a fair trial.
8. If the Metropolitan Police Service are assisting with the criminal investigation or prosecution in Uganda, please confirm whether a mutual legal assistance agreement is in place governing this collaboration.
a.) If an agreement is in place, please share a copy of this agreement.
b.) If it is not possible to provide an unredacted copy, please share any excerpts of this agreement that can be made available under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
We are particularly interested to know whether measures have been agreed with the aim of mitigating the risk of human rights violations in this case.
We recognise the importance of a fair and effective investigation taking place and perpetrators being brought to justice, not just for the victims’ families but also for the wider community. However, Uganda retains the death penalty and torture continues to be frequently practiced in Uganda, in particular by security and policing agencies.
v) We are making this request because we are concerned to ensure that UK authorities are not providing material support and assistance where there is a real risk of torture or mistreatment of any suspect, or of a death sentence being imposed.
It is the longstanding policy of the UK Government to condemn the use of torture and oppose the imposition of the death penalty in all circumstances.
vi) This position is also embedded in the UK’s domestic and international legal obligations. Reprieve has frequently engaged in dialogue with the UK Government and local police forces to discuss how this position is reflected in practice. This engagement on matters of fundamental human rights is strongly in the public interest. The requested information will assist us with this work.
Should our request for information be too wide or unclear, please contact us as soon as possible so that we may refine our request and kindly provide any information that you are able to obtain in the meantime.
If full copies of the documents requested cannot be provided due to the sensitivity of some of their contents, please consider whether redactions or ‘gisting’ of the material may enable you to release sections of, or a summary of, the material.
Should you be unable to provide the information requested above, we would be grateful if you could give full reasoning for the non-disclosure. If any of this information is already in the public domain, please direct us to this, with page numbers, references and URLs if necessary.
I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 27(1)(a)(c) - International Relations
Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)(3) – Personal Information.
However, in regards to Question 6a, where you seek a copy of any assessments conducted, this has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure by virtue of the following provisions stated above.
Reason for decision
Section 27 - International Relations & Section 31 - Law Enforcement - In considering whether or not the MPS should release the information requested I have considered the potential harm that could be caused by such a disclosure.
A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under the Act any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual. Therefore, for any disclosure made the MPS has no control over what use is made of that information.
To disclose a copy of the assessment made prior to the deployment to Uganda to assist the coroner’s inquiry could cause operational harm to the MPS and affect our ability to fulfil our core function of law enforcement. Disclosure would technically be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain and allow members of the public, which includes those with a criminal or terrorist intent, to have an understanding of CTC’s resourcing in regards to the deployment of its officers overseas. This would likely allow for an opportunity to disrupt policing activity and hinder the prevention and detection of crime and apprehension of offenders. As a result, this would have the likelihood of impacting on police resources and may also cause the MPS to have to consider adapting their tactics and strategies for such deployments, when providing any type of overseas assistance.
As the assistance being provided to the coroner is still ongoing, disclosure of the requested documentation has the opportunity to disrupt our police activity. Therefore, this could be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public. Any disclosure, which has a detrimental effect on the operational effectiveness of the MPS and ultimately then increases the risk to public safety cannot be in the public interest.
In addition, disclosure of this assessment could have a detrimental effect on the UK government’s relationship with Uganda and therefore, other states or international organisations, would reconsider their affinity with the UK. Consequently, this could lead to a lack of trust and undermine law enforcement agreements in the future. It could also influence the sharing of information provided during the course of diplomatic and political exchanges.
The British Government develops and maintains a robust relationship with other nation states which can promote mutual interest in trade, defence, environmental issues, human rights and the fight against terrorism and international crime. As such, there is a need to ensure that this type of relationship continues and does not ultimately compromise the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS and allows us to continue to provide an efficient policing service.
To disclose the requested assessment completed in relation to this deployment would likely prejudice or undermine international relations between the United Kingdom and Uganda.
