Digital Forensics Units

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.032773

I note you seek access to the following information:

1. The locations of the Met's Digital Forensics Units.
2. If it is possible for officers to access data extracted by Digital Forensics Units remotely.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 31(1)(a)(b) – Law Enforcement

Reason for decision

This is because a disclosure under the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act is a disclosure to the world. That means that any information disclosed in response to a request must be suitable for any individual in the public domain to view. This is demonstrated by the fact that all MPS disclosures made under the Act are published on our external website.

Disclosing the exact locations of these forensic processing hubs would be extremely valuable intelligence to those wishing to disrupt our law enforcement processes and evade apprehension.

Disclosing information about our properties and what work is carried out at each location would enable those with ill intent to potentially disrupt our services. If someone knew the specific locations at which we held and processed forensic evidence, they could utilise this to potentially gain access to or commit attacks against the locations.

This information would therefore be likely to provide enough detail for individuals (or groups of individuals) with mal-intent to disrupt our ability to fulfil our basic law enforcement functions, namely that of criminal investigations, and potentially also put employees at risk.

Section 31(1)(a)(b) – Law Enforcement - of the Act provides an exemption from disclosure of information which would, or would be likely to, prejudice law enforcement functions, namely the prevention and detection of crime and the apprehension or prosecution of offenders.

This exemption has been claimed in that the release and publication of the exact locations of these hubs would provide persons intent on disrupting the work of the MPS with information that would assist them in this endeavour. Section 31 is therefore engaged.

For your information, in this case we are relying on the lower threshold of ‘would be likely’ to prejudice, as opposed to ‘would’.

Where disclosure will be likely to jeopardise the primary functions of the MPS, namely the prevention and detection of crime and ensuring public safety, information needs to be protected.

To provide information about locations at which our officers are based and work out of would disclose the specific resources and capabilities the MPS has at each location. This could highlight potential areas of interest and allow individuals wishing to disrupt certain business areas or processes with the information to do just that.

Disclosure would be likely to give an indication of which areas to target if someone wanted to delay the police ability to securely handle and process forensic evidence. This could therefore compromise the ability of the MPS to investigate offences efficiently and effectively, as well as compromise the security of our operational buildings and our officers and staff, and the security of the public in general.

Ultimately the public release of this information would be likely the adversely affect the ability of the MPS to prevent and detect crime and apprehend those that commit offences. Not only would this be likely to have a negative impact upon our ability to carry out our core law enforcement functions, but it would also impact heavily on officer and public safety.

Disclosing the requested information would be likely to have a detrimental impact upon operational policing and crime investigation.

As explained above, this information could be used to create a list of the locations in London where forensic evidence is processed, stored and examined. This would therefore reveal both the operational and tactical capabilities of the MPS and would allow for the geographic mapping of resources. This would compromise law enforcement tactics and hinder the prevention and detection of crime and the successful apprehension of offenders should the information be used malevolently.

Disclosure would provide those individuals or groups within the criminal fraternity who wish to attack the police with a significant operational advantage. The information could be used to target specific locations to significantly delay or completely hinder our ability to process evidence, thus impacting upon our ability to successfully investigate crime. This would clearly jeopardise the ability of the MPS to respond appropriately to criminal activity and thereby protect the public.

The requested information could be used to compromise law enforcement capabilities by decreasing the ability of the MPS to fight crime, which would increase the commission of crime and subsequently have a detrimental impact on public safety as well as decrease public confidence in the police force.

Whilst it can be accepted that there is a public interest in transparency when any request is made for police information, the public interest favouring release must be balanced against any associated risk and/or prejudice that would be caused through disclosure.

Having carefully considered this, it has been found that that the public release of the exact locations of where we store, handle and process forensic evidence would leave these places vulnerable and assist an offender in successfully planning ways in which to hinder the service’s ability to respond appropriately and successfully to crime.

Clearly the release of any information that is likely to assist the criminal network and impact on our operational and tactical capabilities cannot be in the public interest and whilst wishing to embrace the ethos of information disclosure, this cannot take precedence over public safety.

For these reasons, the release of the requested information is not in the public interest. Accordingly, this information has not been provided to you.

The MPS appreciates this is not the outcome you would have liked. However it is hoped that you understand that this decision is based on the understanding that the public interest is not what interests the public, but is what would be of greater good to the community and the public as a whole should the information be disclosed.

Disclosure

Q1 - The locations of the Met's Digital Forensics Units.

Our Digital Forensic Hubs are labs located around the capital and our HQ and Central Lab is based in Lambeth. Any more details on the locations than this would be exempt in accordance with Section 31 – law enforcement, as explained above.

Q2 - If it is possible for officers to access data extracted by Digital Forensics Units remotely.

We are currently implementing a web based tool that allows investigators to search and examine digital data that has been extracted directly from mobile devices – it is hosted on a secure cloud platform and accessible only from MPS police issue IT including laptops. We are working with criminal justice partners to progress the roll out over the coming months.