FILE MEPO 38/67 - Margot Heinemann

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.032729

I note you seek access to the following information:

I should like to see the file Metropolitan Police MEPO 38/67 Margot Heinemann former reference 301/MP/6391. Although listed at the National Archives, this file is currently retained by the department. If you intend to rely on a Section 22(1) exemption on the grounds of future intended publication, please also provide your estimated date of this publication, together with the information you are relying on to estimate it.

Decision

A full review of MEPO 38/67 has been conducted following receipt of your freedom of information request and I have today decided that the response provided for these previous requests is still applicable. Therefore, only some of the requested information is suitable for disclosure. Some documentation has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 23(1) - Information supplied by, or concerning, certain security bodies
Section 24(1) - National Security
Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)(3) – Personal Information

Reason for decision

Disclosure of some of the requested documentation would either identify issues relating to national security or information which had been supplied by or relate to a security body. In order to protect this information, Section 23(1) and Section 24(1) in the alternative has therefore been applied.

In addition, to disclose some information would identify the nature of police enquiries, methodologies and the focus of their activities highlighting areas of interest. To release this information along with how intelligence was recorded would be prejudicial to law enforcement and as such, Section 31(1)(a)(b) of the Act is engaged.

Finally, Section 40(2)(3) of the Act has been invoked, as to disclose personal information contained with the documents would publicly reveal the names of officers below the rank of Chief Superintendent who were based in Special Branch after 1950. The MPS does not disclose the names of officers under FOIA, unless there is a public interest in doing so, especially when based in a specialist unit. This information, as well as the disclosure of specific individuals of interest, as well as current residential addresses, would breach the right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

Section 23 - Information supplied by, or concerning, certain security bodies - Information held by a public authority is exempt information if it was directly or indirectly supplied to the public authority by, or relates to, any of the bodies specified in subsection (3).

Section 24 - National Security - Information which does not fall within section 23(1) is exempt information if exemption from section 1(1)(b) is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security.

Section 23(1) and Section 24(1) exemptions can be applied together by a public authority in order to withhold information that provides information that would undermine national security or reveal the extent of any involvement of the security bodies by the disclosure of these records. Applying these two exemptions in the alternative means that either one or both of the exemptions applies to information contained within the document, however, it would be inappropriate to confirm which in fact applies.

Based on this definition national security encompasses a wide spectrum and it is our duty to protect the people within the UK. Public safety is of paramount importance to the policing purpose and must be taken into account in deciding whether to disclose the information or not and therefore I find it is not in the public interest to release the requested information.

To disclose the requested information would allow interested parties to gain an upper hand and awareness of policing decisions used to safeguard national security. As you may be aware, disclosure under FOIA is a release to the public at large. Therefore, to disclose the information you have requested into the public domain could potentially be misused proving detrimental to national security.

In this current environment, where there is a possibility of increased threat of terrorist or extremist activity, providing any details that could assist any terrorist or extremist faction would undermine the safeguarding of national security.

It is not in the public interest to disclose information that may compromise the service's ability to accomplish one of its core functions of national security.

To release any policing arrangements of this nature would render Security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to either specific individuals, including those who are visiting the UK or the general public as a whole.

The strongest reason favouring disclosure is this would allow the general public to be aware of the decisions made in relation to specific groups or individuals who were deemed to be members of organisations which could likely impact on national security.

The strongest reason favouring non-disclosure is to do so would allow those with a criminal intent to gain an awareness of policing decisions, therefore rendering them ineffective. This would dramatically weaken the MPS’s ability to safeguard national security in the fight against terrorism and extremism whether on a local, national or international scale.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police service will not divulge whether information is held if to do so would place the safety of an individual or people at risk or undermine National Security. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by various groups or individuals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police investigations and operations in this highly sensitive area. Whilst there is a public interest in keeping everyone informed about security measures, there is also a duty to ensure public safety. It is for these reasons I have determined that the balance test favours non-disclosure.

Section 31 - Law Enforcement - Under the Act, we cannot, and do not request the motives of any applicant for information. We have no doubt that the vast majority of applications under the Act are legitimate and do not have any ulterior motives, however, in disclosing information to one applicant we are expressing a willingness to provide it to anyone in the world and as such the MPS, has no control over what use is made of that information. This means that a disclosure to a genuinely interested applicant automatically opens it up for a similar disclosure to anyone, including those who might represent a threat to individuals, or any possible judicial process.

By disclosing information which relates to how officers conducted their enquiries, gathered and recorded intelligence and therefore ascertained who was of interest, would be harmful to future investigations and policing in general if details around police techniques were disclosed. The information contained within this file spans a number of decades and although some of this relates to investigative tactics employed in the 1930s onwards; the basis of the methods adopted is still applicable to present day policing. By disclosing these details would allow members of the public to define and identify the investigative tactics used by the MPS when planning and undertaking operations of this type.

The MPS is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we service. There remains the possibility that the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS may be compromised by the releasing of information relating to investigative tactics. Modern-day policing is intelligence led and information of this nature needs to be treated with extreme sensitivity as it could have a detrimental effect on the operational effectiveness of the MPS. There are significant risks associated with providing information in relation to any aspects of an operation, whether it be historical or current, as to provide such details would reveal how investigations are carried out, which would provide criminals of today with an insight to how the police operate, and people who wish to harm the citizens of London with the opportunity of disrupting police activity.
This could be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public and might require the MPS to actually have to increase the amount of officers available to them thus increasing the cost to the public purse.

Release would have the effect of compromising law enforcement tactics as by disclosing details of police tactics used in the gathering of intelligence etc., could be used by those with a criminal intent to gain an insight into what type of information is deemed pertinent to the MPS and how this is recorded. By disclosing this, it could ultimately hinder the prevention and detection of crime. More crime would be committed and individuals would be placed at risk.

Disclosure would technically be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain which would enable those with the time, capacity and inclination to try and map strategies used by the MPS.

The MPS is reliant upon the techniques used during small and large scale operations and the public release of the modus operandi employed during these operations would prejudice the ability of the MPS to conduct policing of similar operations.

Additionally MPS resources and its ability to operate effectively and efficiently would directly be affected as this information could be manipulated by those with criminal intent to operate in those areas.

To disclose how the police conducted their enquiries by gathering and recording intelligence would allow criminals an insight into police investigations and ultimately how to evade prosecution, therefore compromising the MPS’s ability to accomplish its core function of law enforcement.

Section 40 - Personal Information - Act, Public Authorities are able to withhold information where its release would identify any living individual and breach the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA). I have applied this exemption in that some of the named individuals, including Special Branch officers and private addresses which are contained within documentation would constitute personal data which, if released, would be in breach of the rights provided by the DPA.

The six principles of the DPA govern the way in which data controllers must manage personal data. Under principle one of the DPA, personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully. I consider that the release of these officers and individuals’ names, as well as private addresses that are recorded within the requested documentation constitutes personal data. The release of this information would be unfair as the persons concerned would have no reasonable expectation that the MPS would make this information publicly available.

In reaching my decision, I have, in each case, given due regard to the condition at Article 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(e) of the GDPR. Condition one of the GDPR requires that consideration is given to whether consent for disclosure has been given whilst Condition six requires that consideration is given to performance of a public task in the public interest.

Having considered both conditions, I have established that no consent is present or would likely be received to release this information.

When this exemption is applied, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to consider whether release of information is in the public interest or demonstrate what harm would result from disclosure.

Disclosure

Please find below documentation suitable for disclosure contained within MEPO 38/67.