Redacted retrospective facial recognition minutes in 2022 and 2023
Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.030506
I note you seek access to the following information:
- All documents presented or provided by the MPS to the London Policing Ethics Panel during the past 12 months in relation to the use of retrospective facial recognition.
- All documents presented or provided by the MPS to the MPS Strategic IAG during the past 12 months in relation to the use of retrospective facial recognition.
- Minutes of all meetings of the MPS RFR Project Board in the past 12 months.
- Any Data Protection Impact Assessments conducted in relation to the MPS RFR system.
- Any Equality Impact Assessments conducted in relation to the MPS RFR system.
- Any Business Justification Papers presented to the MPS Portfolio and Investment Board in relation to the MPS RFR system.
Decision
I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 40(2) - Personal Information
Section 43(2) - Commercial Interests
Section 31(1)(a) - Law Enforcement
Section 42(1) - Legal Professional Privilege
Limitation on disclosure (Partial NCND)
The duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions;
Section 23(5) - Information relating to Security Bodies
Section 24(2) - (National Security
Section 31(3) - (Law enforcement
Reason for decision
In respect of Questions One (1) and Two (2), information is not held or recorded by the MPS.
In respect of Questions Four (4) and Five (5), this information is held but exempt by virtue of the following exemption:
Section 22 - Information intended for future publication
In respect of information recorded for Questions Three (3) and Six (6), information is held and has been disclosed to you in redacted form today.
The document held for Question Six (6) additionally includes redactions as the following exemption has been engaged in regards to data contained therein;
Section 42(1) - Legal Professional Privilege
Limitation on disclosure (Partial NCND)
The MPS is also required to engage a partial NCND to all questions for any other information that may or may not be held in relation to the covert use of FR technology (by the MPS or otherwise) as per our policy definition document below;
LFR - Terminology Overview | Met Police.pdf
The duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions;
- 23(5) (Information relating to Security Bodies)
- 24(2) (National Security)
- 31(3) (Law enforcement)
In regards to the engagement of the above listed exemptions, please note this response should not be taken as an indication of whether or not further information is held, other than what the MPS have confirmed is and is not held within this response to your questions.
When deciding to neither confirming nor deny whether any other information is held a key consideration are the possible detriment that the release of that information may have on future uses of Facial Recognition. For example, confirming if information is held may adversely impact possible covert use of facial recognition technology (whether or not used in this case) as it would potentially inform individuals in relation to the capacity, tactical abilities and capabilities of the MPS or other bodies in this field.
Disclosure under FOIA may create a situation in which individuals are able to discern MPS (and the wider Police) surveillance capabilities and use this information to allow individuals to target specific areas of the UK or to conduct certain activities (including possible criminal/terrorist activities or other activities that undermine the role of the police) where they perceive the risk of effective surveillance to be weakest.
Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities (whether information is or is not held in this instance) will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both National Security and Law Enforcement.
Please note this response should not be taken as an indication of whether or not information in relation to the covert use of facial recognition is held or not. Please note that the absence of further disclosable information should not be taken as a confirmation that any further information exists or not.
Section 22 Information intended for future publication - The spending of additional time and public funds to ensure an early release of data (which will be disclosed in due course), would be inefficient if the information is extracted and published specifically for this request alone.
I appreciate this may not be the decision you would have liked. However, this decision is made on the understanding that the public interest is not what interests the public but is what would be of greater good to the community as a whole if the information were disclosed before its intended time and preparation.
Section 23(5) - Information concerning/relating to security bodies NCND & Section 24(2) - (National Security) NCND - The MPS is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. The security of the country is of paramount importance and the MPS will not divulge whether any other information is or is not held if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk or undermine National Security.
There is a public interest in the transparency of policing, providing assurance that the MPS is appropriately and effectively engaging with any threat from individuals including criminals. However, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both National Security and the integrity of the police in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of National Security. This will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.
To confirm or deny whether the MPS hold any additional information would allow inferences to be made about the nature and extent of national security related activities which may or may not take place. This could enable terrorist groups to take steps to avoid detection, and as such, confirmation or denial would be damaging to national security. By confirming or denying any policing arrangements of this nature would render national security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure on the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.
Section 31(3) - Law Enforcement) NCND - By confirming or denying whether any further information is held would mean that FR law enforcement tactics would be compromised which would hinder the prevention and detection of crime.
