Parliamentary and Diplomatic Protection Command overtime

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.24.036329

I note you seek access to the following information:

The Angiolini Inquiry, Part 1 Report, February 2024

'5.157 Some officers can be close to doubling their income through overtime; they become used to the money and get used to having that amount of additional income, even though it is made clear when they sign up to an authorised firearms officer role that overtime is not guaranteed.'

1. Please provide the current number of officers in the Parliamentary and Diplomatic Protection Command.

2. Please provide the total amount claimed in overtime by the Parliamentary and Diplomatic Protection Command in the financial year April 2022 to March 2023.

3. Please provide the total amounts claimed in overtime by each of the 10 Parliamentary and Diplomatic Protection Command officers who claimed the most in April 2022 to March 2023.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 24(1) – National Security
Section 31(1)(a) – Law Enforcement

Reason for decision

I have today decided to disclose information relating to Questions 2 and 3. However, in regards to Question 1 this has been withheld.

Question 1 has been exempted from disclosure as PaDP is one of the Commands which comes under the Business Group of Specialist Operations (SO) and the Home Office has advised that resource details below that of SO are not to be published.

Therefore, in regards to PaDP, to disclose the current number of officers in this Command would provide details of policing resources deployed in relation to security and protection operations. This would allow those with a criminal or extremist intent to gain an operational advantage over the MPS and therefore undermine the safeguarding of National Security and compromise our law enforcement functions.

Section 24 - National Security - Providing information relating to what resources are allocated to the protection of particular sites would render security measures less effective. In addition, personal protection is provided by the MPS to a number of people where it is in the national interest or where intelligence (information) suggests protection is necessary. Specific protection arrangements are applied in order to safeguard national security by ensuring that appropriate safety and security is provided to key figures such as the King and the Prime Minister. The disclosure of any other information would ultimately increase the risk of harm to those afforded personal protection and to the general public within their vicinity.

Section 31 - Law Enforcement - Providing the requested information would reveal operational information that would lead to law enforcement tactics being compromised, which would ultimately hinder the MPS’s law enforcement role. It can be argued that there are significant risks associated with providing this information, since they may reveal the relative vulnerability of what we may be trying to protect.

FOIA is considered to be a release to the world as, once the information is published, the public authority, in this case the MPS, has no control over what use is made of that information. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, to provide details of resources relating to the protection of specific sites or individuals, would enable those who sought to threaten the safety of protected individuals to identify actual or perceived vulnerabilities in these arrangements.

The disclosure of the requested information to the applicant, and more importantly to those who might wish to cause harm to those in receipt of protection, such as terrorists, criminals and fixated individuals, would therefore be detrimental to those in receipt of protection. Those with the necessary criminal intent, inclination and capacity could use the information to seek to identify 'weak/vulnerable targets' or vulnerabilities to particular kinds of attack. Disclosure of such information also damages the need to ensure protection arrangements remain covert, purely in the interests of operational sensitivity. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, providing the current number of officers within PaDP will infer the level of capacity within the Command, which would infer capabilities and could allow those who seek to cause harm to members of the public to gain an understanding of the level of resources within this unit.

It is important to note that the UK does face a serious and sustained threat from violent extremists and this threat is greater in scale and ambition than any of the terrorist threats in the past. Government reports suggest that at any one time the police and security agencies are contending with many terrorist plots, terrorist groups or networks and individuals who are judged to pose a threat to the well-being of the UK and or UK interests. While the plots may not necessarily all be directed at attacks on the protected individuals or sites, the MPS bear in mind that an attack on members of government or significant individuals afforded protection would be of national significance to our country. To provide information regarding protection arrangements for individuals is likely to place them at serious risk due to their prominence across the globe.

In this current environment of an increased threat of terrorist activity, disclosure of information held that could assist an extremist faction would undermine the safeguarding of national security.

The ICO guidance also states ‘safeguarding national security also includes protecting potential targets even if there is no evidence that an attack is imminent…the Commissioner also recognises terrorist can be highly motivated and may go to great lengths to gather intelligence. This means there may be grounds for withholding what seems harmless information on the basis that it may assist terrorists when pieced together with other information they may obtain.’ By providing details relating to a specific unit’s manpower levels, this information could potentially be misused proving detrimental to national security.

Based on this definition national security encompasses a wide spectrum and it is our duty to protect the people within the UK. Public safety is of paramount importance to the policing purpose and must be taken into account in deciding whether to disclose any requested information.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police service will not divulge information that would place the safety of individuals in receipt of protection at risk or undermine National Security. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively managing its resources, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of police operations in the highly sensitive area of the protection of sites of national importance.

The public interest is defined not as what the public might find interesting but there must be some tangible benefit to the public in the disclosure of the interest. In this case, where the request is about resources deployed in relation to protection and security arrangements, the net result of publishing that information would be that a review would need to be conducted to ensure that the threat level was effectively challenged, which would require additional resources to be provided.

I consider that the benefit that would result from the information being disclosed does not outweigh the considerations favouring non-disclosure.

Disclosure

Please find below information relating to Questions 2 and 3.

Q2 - Please provide the total amount claimed in overtime by the Parliamentary and Diplomatic Protection Command in the financial year April 2022 to March 2023.

The total amount paid through payroll to PaPD officers for April 2022 to March 2023 was £14,034,658.

This figure was retrieved through a payroll report using PSOP (Police Single Operating Platform). PSOP is an oracle based system through SSCL, our outsourced payroll provider

Q3 - Please provide the total amounts claimed in overtime by each of the 10 Parliamentary and Diplomatic Protection Command officers who claimed the most in April 2022 to March 2023.

Answer as below.