MEPO 38/81 file

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.24.040290

I note you seek access to the following information:

Could I now request file MEPO 38/81?

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 23 - Information supplied by, or concerning, certain security bodies
Section 31(1)(a)(b) – Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)(3) – Personal Information

Reason for decision

To provide information, which concerns how the police conduct their enquiries and gather intelligence, would allow criminals to have a better understanding of how the MPS prevents and detects crime. To identify police methodologies used, the focus of police activities, as well of areas or people of interest, would also compromise the MPS’s ability to apprehend and prosecute offenders. Therefore, it is for this reason that Section 31(1)(a)(b) of the Act is engaged.

Section 31 - Law Enforcement - FOIA is considered to be a release to the world as once the information is published the public authority in this case the MPS has no control over what use is made of that information. To disclose information on how the police conducted enquiries, gathered and shared their intelligence - in effect how its officers carried out their day-to-day duties during the course of the General Strike of 1926, would be harmful as it would allow members of the public to define and identify the type of investigative processes used by the MPS. There remains the possibility that the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS may be compromised by releasing information relating to investigative tactics. There are significant risks associated with providing information in relation to any aspects of an investigation, whether it be historical or current, as to provide such details would reveal how investigations are conducted, in particular gathering and sharing police intelligence, which would provide criminals of today with an insight to how the police operate, and people who wish to harm the citizens of London with the opportunity of disrupting police activity.

This could be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public and might require the MPS to actually have to increase the amount of officers available to them thus increasing the cost to the public purse.

Release would have the effect of compromising law enforcement tactics as by disclosing the methods being employed to mitigate the risk of criminal activity would hinder the prevention and detection of crime. More crime would be committed and individuals would be placed at risk.

Disclosure would technically be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain which would enable those with the time, capacity and inclination to try and map strategies used by the MPS.

The MPS is reliant upon the techniques used during operations and investigations and the public release of the modus operandi employed during these operations would prejudice the ability of the MPS to conduct policing of similar operations.

Additionally, MPS resources and its ability to operate effectively and efficiently would directly be affected as this information, could be manipulated by those with criminal intent to operate in those areas.

Disclosure of this information would demonstrate the actions and decisions taken were commensurate with the information held. The release of details relating into this event would provide assurance to the public that the MPS appropriately and effectively conducts its investigations. This can only build confidence in the role of the police in protecting the citizens of London.

However, the most compelling reason for non-disclosure is this would provide criminals with valuable intelligence on how the police conducts investigations and what might be of interest. By giving this insight would ultimately hinder the police’s ability to prevent and detect crime and therefore allow an individual to evade prosecution. Some of the techniques used during the time period of the documentation is still prevalent to modern day policing and therefore to disclose this information would be detrimental to law enforcement.

In addition, disclosure would identify whether information had directly or indirectly been supplied by or relate to a security body, thereby invoking Section 23(1).
Section 23 - Information supplied by, or concerning, certain security bodies

Finally, Section 40(2)(3) of the Act is engaged as to disclose personal information contained within some documentation would publicly reveal the name of an officer below the rank of Chief Superintendent who was based in Special Branch after 1950. The MPS does not disclose the names of officers under FOIA, unless there is a public interest in doing so, especially when based in a specialist unit. This information, which could be allow an individual to be identified, would breach the right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

Section 40 - Personal Information - Under Section 40(2) and (3) of the Act, Public Authorities are able to withhold information where its release would identify any living individual and breach the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA). I have applied this exemption due to the name of an officer, based in Special Branch, being contained within documentation would constitute personal data which, if released, would be in breach of the rights provided by the DPA.

The six principles of the DPA govern the way in which data controllers must manage personal data. Under principle one of the DPA, personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully. I consider that the release of this officer’s name that is recorded within the requested documentation constitutes personal data. The release of this information would be unfair as the person concerned would have no reasonable expectation that the MPS would make this information publicly available.
In reaching my decision, I have, in each case, given due regard to the condition at Article 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(e) of the GDPR. Condition one of the GDPR requires that consideration is given to whether consent for disclosure has been given whilst Condition six requires that consideration is given to performance of a public task in the public interest.

Disclosure

Please find below 9 pdfs which contain the disclosed documentation held within MEPO 38/81.