Security arrangements and law enforcement tactics (not just in regards to FR) are often reused and have been monitored by criminal groups, fixated individuals and terrorists. These security arrangements and tactics would need to be reviewed which would require more resources and would add to the cost to the public purse if an adverse FOIA disclosure undermined any possible operational methodology/work, specifically in FR activity.
The MPS is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. The ability to protect uphold and protect law enforcement capabilities within the country is of paramount importance and the MPS will not divulge whether any other information is or is not held if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk or undermine law enforcement capabilities due to adverse disclosure.
Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing, providing assurance that the MPS is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat from criminals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding law enforcement methodology and capabilities, as well as the integrity of the police in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced when using FR.
Section 24(2) (National Security) & Section 31(3)(Law Enforcement) NCND - Any disclosure under FOIA is a release to the public at large. Whilst not questioning the motives behind this specific request, confirming or denying that any information relating to the any possible covert practices or use regarding facial recognition would provide the public with details regarding the capacity, tactical abilities and capabilities of the MPS or other bodies, allowing them to target specific areas of the UK to conduct/undertake possible criminal/terrorist activities.
Confirming or denying the specific circumstances in which the Police Service may or may not deploy the use of facial recognition would be likely to lead to an increase of harm to covert investigations and compromise law enforcement. This would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.
The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. Since 2006, the UK Government has published the threat level, based upon current intelligence and that threat has remained at the second highest level ‘severe’, except for two short periods during August 2006, June and July 2007, and more recently in May and June last year following the Manchester and London terrorist attacks, when it was raised to the highest threat, ‘critical’. The UK continues to face a sustained threat from violent extremists and terrorists and the current threat level is set at ‘substantial’.
It is well established that police services use covert tactics and surveillance to gain intelligence in order to counteract criminal or law enforcement undermining behaviour. It has been previously documented in the media that many incidents have been thwarted due to intelligence gained by these means.
Confirming or denying whether any information is or isn’t held relating to the covert use of facial recognition technology would limit operational capabilities as individuals (including criminals/terrorist) would gain a greater understanding of the police’s methods and techniques, enabling offenders to take steps to counter them. It may also suggest the limitations of police capabilities in this area, which may further encourage criminal/terrorist activity by exposing potential vulnerabilities.
This detrimental effect is increased if the request is made to several different law enforcement bodies. In addition to the local criminal fraternity now being better informed, those intent on organised crime throughout the UK will be able to ‘map’ where or how the use of certain tactics may or may not be deployed and why. This can be useful information to those committing (or those intent on committing or planning) crime. It would have the likelihood of identifying location-specific operations which would ultimately compromise police tactics, operations and future prosecutions as criminals could counteract the measures used against them.
Any information identifying the focus of policing activity and methods could be used to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both National Security and Law Enforcement.
Please note this response should therefore not be taken to as an indication of whether or not the further information is held, other than what the MPS have confirmed is or is not held within this response for your questions.
Section 40(2)&(3A)(a) - Personal Information - A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under Freedom of Information, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world and not just to one individual.
Section 40 is an absolute and class-based exemption and if a request for information relates to third parties, it is absolute under Section 40(2) if disclosure would breach any of the data protection principles. There is therefore no requirement to either evidence harm in disclosure or conduct a public interest test
The provision to refuse access to information under Section 40(2)(a)(b) and (3A)(a) of the Act is both absolute and class based. When this exemption is claimed, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to demonstrate what that harm may be in refusing access to information.
40(2)(a)(b) of the Act provides that any information to which a request for information relates, is exempt information if the first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) is satisfied.
The first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) states that personal information is exempt if its disclosure would contravene any of the data protection principles. If the disclosure of the requested personal data would not contravene the data protection principles, the disclosure must also not contravene Sections 3A(b) and 3B of the Act.
Some individual members of the public may feel there is to some degree a legitimate interest in the disclosure of the redacted personal information upon request.
However, the rationale for redacting information is that disclosure is not necessary to satisfy the legitimate interest in disclosure and/or may cause unwarranted harm to one or more data subjects. The names of those already in the public domain who work in this area of Facial recognition have been consider and disclosed today.
Consequently, it would be disproportionate to disclose the redacted remaining personal information.
Additionally there is not an overwhelming legitimate interest of full disclosure of all personal information in consideration that the information in the documents has been disclosed today, along with names of those in the public domain in connection with working in this subject matter.
