Large Scale Police Protest Operations 2021-22
Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.028905
I note you seek access to the following information:
Q1 - I'm writing to ask that you please disclose to me the operation names of any large scale protest action that you have been called out to as a force over the last two calendar years (2021, and 2022).
It is only basic details of these operations I require. I'm not asking for internal documents, workings, technologies used, number of officers deployed, cost of this, or anything other than the following:
Q2 - Operation name, date, the name of the group involved (this could span anything from white nationalists to environmentalists - XR, BLM, National Action, EDL, NBU, Insulate Britain, Women's Rights marches, anti-military Marches like the anti-Elbit Systems action recently, and things like this).
Q3 - I'd also like to know what constitutes a "large scale operation" please. I have been made aware that forces may not be able to answer, for example, questions about smaller operations like protests of one person, so I've been advised by multiple forces that large scale operations carry a much higher chance of being answerable within cost limit.
Q4 - Again, dates, and the focus of the action, and if possible (within cost limit) the amount of people arrested during these actions in the limited 24 month period is all the information I am seeking for this request.
Q5 - If possible, and if it isn't exempt, I'd also like a list (if it exists in this format) of the groups that are of most interest to you regarding these large scale operations, or which exist on a list of monitored groups, again this could include any type of organisation but I'm really only looking for the bare bones basics of the most of note (top ten, or top five) groups that are of concern to your force.
Decision
I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 24(2) - National security
Section 31(3) - Law enforcement
Section 30(3) - Investigations
Reason for decision
Question 1, 2 and 4:
Q1 - I'm writing to ask that you please disclose to me the operation names of any large scale protest action that you have been called out to as a force over the last two calendar years (2021, and 2022).
It is only basic details of these operations I require. I'm not asking for internal documents, workings, technologies used, number of officers deployed, cost of this, or anything other than the following:
Q2 - Operation name, date, the name of the group involved (this could span anything from white nationalists to environmentalists - XR, BLM, National Action, EDL, NBU, Insulate Britain, Women's Rights marches, anti-military Marches like the anti-Elbit Systems action recently, and things like this).
Q4 - Again, dates, and the focus of the action, and if possible (within cost limit) the amount of people arrested during these actions in the limited 24 month period is all the information I am seeking for this request.
I have included a partial neither confirm nor denies that the MPS holds the information you have requested, as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Act (the duty to confirm or deny that information is held) does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 24(2) - National security
Section 31(3) - Law enforcement
Section 30(3) - Investigations
Q5 - If possible, and if it isn't exempt, I'd also like a list (if it exists in this format) of the groups that are of most interest to you regarding these large scale operations, or which exist on a list of monitored groups, again this could include any type of organisation but I'm really only looking for the bare bones basics of the most of note (top ten, or top five) groups that are of concern to your force.
The MPS neither confirms nor denies that it holds the information you have requested, as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Act (the duty to confirm or deny that information is held) does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 24(2) - National security
Section 31(3) - Law enforcement
Any release under FOIA is a disclosure to the world, not just to the individual making the request. Providing any notice that confirms or denies the existence of any other policing operations outlined in the excel sheet at protests would make security measures less effective. In addition, the Police are charged with enforcing the law, detecting and preventing crime, and protecting the communities we serve. Confirming or denying whether any other information is held would impact on the effectiveness of police investigations, thereby hindering the prevention and detection of crime.
Section 24(2) National Security - The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. In order to counter criminal and terrorist behaviour, it is vital that the police have the ability to work together, where necessary covertly, to obtain intelligence within current legislative frameworks to assist in the investigative process to ensure the successful arrest and prosecution of offenders who commit or plan to commit crime including acts of extremism and terrorism.
To achieve this goal, it is vitally important that information sharing takes place between police officers, members of the public, police forces as well as other law enforcement bodies within the United Kingdom. Such action would support policing and counter terrorism measures in the fight to deprive criminals including extremists of their ability to commit crime.
The impact of providing information under FOI which aids in identifying whether or not the MPS has conducted any other counter criminal or terrorist operations at protests would provide those intent on committing such acts in the future with valuable information as to where the police are targeting their investigations.
If the MPS were to confirm or deny that any other information was or was not held, this could prejudice the Government’s ability to maintain national security. It is not in the public interest to disclose the capabilities of the police service and other UK authorities and the operations that they may or may not use to safeguard the country. This would allow determined individuals the ability to, over time, identify which public authorities hold certain types of national security information and which do not, thereby allowing inferences to be drawn about what authorities or bodies might have an interest in certain matters of national security.
Any response that has the potential to undermine ongoing and future operations to protect the security of the United Kingdom would significantly increase the risk of harm to the community at large. Such actions would obviously not be in the best interest of the public.
Section 30(3) – Investigations and proceedings conducted by the public authority - There is an inherently strong public interest in public authorities carrying out investigations to prevent and detect crime. This ensures that offenders are brought to justice and that the necessary actions are taken to safeguard public funds and resources. To allow the effectiveness of investigations to be reduced, as described in the harm above, is not in the public interest. The Police need to be allowed to carry out investigations effectively away from public scrutiny until such times as the details need to be made public, otherwise it will be difficult for accurate, thorough and objective investigations to be carried out.
