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Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.032832
I note you seek access to the following information:
Thank you for your response to my FOI request. As advised, I will reshape the request.
i) Has the Met Police run training or exchange programmes with Israel's police or military from 2020 to present?
ii) If yes, I request the itinerary and timetable of the training or exchange programme.
iii) Has the Met Police Senior Management Team held any event with Israel's police or military from 2020 to present?
iv) If yes, I request the itinerary and timetable of the event
I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:
• Section 24(1) National Security
• Section 27(1) - International Relations
• Section 31(1) - Law Enforcement
• Section 23(5) - Information supplied by, or concerning, certain Security Bodies;
• Section 24(2) – National Security
• Section 31(3) – Law Enforcement
Reason for decision
Before I explain the reasons for the decisions I have made in relation to your request, I thought that it would be helpful if I outline the parameters set out by the Freedom of Information Act 2000 within which a request for information can be answered.
When a request is made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act), a public authority must inform you, when permitted, whether the information requested is held. It must then communicate that information to you. If a public authority decides that it is cannot comply with all or part of a request, it must cite the appropriate section or exemption of the Act and provide you with a suitable explanation. It is important to note that the Act is designed to place information into the public domain, that is, once access to information is granted to one person under the Act, it is then considered public information and must be communicated to any individual should a request be received.
Section 24(1) - National Security - Any release under FOIA is a disclosure to the world, not just to the individual making the request. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, providing specific details of meetings, exchanges, learning visits or joint training between the force and the Israeli police, Israeli Civil Administration or Israeli Defence Forces would highlight to criminals, including terrorists, intricacies of tactical abilities and capabilities between the force and the relevant country. This awareness would allow terrorists to target specific areas within the United Kingdom and abroad which they feel are vulnerable targets. Any information which could be used to pose a threat to the national security of the UK is harmful to release.
Security measures are in place to protect the communities that police forces serve.
To disclose information relevant to this request would highlight to terrorists and individuals intent on carrying out criminal activity, potential vulnerabilities within the Police Service. Taking into account the current security climate, with a current terrorist threat of ‘Substantial’, meaning an attack is ‘likely’, no information which could assist a terrorist in their attempts to disrupt society should be disclosed. To what extent this information may aid a terrorist is unknown, but it is clear that it would have an impact on a force’s ability to monitor terrorist activity, both nationally and internationally.
The public trust the Police Service as a whole to make appropriate decisions with regards their safety and protection, and one of the ways of reducing risk is to be cautious with what is placed into the public domain.
The cumulative effect of terrorists gathering information from various sources would be even more impactive when viewed as a whole. The more information that is disclosed over time will provide a detailed account of the tactical infrastructure of a force area, then the country as a whole, and then globally.
Any incident that results from such a disclosure would by default affect national
security.
In addition, other organisations outside the police service are also widely involved in overseas deployments, and therefore disclosing information relevant to the request would harm the close relationship that exists with such organisations, where trust and confidence in specific areas have been built up over time.
To disclose information would allow inferences to be made about the nature and extent of national security related activities abroad. This could enable terrorist groups to take steps to avoid detection, and as such, this would impact and be damaging to National Security. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infrastructure both within the UK and internationally
Section 27(1) - International Relations - Section 27 recognises that the effective conduct of international relations depends upon the maintenance of trust and confidence between states and international organisations. If the UK does not maintain this trust and confidence, its ability to protect and promote UK interests through international relations will be severely diminished. Disclosure of information captured by this request would be very likely to be seen as a breach of trust, which is fundamental to international relations in general. In this particular instance, is vital to the UK’s ability to conduct effective relations with these countries.
Furthermore, disclosure of the information requested could well have the effect of limiting the bargaining power for these states with future training providers. Such a consequence would be very likely to prevent other international states from working with and seeking the assistance of the UK in the future; it cannot be assumed that provision of training and assistance by the force is purely for financial gain. The provision of such services has a much wider impact on the wellbeing of the UK’s relations with international law enforcement partners, as well as the UK’s economic, diplomatic and intelligence interests. Moreover, disclosure of any specifics of training packages captured by the request, which are provided to countries, including the amounts charged (which may for valid reasons, differ from country to country) runs the very real risk of damaging the UK’s international relations with the countries concerned.
Disclosure of the information requested is very likely to prejudice and cause irreparable damage to relations between the UK and other states. It would be very likely to be seen as a breach of trust by the UK, and confidence, fundamental to such international relations would in turn compromise the ability of the UK to promote and protect its interests abroad whilst also undermining the UK’s ability to form new and mutually beneficial relationships with other states. The reduction in revenue likely to result from states choosing not to approach the UK for further services. The damage that disclosure is likely to cause to the UK’s international relations cannot be said to be in the public interest.
Transparency in public office in respect of requests concerning police training, whether domestically and abroad, would inform public debate, provide reassurance and promote confidence in the police service as a whole. There is however a considerable risk that disclosure of all of the information requested would be seen by some as a breach of vital trust and confidence, and would cause severe and lasting damage to UK relations with other states. The release of information that is likely to prejudice the interests of the UK abroad, and further undermining the ability of the UK to protect and promote its interests abroad cannot be in the public interest, and therefore the public interest test favours withholding the redacted information.
Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement - The release of this information would compromise the forces’ ability to engage and assist overseas police forces in tackling international threats and share best practice within policing. The disclosure would identify countries in which the force has a direct interest in offering assistance, which could infer local overseas criminal threats. The safety of the public is of paramount importance to policing purposes, and any increase in crime would place the public at risk of harm.
Taking the above points into account the balance favours non-disclosure at this time.
To disclose any further information other than the data already published, would not only effectively prejudice law enforcement as information is held exclusively for the purpose of a police investigation. It would also lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infrastructure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.
