MPS review of Parliamentary and Diplomatic Protection(PaDP)

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.028322

I note you seek access to the following information:

Dear Metropolitan Police Service

On the 19 January 2023 Baroness Bertin made reference in the chamber of the House of Lords (See Hansard - column 1940) to sitting on an advisory panel for the Metropolitan Police’s ongoing review of PaDP - the Parliamentary and Diplomatic Protection Command.

Please provide a copy of:
1. The Terms of Reference for this review.
2. The full agendas, papers and minutes for all of the meetings of the advisory group which have been held to date.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 21 - Information Accessible by Other Means
Section 24 - National Security
Section 31 - Law Enforcement
Section 40 - Personal Information

Reason for decision

To disclose the information requested in full would reveal operational details relating to the work of PaDP and other MPS units and emerging recommendations relating to operational changes that may, or may not, be actioned in the future. This could allow those who seek to cause harm to gain an understanding of current and potential protection arrangements, the resources and capabilities of PaDP, and any potential vulnerabilities in these arrangements. Any release of operational information which has the potential to compromise our law enforcement functions by hindering the prevention and detection of crime, and also the safeguarding of national security by impacting on the effectiveness of current or future security arrangements, is exempt by virtue of Section 24(1) and 31(1)(a) of the Act.

Section 24 - National Security - Disclosing this information would render security measures less effective. In order to safeguard national security, there is a need for the MPS to protect information held as to release it would likely have a detrimental effect on policing resources, particularly in the sensitive area of national security.
Policing resources would be negatively affected should those with a terrorist or criminal intent gain an understanding of current security measures in place and any vulnerabilities or short-comings identified. This would allow them to obtain an operational advantage over MPS resources (allocated for national security purposes) and therefore undermine or circumvent any current or potential arrangements in place. This would restrict our operational effectiveness and result in a potential risk to public safety.

Section 31 - Law Enforcement - To release additional information relevant to this request, which relates to the assessment of PaDP’s operational strengths and weaknesses and specific emerging recommendations relating to potential changes to its operating model, would mean that there is a strong possibility that the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS will be compromised. Those intent to cause harm would have a better understanding of the operational capabilities of PaDP, which would therefore hinder the prevention and detection of crime.

In addition, it can be argued that there are significant risks associated with providing this information, since it would reveal our operational practices, enabling terrorists to exploit any perceived gaps or short-comings. Any disclosure under FOIA which provides those intent to cause harm with valuable intelligence and the opportunity to identify any perceived vulnerabilities around our methodology, would impact on our ability to effectively enforce the law. Consequently, police resources would need to increase to counteract any threat in terrorist or criminal activity.

A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under the Act, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual. Therefore, the MPS has no control over what use is made of that information.
Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, it must be noted that the threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It should be recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK faces a sustained threat from violent terrorists and extremists. With the current threat level to the UK given as ‘substantial’ the Home Office website explains that ‘this means that a terrorist attack is likely’.

In consideration of the ramifications of these threat levels, it would not be wise to release operational details relating to PaDP’s role, resources (such as officer numbers) and capabilities, as to do so could compromise our current or future law enforcement role and the effectiveness of protection arrangements. There are significant risks associated with the release of such information as this may provide those seeking to commit criminal acts with an advantage over the MPS, as the information withheld can be viewed as operationally sensitive.

Disclosure could also have a negative effect on the MPS’s ability to identify and review vulnerabilities and short-comings in operational matters, should the release of information from such internal reviews be used and manipulated by those who are intent on carrying out terrorist/extremist activities. To disclose the requested information would therefore provide those intent on harm with an insight into PaDP’s capabilities and an opportunity of disrupting police activity.

Due to the nature of PaDP’s role, which includes the protection of the Parliamentary estate, any detrimental effect on their operational effectiveness would also have a detrimental effect on the MPS’ role in protecting National Security.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police Service will not divulge information if to do so has the potential to place the safety of the public at risk, undermine National Security or law enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing and, in this case, providing assurance that the police service is effectively reviewing the culture and effectiveness of PaDP, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police operations in this highly sensitive area.

As much as there is a public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced, in areas of National Security, this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. The area of protective security involves sensitive issues of intelligence value to a criminal or terrorist, which if disclosed, could undermine our ability to combat crimes of this nature. The prevention and detection of crime is the foundation upon which policing is built. Therefore, to disclose any information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on our law enforcement functions.

To disclose names and other personal details of specific individuals referenced in the documents would also breach the right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Therefore, Section 40(2)(3) of the Act is also engaged.

Section 40 - Personal Information - Under Section 40(2) and (3) of the Act, Public Authorities are able to withhold information where its release would identify any living individual and breach the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA). I have applied this exemption in that the documentation requested includes personal details of specific individuals and records personal experiences and opinions attributable to them. This constitutes personal data that, if released, would be in breach of the rights provided by the DPA.

The six principles of the DPA govern the way in which data controllers must manage personal data. Under principle one of the DPA, personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully. I consider that providing information that identifies individuals constitutes personal data. The release of this information would be unfair as the persons concerned would have no reasonable expectation that the MPS would make this information publicly available.

In reaching my decision, I have, in each case, given due regard to the condition at Article 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(e) of the GDPR. Condition one of the GDPR requires that consideration is given to whether consent for disclosure has been given whilst Condition six requires that consideration is given to performance of a public task in the public interest.

Having considered both conditions, I have established that no consent is present or would likely be received to release this information.
When this exemption is applied, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to consider whether release of information is in the public interest or demonstrate what harm would result from disclosure.

In addition, I am pleased to inform you that some of the information requested is held by the MPS, but is already in the public domain. Information provided to the review group relating to The Baroness Casey Review has already been published. Please see the links below:

Baroness Casey's letter to Commissioner

Commissioner Sir Mark Rowley's letter to Baroness Casey on misconduct - October 2022

Baroness Casey Review Interim Report on Misconduct.pdf

Therefore, this information has been identified as being accessible via other means as it is already published. Where information is already in the public domain the MPS are not required to re-publish the data; instead public authorities are required to direct you to the information, which we have done in this instance. This action is in accordance with Section 21 of the Freedom of Information Act.

Disclosure

Please find below the following documents (11 in total) pertaining to your request:

• Operation Leven Terms of Reference
• Agenda for meeting dated 01 December 2022
• Agenda and Minutes for meeting of 27 January 2022
• Agenda and Minutes for meeting of 31 March 2022
• Misconduct Analysis document
• AFO Training slide
• 3 x supporting slides