Live video streaming via cellular technology

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.24.036818

I note you seek access to the following information:

1. Do you currently employ live video streaming technology within your Police Force for operational purposes? If so, in what contexts or situations is it utilized?
2. What specific platforms or systems do you use for live video streaming?
3. Are there any plans for expanding or enhancing the use of live video streaming technology in the future? If so, what are they, and what considerations are being taken into account?
4. Who is the key contact within the Police Force who deals with the Live Video Streaming Technology? (Name, Position and Email).

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement
Section 24(1) - National Security
Section 40(2) – Personal Information

Reason for decision

The top 2 exemptions listed above have been utilised in relation to Question 2. This is because we believe that providing the information requested on what specific platforms or systems we use for live video streaming would be harmful to national security. We believe that those with criminal intent who take an interest in such matters can use it maliciously to the detriment of operational policing and this could compromise our law enforcement capabilities and undermine its effectiveness.

Section 31(1)(a)&(b) of the Act provides that any information is exempt if its disclosure under the Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice the prevention or detection of crime or the apprehension or prosecution of offenders.

A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because under the Act, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to one individual. Once the information is published the MPS has no control over what use is made of it.

To provide the information requested on what specific platforms or systems we use for live video streaming would be harmful to national security. Although the request itself may seem harmless, if pieced together with other information in the public domain and/or gathered from other sources, it may be useful to the criminal fraternity and those seeking to cause harm. This would be to the detriment of operational policing.

Whilst national security is not defined under the Freedom of Information Act, it does include the security of the United Kingdom and its people. Disclosing information held in regards to your FOIA request would inform the general public but would also inform those with criminal intent who would wish to cause harm.

Disclosure of what specific platforms or systems the MPS uses for live video streaming may be used as intelligence to exploit any perceived vulnerability and this could undermine the ability of the MPS to protect national security by those with the intent to do so. This would place individuals and officers at risk in the event that they were targeted by criminals and terrorists. Criminals could gain an enhanced knowledge of the MPS’ operational capabilities highlight and policing tactics could highlight as well as reveal any deficiencies. This would be detrimental to law enforcement.

Modern-day policing is intelligence-led and this is particularly pertinent with regard to both law enforcement and national security. The public expect police forces to use all powers and tactics available to them to prevent and detect crime or disorder and maintain public safety. However, any information released cannot be to the detriment of national security or law enforcement.

The public interest is defined not as what the public might find interesting, but there must be some tangible benefit to the public in the disclosure of the information. The MPS appreciates the public interest in this matter, however, we believe that it is not in the public interest to disclose information that may compromise our ability to fulfil our core function of law enforcement, especially when providing information in relation to protection and security of its officers and staff.

The MPS considers that the benefit that would result from the information being disclosed does not outweigh the harm arising from disclosing the information requested.

Section 40 - Personal Information - Section 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018 confirms that information which relates to an identified or identifiable living individual is Personal Data.

The Freedom of Information Act provides an exemption for Personal Data and this is known as the section 40 exemption.

The information sought under your Freedom of Information request for question 4 includes the following which we consider to be Personal Data

The name, job position and email address of an individual
Where the request is seeking access to third party personal data the section 40(2) exemption may be engaged.

In order to apply the Section 40(2) exemption the disclosure of the requested information must satisfy either the first, second or third conditions as defined by subsections 3A, 3B and 4A of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (as amended by Schedule 19 of the Data Protection Act 2018, specifically Section 58 of that schedule).

The first condition ensures that the exemption would apply in circumstances where the disclosure of the information would breach any of the Data Protection Act 2018 principles.

There are six Data Protection principles set out in the 2018 act and these can be found at section 34.

In this instance I have decided that the disclosure of the Personal Data would be incompatible with the first Data Protection principle which states that the processing (in this case the disclosure) of the data must be both lawful and fair.

I have applied the exemption provided under Section 40(2) of the Freedom of Information Act to this information as the first condition, defined in subsection 3(A)(a) of Section 40 has been satisfied.

