Prevent/Channel data management

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.029461

I note you seek access to the following information:

The document CTP-Prevent Policy 2020 (released under 01.FOI.21.021978) provides a number of details related to Prevent case management. Please answer the following questions or provide the following documents:

1: The document notes that the following databases are searched when a referral is made:
o PNC,
o PND,
o NCIA,
o OpenSource,
o Local Crime & Intel Systems,
o CTHolmes

1a. Please indicate whether Prevent referrals are also added to that database.

1b. Please indicate whether a note is added about Prevent referrals to those databases.

1c. Please indicate whether data from those databases is added to the PCDM and/or the CMIS.

2: The document indicates that the PCMD cannot store documents, and instead documents are added to case notes. Please indicate whether these case notes are deleted after a PCMD file is closed.

3: The document notes where foreign nationals are referred to Prevent, consideration must be given to contacting the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Criminal Records Office (CRO) and Immigration Services to identify whether Subject has any convictions abroad. Please release any Data Sharing Agreements and Data Protection Impact Assessments relevant to this.

4: The document notes that for any Subjects who show a propensity to travel to areas of conflict or who are juveniles, consideration must be given to requesting CTP-POC create a Ports Intelligence Watchlist (PIW). Please release any guidance on data retention for the PIW.

4a. Please also answer the following related to the PIW: For how long is the data retained? Are subjects with a closed PCMD case deleted from the PIW? Are subjects and/or guardians informed that they are placed on the PIW? What oversight is there of the PIW?

5: The document notes that there is now a editable Data Sharing Agreement template on the CTNet. Please release this.

6: The document notes that “We are in the process of agreeing the terms of a single national DPIA for CTP-Prevent as a whole, which includes PLP processes, the PCM Tracker and its uses.” Please release this.

7: Please outline how continually feeding intelligence to the FIMU meets your data protection obligations. If this is outlined in a document or Data Protection Impact Assessment or Data Sharing Agreement, please release this.

8: The document notes that the PCMD is “Official Sensitive” and that nothing Secret or above can be stored there. Please outline how any Prevent and/or Channel data that is Secret or above is stored, in which database, who has access, who it is shared with, and how this data is managed.

9: Please list all parties who were consulted about answering this request. Only position and organisation is required.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 24(1) – National security
Section 31(1)(a)(b) – Law enforcement
Section 40(2)(3) – Personal information

Reason for decision

I have decided to address some questions separately.

In regards to Questions 1c, 2 and 3, I have today decided to disclose the requested information. Please see the section below entitled ‘Disclosure’.

Information relating to Questions 1a, 1b, 7, 8 and 9 (names of individuals) have been withheld as they are exempt from disclosure.

In relation, to Questions 4, 4a, 5 and 6 the searches failed to locate any information relevant to your request, therefore, the information you have requested is not held by the MPS. I would like to take this opportunity to advise why this information is not held. You have requested information which relates to or concerns Counter Terrorism Policing and therefore has a national remit. Such requests for information will therefore need to be directed to the team who manage these FOIA requests on behalf of the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC).

To disclose information relevant to the prevent referral system and details around the updating of any further databases or documentation concerning where any resulting intelligence is fed would identify policing tactics and operational procedures pertaining to the Prevent programme. This would allow those with a criminal or extremist intent to gain an operational advantage over the MPS and therefore undermine the safeguarding of National Security and compromise our law enforcement functions.

In regards to Question 9, whilst the details of the searches conducted on the first page denote the policing organisations consulted, to also release the names of individuals consulted with in answering this request, would provide the names of officers and staff based CTC and CTPHQ, which would be breach of data protection.

Section 24 - National Security & Section 31 - Law Enforcement

In considering whether or not this information should be disclosed, I have considered the potential harm that could be caused by disclosure.

A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication.

This is because, under the Act, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant to disclose the requested information may allow those with a criminal intent to gain a better understanding of policing tactics across the Prevent network to determine how police obtain, manage and record referrals in an effort to counter extremist activity.

Providing details relating to policing methodologies or tactics would enable those seeking to identify vulnerabilities in counter terrorism operations to gain valuable information. The disclosure of the requested information would undermine the effectiveness of the Prevent programme and consequently be detrimental to our ability to be able to deal with the on-going terrorist threat we face.

