MEPO 25/13 - WPC Yvonne Fletcher shooting

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.029696

I note you seek access to the following information:

MEPO 25/13 - Shooting of WPC Yvonne Fletcher at the Libyan People's Bureau, St James's Square, London SW1, 17 April 1984: communications facilities

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 31(1)(a) – Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)(3) – Personal Information

Furthermore, the Metropolitan Police Service can neither confirm nor deny that it holds any further information relevant to this request as the duty in S1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply, by virtue of the following sections:

• Section 23(5) - Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters
• Section 24(2) - National Security
• Section 31(3) - Law enforcement
• Section 40(5) - Personal Information

Reason for decision

A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under the Act, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant to provide full details of the police response to this siege and the communication facilities arranged would allow those whose with a criminal or terrorist intent to gain an understanding of police tactics and methods employed.

To disclose all details relating to the communication facilities which were arranged following the shooting of WPC Yvonne Fletcher and the resultant siege at the Libyan’s People’s Bureau would allow those with a criminal intent to have a better understanding of police methodology during these incidents and how and where information might be recorded. This would compromise our law enforcement functions by hindering the prevention and detection of crime. Therefore, Section 31(1)(a) of the Act is engaged.

In addition, Section 40(2)(3) of the Act applies as to disclose personal information contained with the documents would publicly reveal the names of officers below the rank of Chief Superintendent who were involved. The MPS does not disclose the names of its officers under FOIA, unless there is a public interest in doing so. This information, as well as the disclosure of the names of individuals who might have assisted the police during this incident, along with any other identifying information would breach the right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

Section 31(1)(a) – Law Enforcement - The MPS is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we service. There remains the possibility that the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS may be compromised by releasing information relating to the communication facilities during this siege. By disclosing these details would allow members of the public to define and identify the policing tactics used by the MPS when undertaking operations of this type and thus could have a have a detrimental effect on our operational effectiveness.

Release would have the effect of compromising law enforcement tactics as by disclosing the methods being employed to mitigate the risk of a terrorist or criminal incident etc. would hinder the prevention and detection of crime. More crime would be committed, and individuals would be placed at risk.

Disclosure would technically be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain which would enable those with the time, capacity and inclination to try and map strategies used by the MPS and assist them in evading capture.

The MPS is reliant upon the techniques used during its operations and the public release of the modus operandi employed during these would prejudice the ability of the MPS to conduct these in the future.

Additionally, MPS resources and its ability to operate effectively and efficiently would directly be affected as this information, could be manipulated by those with criminal intent to operate in those areas.

The most persuasive reason for disclosing the information is to demonstrate greater transparency by the MPS. This siege occurred nearly 40 years ago and generated great public interest following the death of WPC Fletcher, therefore given the time that has passed to disclose police arrangements relating to communication facilities would allow the public to have a better understanding of how the Police Service operated in these circumstances.

Section 40(2)(3) – Personal Information - are able to withhold information where its release would identify any living individual and breach the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA). I have applied this exemption in that some of the named individuals, including MPS officers and private addresses which are contained within documentation would constitute personal data which, if released, would be in breach of the rights provided by the DPA.

The six principles of the DPA govern the way in which data controllers must manage personal data. Under principle one of the DPA, personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully. I consider that the release of these officers and individuals’ names, as well as addresses that are recorded within the requested documentation constitutes personal data. The release of this information would be unfair as the persons concerned would have no reasonable expectation that the MPS would make this information publicly available.

Furthermore, the Metropolitan Police Service can neither confirm nor deny that it holds any further information relevant to this request as the duty in S1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply, by virtue of the following sections:

Section 23(5) - Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters - The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that, compliance with section 1(1)(a) would involve the disclosure of any information (whether or not already recorded) which was directly or indirectly supplied to the public authority by, or relates to, any of the bodies specified in subsection (3).

Section 24 - National Security & Section 31 - Law Enforcement - Confirmation or denial would identify whether or not the MPS strategy for the management of this incident was deemed to be successful and whether or not any new procedures were adopted. To confirm whether the MPS holds any further information would provide valuable intelligence to those whose intent it is to cause harm through criminal or terrorist activity by undertaking a similar type of hostage situation.

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It should be recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK faces a sustained threat from violent terrorists and extremists. Since 2006, the UK Government have published the threat level, as set by the security service (MI5) based upon current intelligence. The current threat level to the UK is ‘substantial. The government website explains that ‘this means that a terrorist attack is likely’.

In consideration of the ramifications of this threat level, it would not be wise to confirm whether any further documentation exists relating to operational matters. There remains the possibility that the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS may be compromised by releasing information, if held, relating to policing tactics employed during a siege and any subsequent changes made. Some of this might still be applicable to present day policing and as such needs to be treated with extreme sensitivity as it could have a detrimental effect on the operational effectiveness of the MPS.

There are significant risks associated with providing information, if held, in relation to any aspects of an operation, whether it be historical or current, as to provide such details would reveal how these are carried out, which would provide criminals of today with an insight to how the police operate, and people who wish to harm the citizens of London with the opportunity of disrupting police activity.

This could be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public and might require the MPS to actually have to increase the amount of officers available to them thus increasing the cost to the public purse.

By confirming or denying whether any other information is held would render Security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.

By confirming or denying whether or not any further information is held would identify how the police manage incidents of this nature and if there was any outside assistance, which would compromise the partnership approach to law enforcement. Any information, if held, which highlights police siege tactics and processes in place as well as necessary changes, would compromise our law enforcement tactics, which would hinder the prevention and detection of crime. More crime would be committed and individuals would be placed at risk. Security arrangements and tactics are re-used and have been monitored by criminal groups and activists alike.

As previously stated confirmation or denial of further information being held may hinder and undermine the partnership approach to law enforcement.

The integrity of police operations and the security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police service will not divulge whether any further information is, or is not held, if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk or undermine National Security or our law enforcement functions.

The Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve and the release of any further information, if held, that would be detrimental to these functions would clearly not be in the public interest.

The MPS considers that the benefit that would result from a confirmation or denial does not outweigh the harm arising from confirming or denying whether any other information exists relating to this policing operation.

Section 40(5A)&(5B)(a)(i) - Personal Information - the MPS is not required to comply with the requirements of section 1(1) (a) i.e. the duty to inform the applicant whether or not the information is held.

In most cases Personal Data is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act as I will explain below.

To confirm or deny whether any further information exists, would be disclosing whether a named individual(s) had any involvement in this policing operation. This would publicly reveal information about an identifiable individual, thereby breaching the right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act (DPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2018.

Therefore, where an individual is requesting his or her own personal data the information is always exempt. Such information can be requested under other legislation.

However, where an individual is requesting third party personal data the MPS must ensure that any action taken adheres to the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 and the GDPR. To clarify, the Freedom of Information Act only allows disclosure of personal data if that disclosure would be compliant with the principles for processing personal data. These principles are outlined under section 34 of the DPA 2018 and under Article 5 of the GDPR.

Please note that the rationale presented above is in relation to the duty to confirm whether any further information requested is held by the MPS.

To confirm or deny information were held would likely identify individuals and therefore breach the Data Protection Act.

No inference can be drawn from this refusal that any further information is or is not held

Disclosure

Please find below 2 pdfs relating to MEPO file 25/13.