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Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.030240
I note you seek access to the following information:
I am requesting to see copies of the Gold Strategy and Tactical Plan for Operation London Bridge.
If necessary to meet the limits set by the act, I only request the first versions of these two documents.
In using Operation London Bridge, I mean the events surrounding the death of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, including the processions and the funerals. Specifically, the period beginning on the 8th September 2022 to the 19th September 2022. This period is not a reference to a desired publication date.
Clarification
I am happy to refine my request to just the MPS-specific Gold strategy and Silver plan.
I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 31(1) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(2) - Personal Information
The MPS can neither confirm nor deny that it holds any other information relevant to your request as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Act does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 24(2) - National Security
Section 31(3) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(5) - Personal information
Reason for decision
To locate the information relevant to your request searches were conducted within the MPS. The searches located information relevant to your request.
Before I explain the reasons for the decisions I have made in relation to your request, I thought that it would be helpful if I outline the parameters set out by the Act within which a request for information can be answered. The Act creates a statutory right of access to information held by public authorities. A public authority in receipt of a request must, if permitted, confirm if the requested information is held by that public authority and, if so, then communicate that information to the applicant.
The MPS refuses full access to the related Con/Ops document, by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 31(1)(a)(b) – Law Enforcement - is engaged in this case as disclosure under the Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice the prevention and detection of crimes and the apprehension or prosecution of offenders.
Release would have the effect of compromising law enforcement tactics and strategies and would also hinder any future investigations or review investigations into similar matters.
Disclosure would technically be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain which would enable those with the time, capacity and inclination to try and map strategies and tactics used by police forces.
Release would have the effect of compromising law enforcement processes and would also hinder the ability of the MPS to fulfil its primary aim of enforcing the law and protecting the public. Any intelligence contained within documents is in use by Officers any release of tactical information could harm our ability to conduct that assessment and reduce our ability to conduct future investigations.
Disclosure would technically be releasing information into the public domain which would enable those with the capacity and inclination to try and use the information to commit crime or evade justice.
Care must be taken to not compromise any strand of an investigation or cause any undue harm to any people or families involved.
The MPS has a duty to protect both witnesses and suspects of criminal investigations and the integrity of tried and tested investigative techniques used now and for future criminal investigations. Therefore, I consider that considerations favouring non-disclosure of the requested information far outweighs the considerations favouring disclosure.
The disclosure of this information to the public by the MPS would undermine individuals' confidence in helping the MPS with investigations. Anything that undermines this would have a detrimental effect, reducing the quality of information the MPS receives and consequently compromising the effectiveness of any investigation.
The disclosure of this information to the public by the MPS would inhibit the flow of free and frank discussion, sharing of advice and best practices for investigations between police services. Anything that undermines this would have a detrimental effect on the thoroughness, efficiency and effectiveness of police investigations and ultimately the apprehension and prosecution of offenders.
Section 40(2)(3)&(4) – Personal Information - of the Act states that information should be exempt if the question asked constitutes a request for personal information which is not the requestors.
The right of access to information is not without exception and is subject to a number of exemptions which are designed to enable public authorities to withhold information that is not suitable for release. Importantly, the Act is designed to place information into the public domain, that is, once access to information is granted to one person under the Act, it is then considered public information and must be communicated to any individual should a request be received.
Details of an investigation could cause an individual to be identified and is therefore exempted in this case.
Section 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018 confirms that information which relates to an identified or identifiable living individual is Personal Data.
The Freedom of Information Act provides an exemption for Personal Data and this is known as the section 40 exemption.
Some of the information sought under your Freedom of Information request includes the following which we consider to be Personal Data
• Names within the data, that could, if disclosed, identify an individual.
Where the request is seeking access to third party personal data the section 40(2) exemption may be engaged. In order to apply the Section 40(2) exemption the disclosure of the requested information must satisfy either the first, second or third conditions as defined by subsections 3A, 3B and 4A of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (as amended by Section 58 of the Data Protection Act 2018).
The first condition ensures that the exemption would apply in circumstances where the disclosure of the information would breach any of the Data Protection Act 2018 principles.
There are six Data Protection principles set out in the 2018 act and these can be found at section 34.
In this instance I have decided that the disclosure of the Personal Data would be incompatible with the first Data Protection principle which states that the processing (in this case the disclosure) of the data must be both lawful and fair.
It should not be surmised that we are applying Sections 31 & 40 to the same pieces of information.