Section 31(3) – Law Enforcement - To confirm or deny that any other information is held would compromise law enforcement tactics, including covert activity, in areas which may include serious and organised criminality, as well as extremism and counter terrorism. This would hinder the UK Police service's ability to prevent and detect criminality overall. By confirming that the MPS had conducted any operations of such a nature, or alternatively stating that they had not, would give vital information to criminals regarding areas of more or less policing activity (including covert policing). Criminals could take steps to avoid detection if they are aware of force areas that do not take part in such operations.
The ability of the UK police service to effectively investigate organised crime, or counter terrorist behaviour would be severely compromised.
Where current or future law enforcement capabilities of the force may be compromised by the release of information, it is unlikely to be in the interest of the public.
The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK continues to face a sustained threat from violent extremists and terrorists.
In order to counter criminal and terrorist behaviour it is vital that the police have the ability to work together, to obtain intelligence within current legislative frameworks to assist in the investigative process to ensure the successful arrest and prosecution of offenders who commit or plan to commit acts of terrorism.
To achieve this goal, it is vitally important that information sharing takes place between police officers, members of the public, police forces as well as other security law enforcement bodies within the United Kingdom and internationally if appropriate.
This information sharing supports counter-terrorism measures in the fight to deprive extremists and terrorist networks of the ability to commit crime.
To confirm or deny whether information is held relevant to this question would be extremely useful to those involved in criminal activities and also terrorists as it would enable them to identify police intelligence and whether covert police techniques, including surveillance are being used. This harm is magnified when a request for information is made to all forces, as through individual force confirmation or denial of whether information was held, a national picture would very quickly become apparent of where in the UK police are undertaking monitoring activity, and where they are not.
Any disclosure no matter how generic, which may assist a criminal, terrorist or terrorist organisation will adversely affect public safety.
The Police Service is committed to demonstrating proportionality and accountability regarding surveillance techniques to the appropriate authorities. However, if the Police Service were to either confirm or deny that information exists, it would highlight where the focus of police intelligence and surveillance on specific groups was across the UK. The impact could undermine national security, any on-going investigations and any future investigations, as it would enable targeted individuals/groups to become surveillance aware. This would help subjects avoid detection, and inhibit the prevention and detection of crime.
Security measures are put in place to protect the community we serve. To confirm or deny specific groups are monitored would highlight to terrorists, and individuals intent on carrying out criminal activity, vulnerabilities within policing.
Irrespective of what information is or isn’t held, the public entrust the Police Service to make appropriate decisions with regard to their safety and protection and the only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with what is placed into the public domain.
To confirm or deny whether the Force hold information would allow inferences to be made about the nature and extent of national security related activities which may or may not take place in a given area. This could enable extremist and terrorist group(s) to take steps to avoid detection, and as such, confirmation or denial would be damaging to National Security. To what extent this information may aid a terrorist is unknown, but it is clear that it will have an impact on a force’s ability to monitor terrorist activity.
By confirming or denying any policing arrangements of this nature would render
national security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.
Confirmation or denial that information is held in this case would suggest the MPS take their responsibility to protect information dismissively and inappropriately.
The MPS has a duty of care to the community at large and public safety is of paramount importance. If an FOI disclosure revealed information to the world that would undermine the security of the national infrastructure, offenders, including terrorist organisations, could use this to their advantage which would compromise public safety and more worryingly encourage offenders to carry out further crimes.
By its very nature, information relating to the use of police intelligence and surveillance within a specific force area undoubtedly undermines the effective delivery of operational law enforcement. Under FOI there is a requirement to comply with Section 1(1) (a) and confirm what information is held. In some cases it is that confirmation, or not, which could disclose facts harmful to members of the public, police officers, other law enforcement agencies and their employees.
The most persuasive reasons for confirming or denying that the information is held would demonstrate greater transparency by the MPS. Confirmation of this information being held would lead to greater public awareness.
However, this needs to be weighed against the strongest negative reasons, which, in this case is by neither confirming nor denying that information is held would undermine the integrity of police investigations and law enforcement functions as well as national security. Any disclosure of information, if held, which results in a loss of public confidence in the MPS through its actions would have a detrimental effect on our ability to police the community.
Therefore, it is our opinion that for this reason the balancing test favours neither confirmation nor denial of the requested information.
Disclosure
Question 1, 2 and 4:
Please see excel sheet below.
Q3 - I'd also like to know what constitutes a "large scale operation" please. I have been made aware that forces may not be able to answer, for example, questions about smaller operations like protests of one person, so I've been advised by multiple forces that large scale operations carry a much higher chance of being answerable within cost limit.
We do not hold a definition of what is a ‘large scale operation.’ However, all events follow an assessment process within the MPS. This will follow the College of Policing (CoP) Public Order Authorised Professional Practice and the National Decision Making model. This assessment will look at a number of factors such as complexity and scale of the event. Where it is deemed necessary for a CoP Accredited Command Team then an event will be taken centrally.