The UK enjoys effective international relations with other states to further its foreign policy aims. The disclosure of this documentation could potentially damage the bilateral relationship between the UK and Uganda. This would reduce the UK government's ability to protect and promote UK interests through its relations with Uganda which would not be in the public interest.
As such, any disclosure may hinder and undermine the partnership approach between Countries in respect of law enforcement and international cooperation.
By providing the requested documentation would mean that there is a strong possibility that the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS will be compromised, which would hinder the prevention and detection of crime and and apprehension of offenders. It can be argued that there are significant risks associated with providing this information, since it may allow conjecture as to any perceived vulnerabilities in relation to the assistance that is being provided.
To disclose a copy of the assessment completed would allow one to infer the level of resources/capability being deployed in regards to these types of ‘operations’. This could enable those with a criminal intent to make assumptions on how the MPS manages overseas deployments and the minimum level of resources that could be used. This would be providing operational intelligence, which could allow the opportunity to undertake a criminal offence without being detected and apprehended.
Therefore, MPS resources and its ability to operate effectively and efficiently would directly be affected as this information, could be manipulated by those with criminal intent to operate in those areas.
The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police Service will not divulge information if to do so would place the safety of the public at risk, compromise our law enforcement functions and hinder international relations. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing and in this case providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the coroner to assist with their inquiry, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police ‘operations’ in this highly sensitive area.
As much as there is a public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. Any disclosure of information, which can be viewed as of intelligence value, may lead to conjecture relating to MPS overseas deployments and could be used to identify the allocation of resources and therefore prejudice our ability to conduct similar operations.
In addition, any disclosure of information which has the ability damage the UK’s relationship with another country, would consequently affect the UK's international abilities through the promotion and protection of its overseas citizens, consular and commercial interests.
Consequently, it is our opinion that for these reasons the balancing test favours non-disclosure.
Section 40(2)&(3) - Personal Information - provides that any information to which a request for information relates, is exempt information if the first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) is satisfied. The first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) states that personal information is exempt if its disclosure would contravene any of the data protection principles.
There are six principles that are set out in Article 5(1)(a) of the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) that dictate when the processing of personal data is lawful. The first principle requires that any processing of personal data must be lawful, fair and transparent. Under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR, the disclosure of personal data is considered to be lawful if:
a. There is a legitimate interest in the disclosure of that personal data.
b. The disclosure of the personal data is necessary to meet that legitimate interest.
c. The disclosure would not cause unwarranted harm to the data subject.
Having given regard to the legitimate interest test, I have found that:
Name of Member of Staff - The requested documentation contains the name of a person holding the rank of below Band A. Having considered the legitimate interest test in respect of this personal data, I have found that:
a. The employee holding the rank of below Band A would be unlikely to expect for their name to be published in response to this Freedom of Information Act request. Given their role and level of responsibility within the MPS, I have not identified a legitimate interest that would be satisfied in disclosing their personal data in response to this request for information.
The provision to refuse access to information under Section 40(2)(a)(b) and (3A)(a) of the Act is both absolute and class based. When this exemption is claimed, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to demonstrate what that harm may be in refusing access to information.
Disclosure
Please find below responses to the questions posed.
Q1 - Please confirm whether the Metropolitan Police Service are cooperating with the Uganda Police in this case.
There has been no co‐operation by the Metropolitan Police with the investigation of this case. The purpose of the deployment was to assist with the repatriation of the deceased to the UK and assist the coronial investigation. This involved cooperating with the Ugandan authorities in order to
• Obtain the necessary information detailing the circumstances of the deaths, required by the UK Coroner.
• Clearance and facilitation to confirm the identity of the deceased and subsequently repatriate them to the UK.
• Clearance and facilitation to access the scene of the incident to gather information for the UK Coroner.
Q2 - Please confirm whether the Metropolitan Police Service are providing the Ugandan authorities with forensic support.
There has been no forensic co‐operation with the Ugandan authorities relating to their investigation of this case.
Q3 - Please confirm whether the Metropolitan Police Service are providing the Ugandan authorities with investigative support.