The UK faces a serious and sustained threat from violent terrorists and extremists and this threat is greater in scale and ambition than any of the terrorist threats in the past. Government reports suggest that at any one time the police and security agencies are contending with many terrorist plots, terrorist groups or networks and individuals who are judged to pose a threat to the well-being of the UK and or UK interests. While the plots may not necessarily all be directed at specific individuals or locations, the MPS have a duty to promote the safety of all individuals. Therefore, to release this information would allow interested parties to gain an upper hand and awareness of policing decisions used to safeguard national security. National security encompasses a wide spectrum and it is our duty to protect the people within the UK and abroad. Public safety is of paramount importance to the policing purpose and must be taken into account in deciding whether to disclose information. By providing the requested information, this could potentially be misused proving detrimental to national security.

In consideration of the ramifications of these threat levels, it would not be wise to release specific details relating to Prevent programme linked to the referral process and any subsequent actions, as to do so could possibly compromise the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS.

Aspects of the Prevent programme require the local community to work in partnership with the police and other local agencies, and if it were felt that the programme had been discredited this could lead to these partners disengaging from the process altogether. This would ultimately lead to fewer referrals and therefore an increased risk from extremists and terrorists

In the current environment of an increased threat of terrorist activity, providing any details that could assist an extremist, terrorist faction or fixated individual who have the relevant time and know-how, would put people’s lives at risk.

To release the requested information would render Security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public as those with an extremist intent could gain information that may resulting in a disruption to CT activity in the area of Prevent across the country.

The public interest is not what interests the public but what will be of greater good if released to the community as a whole. It is not in the public interest to disclose information that may compromise the service's ability to accomplish its core function of law enforcement.

Law enforcement tactics would be compromised because those with a criminal or extremist intent would have better operational knowledge of the Prevent programme, the information that is recorded and how it is used. Any disclosure which could result in a disruption to CT activity will impact on police resources and therefore place individuals at risk.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police service will not divulge information if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk or undermine National Security and Law Enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing programmes and, in this case, providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by extremists and terrorists, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of the police service in the highly sensitive area of terrorism.

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of national security this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. Details relating to police tactics and operational procedures is of intelligence value to those with a criminal or extremist intent and therefore it is our opinion that, for these reasons, the balancing test does not fall in favour of disclosing the information requested.

Section 40 - Personal Information - Under Section 40(2) and (3) of the Act, Public Authorities are able to withhold information where its release would identify any living individual and breach the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA). I have applied this exemption as by providing the names of those who have been consulted with to assist with this FOIA request, would constitute personal data which, if released, would be in breach of the rights provided by the DPA.

The six principles of the DPA govern the way in which data controllers must manage personal data. Under principle one of the DPA, personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully. I consider that providing information that identifies individuals constitutes personal data. The release of this information would be unfair as the persons concerned would have no reasonable expectation that the MPS would make this information publicly available.

In reaching my decision, I have, in each case, given due regard to the condition at Article 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(e) of the GDPR. Condition one of the GDPR requires that consideration is given to whether consent for disclosure has been given whilst Condition six requires that consideration is given to performance of a public task in the public interest.

Having considered both conditions, I have established that no consent is present or would likely be received to release this information.

Disclosure

Please find below information relevant to Questions 1c, 2 and 3.

Q1c - Please indicate whether data from those databases is added to the PCDM and/or the CMIS.

Information gathering that takes place will be recorded within the case management system to assist with making justified and accountable decisions around the safeguarding and management of an individual.

Q2 - The document indicates that the PCMD cannot store documents, and instead documents are added to case notes. Please indicate whether these case notes are deleted after a PCMD file is closed.

Deletion of information is in line with policy and MOPI guidelines. This will include all documents linked to a case but necessarily stored within the case management system.

Q3 - The document notes where foreign nationals are referred to Prevent, consideration must be given to contacting the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Criminal Records Office (CRO) and Immigration Services to identify whether Subject has any convictions abroad. Please release any Data Sharing Agreements and Data Protection Impact Assessments relevant to this.

There are no Data Sharing Agreements and Data Protection Impact Assessments.