In addition, and irrespective of what other information may or may not be held relating to any possible use of live streaming technology, this request also requires the MPS to Neither Confirm nor Deny whether it holds any further information. This is because the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions

Section 24(2) National Security
Section 31(3) Law Enforcement

Confirming or denying whether any other information is held in relation, for example to any possible covert use of live streaming technology would potentially show individuals what the capacity, tactical abilities and capabilities of the MPS are. Disclosure under FOIA would allow individuals to target specific areas of the UK to conduct possibly criminal/terrorist activities or activities that undermine the role of the police.

Please note this response should not be taken as an indication of whether or not information in relation to the covert use of live streaming technology is held or not.

Section 24(2) (National Security) and Section 31(3)(Law Enforcement) NCND - Harm Test in respect of confirming if additional information is held - Confirming or denying that any other information is held regarding the use of live streaming technology would cause operational harm and affect the police’s ability to fulfil their core function of law enforcement in the future. Confirming or denying whether or not any other information is held would allow members of the public to identify the resources and tactics used in sensitive policing operations, some of which may be covert. It would enable individuals and organisations, including serious and organised crime groups and terrorists to identify specific capabilities, strengths and weaknesses of individual forces, undermining operational law enforcement which ultimately results in harm to members of the public.

Confirming or denying if any other information is held about the use or planned use of live video streaming would likely lead to an increase of harm to covert investigations and compromise law enforcement. This would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. Since 2006, the UK Government has published the threat level based upon current intelligence, and that threat is currently judged as "SUBSTANTIAL”, meaning that an attack on the UK is likely. It is well established that police forces use tactics and technology to gain intelligence in order to counteract criminal behaviour, and it has been previously documented in the media that many terrorist incidents have been thwarted due to intelligence gained by these means.

Confirming or denying whether any other information is held about the use of live streaming technology would limit operational capabilities as criminals/terrorists would gain a greater understanding of the police's methods and techniques, enabling offenders to take steps to counter them. It may also suggest the limitations of police capabilities in this area, which may further encourage criminal/terrorist activity by exposing potential vulnerabilities.

This detrimental effect is increased if the request is made to several different law enforcement bodies. In addition to the local criminal fraternity now being better informed, those intent on disrupting policing functions throughout the UK will be able to 'map' where the use of certain tactics may or may not be deployed. This can be useful information to those committing (or those intent on committing or planning) crime.

Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both National Security and Law Enforcement.

By confirming or denying whether any other information is held would render policing and security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.

Confirming or denying that any other information is held regarding the use or potential use of live streaming technologies would have the effect of compromising law enforcement tactics. It has been recorded that FOIA releases are monitored by criminals and terrorists and so to confirm or deny any other information is held concerning live streaming would lead to law enforcement being undermined. The Police Service is reliant upon all manner of techniques during operations and the public release of any modus operandi employed, if held, would prejudice the ability of the Police Service to perform the core functions it has a duty to provide.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and the police will not divulge whether any other information is or is not held regarding live streaming technology, if to do so would place the safety of individuals at risk, undermine National Security or compromise law enforcement.

Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the police are appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by various groups or individuals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police investigations and all areas of operations carried out by police forces throughout the UK.

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. The use of technology can be a sensitive issue that would reveal police tactics and therefore it is our opinion that for these issues the balancing test for confirming or denying whether any other information is held regarding the use or potential use of live streaming technology, is not made out.

This should not be taken as an indication any information does or does not exist.

Disclosure

Q1 - Do you currently employ live video streaming technology within your Police Force for operational purposes? If so, in what contexts or situations is it utilised?

Yes. Streaming from various surveillance/camera platforms. For example, body worn cameras, roadside cameras and mobile surveillance systems.

Q3 - Are there any plans for expanding or enhancing the use of live video streaming technology in the future? If so, what are they, and what considerations are being taken into account?

We are always exploring new ways of enhancing our video streaming capability to maximise performance and availability with minimal latency, particularly where bandwidth is limited.