Having considered the legitimate interest test in respect of this personal data, I have found that particularly in consideration of staff members, and in the context of these minutes, they do not hold roles where they would reasonably expect their names to be continually published in response to specific Freedom of Information Act request relating to requests that at a given point in time may be allocated to them. Additionally, the functions that they performed within these minutes were not that of a decision maker.
The disclosure provided today demonstrates accountability and transparency and is important to the MPS. The rationale for non-disclosure of a staff members name is based on the fact there is little necessity to disclose this personal information to meet a legitimate interest and that disclosure may cause unwarranted harm in its disclosure to the individuals to which the data refers. Consequently, it would be disproportionate to disclose the redacted information.
I have not therefore identified a strong legitimate interest that would be satisfied in disclosing the redacted personal data or any personal data in requests, in response to this request for information.
The public release of names of all MPS employees or all personal information within FOIA requests would not satisfy any identifiable legitimate interest.
Consequently and as explained above, it would be disproportionate to disclose the redacted information.
Section 31(1)(a) (Law enforcement) - While we appreciate you will have no ill meaning behind your request, disclosure could be used by those with criminal intent against the MPS or the UK as intelligence in regards to resources and law enforcement products/methodology. It is not in the public interest to disclose information that could be used to assist in the planning of criminal activity, due to an adverse FOIA disclosure.
Disclosure would lead to a loss of confidence in the MPS’ ability to protect the safety of the community (for example, following an adverse FOIA disclosure regarding service specifications).
The risks to individuals are likely to be significant if the information is used by those with the necessary criminal intent to undermine the very purpose information is held (crime detection and prevention).
Extra security measures and policing resources may need to be put into place with the disclosure of this information. This is because of the risk disclosure brings in that it could be used as intelligence by those with the necessary criminal intent to undermine policing.
The other information disclosed today ensures the public interest is met without placing law enforcement and the safety and security of the community in harm’s way.
I appreciate this is not the decision you would have liked for this part of your request. However this decision has been made on the understanding that the public interest is not what interests the public but is what would be of greater interest to the public as a whole, should the information be disclosed.
Section 42(1) (Legal Professional Privilege) - This exemption applies to information that is protected by Legal Professional Privilege (LPP). The relevant paragraph is subject to Litigation Privilege. This privilege protects confidential written or oral communications between a lawyer and third parties (here, the MPS).
There was an inherent understanding by the legislators when they introduced the Freedom of Information Act 2000 that harm would be caused by the disclosure of information that falls within this exemption – this is why there is no requirement to articulate the prejudice when arguing that it is engaged.
However, this exemption is qualified – and so there are some instances where this type of information is in the public interest to disclose. However, they are not made out in this instance.
There is a strong public interest in safeguarding the openness between communications between a lawyer and their client in order to allow for the full and frank provision of legal advice.
Whilst the MPS understands there is always a public interest in transparency in high profile matters of interest, there is a strong public interest in safeguarding the openness between communications between a lawyer and their client in order to allow for the full and frank communication and advice as a fundamental tenant to the effective administration of justice.
Section 43(2) Commercial Interests - Section 43(2) provides that any information is exempt if its disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice the commercial interests of any person.
The MPS has claimed Section 43(2) of the Act for disclosure of commercially sensitive information. Disclosure of the requested information could be used by competitors or those with criminal intent to harm the MPS business, contracts and its finite resources.
Sections 43(2) of the Act is both a qualified and prejudice based exemption. I am accordingly required to conduct a public interest test to determine whether the 'public interest' lies in disclosing or withholding the requested information. In addition to conducting a public interest test, the MPS must establish the nature of the prejudice/harm that may result from disclosure and where prejudice/harm is established but not certain, determine the likelihood of it occurring.
Public disclosure would harm the Met’s ability to achieve best value in future procurement processes in this area. The MPS would not want to public disclose information regarding its expenditure and commercial information that would detrimentally impact on any future procurement process. The release of any information that would negatively influence, or impact upon, a future procurement process is not in the public interest.
In deciding whether to claim the Commercial Interests exemption (Section 43) of the Act, I have considered whether the public interest lies in favour of releasing the information requested or whether there is sufficient reason to support withholding it.
Having considered the requested information for release, I acknowledge that a public interest would be satisfied in demonstrating how public money is spent. This public interest must be balanced against any identified risk.
Having considered the competing public interest factors, I have found that the public release of information that would negatively influence or impact upon a procurement process and in effect our commercial interests, ability to function and so is not in the public interest.
Disclosure
Please find below information disclosed to you today in respect of Questions Three (3) and Six (6).