There has been no investigative support given to the Ugandan authorities in relation their criminal investigation.
Q4 - Have the Metropolitan Police Service collaborated with any UK Government departments in supporting the Thai authorities’ investigation and/or prosecution? If so, please confirm which departments have been involved.
N/A – This question does not appear to be applicable to the Metropolitan Police deployment to Uganda to assist with the repatriation of the UK deceased and assist with the coronial investigation.
There is no element of this deployment that relates to Thailand.
Q5 - Have the Metropolitan Police Service acted in collaboration with any other UK police forces in connection with the Thai authorities’ investigation and/or prosecution? If so, please confirm which UK police force(s).
N/A – This question does not appear to be applicable to the Metropolitan Police deployment to Uganda to assist with the repatriation of the UK deceased and assist with the coronial investigation.
There is no element of this deployment that relates to Thailand.
Q6 - Please confirm whether legal, risk and human rights impact assessments (such as those conducted under the Overseas Justice and Security Assistance human rights guidance) were carried out in respect of any UK police cooperation with the Ugandan investigation and/or prosecution.
Yes ‐ Please note, the MPS did not provide support to the investigation and/or prosecution. An assessment was carried out in relation to the Metropolitan Police deployment which has been described in our response to Question 1.
Q6a - If assessments were carried out, please provide copies of these (redacted if necessary).
The MPS did not provide support to the investigation and/or prosecution. An assessment carried out in relation to the Metropolitan Police deployment which has been described in our response to Question 1.
However, this document is exempt by virtue of Sections 27(1)(a)(c), 31(1)(a)(b) and 40(2)(3) of the Act (see ‘Reason for Decision’)
Q6b - Please confirm whether “investigative support” refers to support for the Ugandan criminal investigation into, and/or prosecution of, the alleged perpetrators of this incident.
There has been no investigative support given by the MPS for the Ugandan criminal investigation and/or prosecution of the alleged perpetrators of this incident.
Q7 - Please confirm what steps have been taken (including all assurances sought and/or received from the Ugandan authorities) to ensure that the actions of and assistance provided by UK authorities will not, directly or indirectly, contribute to:
Q7a - the imposition of a death sentence on any individual(s) who may be found responsible for or convicted in connection with the deaths of these individuals; and/or
The MPS have not provided any assistance to the Ugandan authorities.
Q7b - the mistreatment of any suspects nor the violation of any suspect’s fundamental rights, including the right to freedom from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment and the right to a fair trial.
The MPS have not provided any assistance to the Ugandan authorities.
Q8 - If the Metropolitan Police Service are assisting with the criminal investigation or prosecution in Uganda, please confirm whether a mutual legal assistance agreement is in place governing this collaboration.
The MPS have not provided any assistance to the Ugandan authorities, therefore there is no mutual legal assistance agreement in place.
Q8a - If an agreement is in place, please share a copy of this agreement.
N/A
Q8b - If it is not possible to provide an unredacted copy, please share any excerpts of this agreement that can be made available under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
N/A
We are particularly interested to know whether measures have been agreed with the aim of mitigating the risk of human rights violations in this case.
We recognise the importance of a fair and effective investigation taking place and perpetrators being brought to justice, not just for the victims’ families but also for the wider community. However, Uganda retains the death penalty and torture continues to be frequently practiced in Uganda, in particular by security and policing agencies.
v) We are making this request because we are concerned to ensure that UK authorities are not providing material support and assistance where there is a real risk of torture or mistreatment of any suspect, or of a death sentence being imposed.
It is the longstanding policy of the UK Government to condemn the use of torture and oppose the imposition of the death penalty in all circumstances.
vi) This position is also embedded in the UK’s domestic and international legal obligations. Reprieve has frequently engaged in dialogue with the UK Government and local police forces to discuss how this position is reflected in practice. This engagement on matters of fundamental human rights is strongly in the public interest. The requested information will assist us with this work.
The MPS deployment to Uganda was to ensure repatriation of the deceased UK citizens and to obtain information to support the UK Coroner.