MEPO-38/42 - Robert Stewart

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.032126

I note you seek access to the following information:

I'm particularly interested in viewing a document within the MEPO 38 section on extremism that are still held by the Metropolitan Police. I'd be grateful if I'd be allowed to view these files. The document I'd like to look at is: MEPO 38/42: Robert Stewart: Communist: Record File.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 23 - Information supplied by, or concerning, certain security bodies
Section 31(1)(a)(b) – Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)(3) – Personal Information

Reason for decision

Information has been exempted as its disclosure would identify the nature of police enquiries, police methodologies in the gathering of intelligence and the focus of police activities, which would identify areas of interest. To release this information would be prejudicial to law enforcement and as such, Section 31(1)(a)(b) of the Act is engaged.

Section 23(1) has been applied as some of the withheld information would reveal the extent of any involvement of the security bodies by the disclosure of these records.
In addition, Section 40(2)(3) of the Act is engaged as to disclose personal information contained with the documents would publicly reveal the names of officers below the rank of Chief Superintendent who were based in Special Branch after 1950. The MPS does not disclose the names of officers under FOIA, unless there is a public interest in doing so, especially when based in a specialist unit. This information, as well as the disclosure of current residential addresses or other persons of interest, would breach the right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

Section 23 - Information supplied by, or concerning, certain security bodies & Section 31 - Law Enforcement - A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under the Act, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant any information disclosed in relation to this request could be of use to those who seek to cause harm to members of the public by gaining an understanding of the operational techniques employed by officers within the MPS, when conducting an investigation. Disclosure would therefore compromise the MPS’s ability to accomplish its core function of law enforcement.

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It should be recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK faces a sustained threat from violent terrorists and extremists. Since 2006, the UK Government have published the threat level, as set by the security service (MI5) based upon current intelligence. The current threat level to the UK is ‘substantial. The government website explains that ‘this means that a terrorist attack is likely’.

In consideration of the ramifications of this threat level, it would not be wise to disclose how the police conducted their enquiries and gathered intelligence. Disclosure would be harmful to future investigations and policing in general if details around police techniques were disclosed. The investigative tactics employed are still applicable to present day policing. By disclosing these details would allow members of the public to define and identify the investigative tactics used by the MPS when undertaking operations of this type.

The MPS is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we service. There remains the possibility that the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS may be compromised by the releasing of information relating to investigative tactics. Modern-day policing is intelligence led with various methods used to gather information. Therefore, this information needs to be treated with extreme sensitivity as it could have a detrimental effect on the operational effectiveness of the MPS. There are significant risks associated with providing information in relation to any aspects of an operation, whether it be historical or current, as to provide such details would reveal how investigations are carried out, which would provide criminals of today with an insight to how the police operate, and people who wish to harm the citizens of London with the opportunity of disrupting police activity.

Release would have the effect of compromising law enforcement tactics. By disclosing all the requested information, this would identify the methods being employed to mitigate the risk of criminal activity, which would hinder the prevention and detection of crime. More crime would be committed and individuals would be placed at risk.

Disclosure would technically be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain which would enable those with the time, capacity and inclination to try and map strategies used by the MPS and assist them in evading capture.

The MPS is reliant upon the techniques used during investigations and the public release of the modus operandi employed during these would prejudice the ability of the MPS to conduct policing of similar investigations.

Additionally MPS resources and its ability to operate effectively and efficiently would directly be affected as this information, could be manipulated by those with criminal intent to operate in those areas.

To release details of how the MPS conducted its enquiries in relation to this individual would also undermine the partnership approach to law enforcement.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police service will not divulge information if to do so would place the safety of individuals at risk or undermine law enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by various groups or individuals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police investigations and operations in this highly sensitive area.

Even though these tactics have evolved over time, they are still based on tactics that were used over 90 years ago and to disclose these details would allow those with a criminal intent to know how to identify what level of policing activity is likely to take place and what tactics may or may not have been employed in an investigation.
The effect of this information being available to the applicant and more importantly those who might wish to disrupt Police tactics, would be a requirement for a full review of police tactics and possible increase in costs to the public purse.
It is for these reasons I have determined that the balance test favours non-disclosure.

Section 40(2) and (3) - Personal Information - Under of the Act, Public Authorities are able to withhold information where its release would identify any living individual and breach the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA). I have applied this exemption in that some of the named individuals, including Special Branch officers and private addresses which are contained within documentation would constitute personal data which, if released, would be in breach of the rights provided by the DPA.

The six principles of the DPA govern the way in which data controllers must manage personal data. Under principle one of the DPA, personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully. I consider that the release of these officers and individuals’ names, as well as private addresses that are recorded within the requested documentation constitutes personal data. The release of this information would be unfair as the persons concerned would have no reasonable expectation that the MPS would make this information publicly available.

Disclosure

Please find below disclosed documentation relating to MEPO file 38/42, which total 3 pdfs.