The MPS has a duty of care to the community at large and public safety is of paramount importance. The effective conduct of international relations depends upon maintaining trust and confidence between overseas government states. The information requested, would destroy that trust and confidence, which in turn would hamper international relations affecting the United Kingdom’s ability to protect and promote the country’s interests.
Additionally, and irrespective of what other information may or may not be held, the MPS can neither confirm nor deny that it holds any other information relevant to this request, as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply by virtue of Section 23(5) of the Act, Section 24(2) – National Security and Section 31(3) which provides an exemption for information supplied by or concerning certain Security Bodies, National Security and Law Enforcement respectively.
Evidence of Harm in complying with Section 1(1)(a) - Confirming or denying the existence of whether any other information is or isn’t held would contravene the constrictions laid out within s23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in that this stipulates a generic bar on disclosure of any information applied by, or concerning, certain Security Bodies.
Any release under FOIA is a disclosure to the world, not just to the individual making the request. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, confirming or denying that any other information is held relating to meetings, joint training, and exchange programmes between the force and the Israeli police, Israeli Civil Administration or Israeli Defence Forces would highlight to criminals the tactical abilities and capabilities between the force and the relevant country. This awareness would allow terrorists to target specific areas within the United Kingdom and abroad which they feel are vulnerable targets.
Confirming or denying whether any other specific agreements are held would lead to an increase of harm to investigations as well as compromise law enforcement. This would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.
The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK Government publish the threat level which is based on current intelligence and currently stands at ‘Substantial’ which means an attack is likely.
It is publicly acknowledged that police forces train their officers and staff to a high standard across the United Kingdom, which includes specific training for terrorism related offending, and that these courses are offered to international clients.
Confirming or denying that any other information is held relating to the types of training, meetings and exchange programmes provided to other countries between
The Metropolitan Police Service and the Israeli Police, Israeli Civil Administration or Israeli Defence Forces between 2014-present, would provide terrorists with a greater understanding of where specific training and exchange programmes are provided.
This awareness would reveal vulnerabilities. This detriment effect is increased as the request has been received by more than one force. In addition to the local criminal fraternity being better informed, those intent on carrying out terrorist atrocities would be able to ‘map’ which forces deals with which country and vice versa. This can be useful information to those committing crimes.
Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both national security and law enforcement.
Evidence of harm in confirmation or denial for Section 31(3) – Law Enforcement and Section 24(2) – National Security - The ICO’s guidance in relation to section 24 states that this exemption applies where withholding information is ‘required for the purposes of safeguarding national security’. ‘Required’ is taken to mean that the use of the exemption is reasonably necessary, and therefore sets a fairly high threshold for its use. It may not be vital to apply the exemption, but it must certainly be more than just useful or convenient. The ICO guidance further states that although there has to be a real possibility that national security would be undermined, the threat to the UK does not need to be direct or immediate.
Whilst national security is not defined in law, the Information Commissioner considers that it can be interpreted widely. Further to this, whilst confirming or denying the existence of an operational code name may appear seemingly innocuous, in reality it could infer or indirectly reveal information or intelligence about the scope or nature of policing operations. In the circumstances of your request, confirming, denying or identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of criminal networks or terrorist groups when pieced together with other available information.
The cumulative effect would be that the operational integrity of those activities would be undermined and the UK’s national security would be compromised. The more information placed into the public domain over time would provide a detailed account of the tactical infrastructure of not only an individual force area but also the country as a whole. The ICO acknowledge the ‘mosaic effect’ of this type of intelligence gathering, and advise:
‘We also recognise that terrorists can be highly motivated and may go to great lengths to gather intelligence. This means there may be grounds for withholding seemingly harmless information on the basis that it may assist terrorists when pieced together with other information they may obtain.’
The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. Since 2006, the UK Government has published the threat level, based upon current intelligence. The UK continues to face a sustained threat from violent extremists and terrorists and the current national threat level is ‘substantial’. It is well established that police forces use a number of covert tactics to gain intelligence in order to counteract criminal behaviour, and it has been previously documented in the media that many terrorist incidents have been thwarted due to intelligence gained by these means.
Disclosing any information in response to your request, has the real potential to act to weaken national security measures and undermine the UK Government’s efforts to prevent acts of terrorism and terrorist related crime
Section 24(2) - National Security & Section 31(3) – Law Enforcement - By confirming or denying whether any other information is held would render security measures less effective and could lead to ongoing or future operations to protect the security of the United Kingdom being compromised and becoming less effective. This in turn would increase the risk of harm to the public.
In this case confirmation or denial would have the effect of compromising law enforcement tactics and would also hinder any future investigations. In addition, it has been recorded that FOIA releases are monitored by criminals and terrorists and so to confirm or deny any other information is held would lead to law enforcement being undermined. The Police Service utilises a number of techniques whilst training their officers and staff and we would not wish to inadvertently reveal tactical options within an FOI disclosure that may undermine law enforcement.
Section 31(3) – Law Enforcement and Section 24(2) – National Security - The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police Service will not divulge whether any other information is or isn’t held if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk, undermine National Security or compromise the effective delivery of Operational Law Enforcement.
Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of training provided to officers and staff in other countries, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police training and relationships with outside agencies, including police forces abroad.
As much as there is a public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. The areas of police interest discussed above for this case are sensitive issues and therefore it is our opinion that for these issues confirmation or denial that any other information is held, at this time, is not made out.
This should not be taken as necessarily indicating that any other information that would meet your request exists or does not exist.
Disclosure
In a partial answer to your first and third answer, On Wednesday 18 May 2022, the Met's Central East Command Unit hosted an Israeli police delegation. Further details of this can be found by following the link to our website below:
Central East Command Unit hosting an Israeli police delegation