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The MPS can neither confirm nor deny that it holds any other information relevant to your request as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Act does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 24(2) - National Security - To confirm or deny that this information is held would render security measures less effective which would compromise ongoing or future operations to protect the security and infrastructure of the UK. The risk of harm to the public would be elevated if areas of the UK which appear vulnerable were identified which would also provide the opportunity for terrorist planning.
Ongoing or future operations to protect the security and infrastructure of the UK would be compromised as terrorists could map the type and level of counter-terrorist activity across the country, providing them with the knowledge of individual force capability as well as valuable knowledge concerning the vulnerability of individual force areas.
Confirming or denying information if it were held could disrupt any future Operations and investigations, by empowering an awareness of it to the criminal fraternity which could cause a change of criminal tactics to counteract the use of information.
Therefore it cannot be in the public interest to do so. However, this should not be taken as necessarily indicating that any further information that would meet your request exists or does not exist.
Section 31 (3) - Law Enforcement - By confirming or denying whether any further information is held, the criminal fraternity including terrorists would be likely to use this information to try and circumvent police law enforcement capabilities and tactics.
It is inevitably harmful to provide the criminal fraternity including terrorists with current intelligence of the MPS. Law enforcement measures (whether additional information is held or not) would be rendered less effective should the MPS confirm or deny whether any additional information is held.
To confirm or deny whether additional information is held may compromise potential ongoing or future operations and or prosecutions, the consequence of which would hinder the prevention and/or detection of crime. It therefore remains the case that any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of terrorist or criminal organisations. Likewise, confirming whether the MPS does not have additional information provides intelligence that can be used by criminals to undermine the operational integrity of policing that would be likely to adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on the ability of the MPS to protect the public and uphold the law.
There is no doubt that terrorists are able to use publicly disclosed intelligence to counter police measures. Confirmation or denial of whether additional information is held could therefore lead to an increase in crime based on criminals understanding of our capabilities. Such an effect would in turn impact on MPS resources and detract officers and staff from its role in law enforcement.
Confirming or denying whether any further information is held would be likely to compromise law enforcement tactics, which in turn would hinder the prevention and detection of crime.
I find the public interest favours neither confirming nor denying whether any additional information is held in respect of this request.
No inference can be drawn from this response as to the existence or not of the information.
Section 40(5A)&(5B)(a)(i) – Personal Information - A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under Freedom of Information, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world and not just to one individual.
In most cases, Personal Data is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, as I will explain below.
To confirm or deny whether personal information exists in response to your request could publicly reveal information about an individual or individuals, thereby breaching the right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
Where an individual is requesting third party personal data the MPS must ensure that any action taken adheres to the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 and the GDPR. To clarify, the Freedom of Information Act only allows disclosure of personal data if that disclosure would be compliant with the principles for processing personal data. These principles are outlined under section 34 of the DPA 2018 and under Article 5 of the GDPR.
When considering identifiability it should be assumed that the MPS are not looking just at the means reasonably likely to be used by the ordinary person in the street, but also the means that are likely to be used by a determined person with a particular reason to want to identify individuals.
Identified’ does not necessarily mean ‘named’. It can be enough to be able to establish a reliable connection between particular information and a known individual.’
A statement confirming or denying whether information has been received by the MPS in relation to a living individual, could constitute sensitive personal data as such information, due to the remit of the MPS may relate to:
• the commission or alleged commission of any offence
• Any proceedings for any offence committed or alleged to have been committed by the data subject, the disposal of such proceedings or the sentence of any court in such proceedings.
A confirmation or denial, or a pattern of such statements could disclose or infer personal data. This could cause unwarranted harm to the interests of individuals.
Individuals may have a reasonable expectation of confidentiality in relation to personal data held by the MPS or other law enforcement organisations. Information relating to the commission or alleged commission of an offence is classed as sensitive personal data and would reasonably carry an increased expectation of privacy.
Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose or those purposes.’
This notice does not confirm or deny that the MPS holds the information that you have requested.
Should it be held, constituents of this information would attract Section 24 & 31 and other constituents attract Section 40 of the Act.
It should not be surmised that should the information be held by the MPS we would be applying Sections 24, 31, & 40 to the same pieces of information.
Disclosure
You have asked to see copies of the Gold Strategy and Tactical Plan for Operation London Bridge.
The MPS can confirm that information is held for both the Gold Strategy and Tactical Plan.
The strategy for the national event sits with the National Gold, Chief Constable from BTP (British Transport Police)
The MPS can provide a redacted version of the following document.
Operation London Bridge and Related Operations Strategic Intentions GOLD STRATEGY