Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.030730
I note you seek access to the following information:
The requested information all relates to the Met's use of facial recognition technologies and is based on comments made by Lindsey Chiswick to Parliament's Science, Innovation and Technology Committee. A transcript of the session can be found here.
1. For all of the facial recognition deployments in 2023, to the date of this request, please may you provide me with any of the results of "blue list" testing.
2. For all of the facial recognition deployments in 2023, to the date of this request, please may you provide me with the "community impact assessments" that were referenced by Lindsey Chiswick.
3. Finally, please may you provide me with minutes from 2023 of the Strategic Facial Recognition Board that is run within the Met.
Decision
I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement,
Section 40(2)(a)(b) and (3)(a)(i)(ii)(b) Personal information
Section 42(1) Legal Professional Privilege.
Reason for decision
Before I explain the reasons for the decisions I have made in relation to your request, I thought that it would be helpful if I outline the parameters set out by the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) within which a request for information can be answered.
The Act creates a statutory right of access to information held by public authorities. A public authority in receipt of a request must, if permitted, confirm if the requested information is held by that public authority and, if so, then communicate that information to the applicant.
The right of access to information is not without exception and is subject to a number of exemptions which are designed to enable public authorities to withhold information that is not suitable for release. Importantly, the Act is designed to place information into the public domain, that is, once access to information is granted to one person under the Act, it is then considered public information and must be communicated to any individual should a request be received.
For the Community Impact Assessments and Strategic Facial Recognition Board minutes requested redactions were made as to disclose names of individuals, phone numbers, email addresses and details of specific policing tactics and intelligence such as what resources are used and where they are located and how the police operate under certain conditions etc and specific legal advice which could cause an individual to be identified and interfere with any ongoing investigation and prejudice the prevention and detection of crime and the apprehension or prosecution of offenders. This cannot be allowed.
Section 31 – Law Enforcement - The MPS is charged with enforcing the law and preventing and detecting crime. Any information released under the Act which reveals information related to the gathering of intelligence and police strategies and tactics would prejudice the prevention and detection of crime and the apprehension or prosecution of offenders.
Disclosure of details of specific policing tactics, capabilities and intelligence such as what resources are used and where they are located and how the police operate under certain conditions etc risks providing information to those that may wish to cause harm or circumvent police tactics.
Release would have the effect of compromising law enforcement processes and would also hinder the ability of the MPS to fulfil its primary aim of enforcing the law and protecting the public.
Disclosure would technically be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain which would enable those with the time, capacity and inclination to try and map strategies and tactics used by police forces.
Section 40 - Personal Information - The information sought under your Freedom of Information request includes the following which we consider to be Personal Data, names of individuals, phone numbers, email addresses, etc.
Where the request is seeking access to third party personal data the section 40(2) exemption may be engaged.
In order to apply the Section 40(2) exemption the disclosure of the requested information must satisfy either the first, second or third conditions as defined by subsections 3A, 3B and 4A of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (as amended by Schedule 19 of the Data Protection Act 2018, specifically Section 58 of that schedule).
The first condition ensures that the exemption would apply in circumstances where the disclosure of the information would breach any of the Data Protection Act 2018 principles.
There are six Data Protection principles set out in the 2018 act and these can be found at section 34.
In this instance I have decided that the disclosure of the Personal Data would be incompatible with the first Data Protection principle which states that the processing (in this case the disclosure) of the data must be both lawful and fair.
Section 42 - Legal Professional Privilege - Public Authorities are able to withhold information to which a claim of legal professional privilege applies.
Legal professional privilege is a common law principle that enforces the fact that a communication of a legal nature between a client and professional legal advisor is confidential. Legal professional privilege is intended to ensure that the communication between client and legal advisor remains open, candid and informed. When a public authority seeks to claim legal professional privilege, the dominant purpose of that communication must be to seek and/or provide legal advice. Where such a claim applies, that information cannot be disclosed without the consent of the client.
I have claimed this exemption as the requested meeting minutes contain legal advice.
This exemption is both qualified and class based. I am therefore required to consider whether the public interest lies in disclosing or withholding the requested information.
Flow of Legal Advice - The MPS is reliant upon the provision of impartial legal advice to inform and guide its decision-making. The public release of the requested legal advice would be likely to impede the free and frank channels of communication that exist between the MPS and professional legal advisors. This is because, over time, those seeking legal advice on behalf of the MPS and/or providing advice to employees of the MPS, would be less likely to be candid in future communications owing to the risk of future release. This would affect the quality of advice provided by legal advisors to the MPS and the ability of the MPS to obtain open, informed and unbiased legal advice in future.
The harm identified above, is reduced by not disclosing names of individuals, phone numbers, email addresses and details of specific policing tactics and intelligence such as what resources are used and where they are located and how the police operate under certain conditions etc and specific legal advice to ensure the identity of subjects captured by this request is not revealed.
The disclosure of this information to the public by the MPS would undermine the MPS's ability to properly police public order events and other routine policing duties. Release of the redacted information would allow those wishing to disrupt public order events to use the information to assist in evading detection should they be planning any unlawful acts.
After weighing up the competing interests I have determined that the disclosure of the Community Impact Assessments and Strategic Facial Recognition Board minutes in full would not be in the public interest.
Lastly, I have considered whether it is appropriate to release the legal advice within the Community Impact Assessments and Strategic Facial Recognition Board minutes. Having considered this, I accept that its release would help the general public to better understand what legal advice the MPS receives in connection with Facial Recognition Technologies. However, having considered the wider impact of the release of legal advice, I have found that the content of the advice is largely immaterial, as its non-disclosure is about maintaining a safe and trusted forum for the provision of free and frank advice between the MPS and recognised professional legal advisors. Having considered your request, I have found that any action that would adversely affect the ability of police to obtain open and candid advice is not in the public interest. I have accordingly refused to release the information described above in response to your request for information.
The MPS has a duty of care to the communities served. In view of the arguments provided above, it is our opinion, that disclosure in full of names of individuals, phone numbers, email addresses and details of specific policing tactics and intelligence such as what resources are used and where they are located and how the police operate under certain conditions etc and specific legal advice cannot be permitted.
It should not be surmised that we are applying Sections 31, 40 and 42 to the same pieces of information.
Disclosure
Q1 - For all of the facial recognition deployments in 2023, to the date of this request, please may you provide me with any of the results of "blue list" testing.
Date |
Blue List True Alert Rate |
Blue List False Alert Rate |
06/04/2023 |
100% |
0% |
14/04/2023 |
100% |
0% |
06/05/2023 |
100% |
0% |
06/05/2023 |
100% |
0% |
06/05/2023 |
100% |
0% |
Please see the attached redacted Community Impact Assessments and Strategic Facial Recognition Board minutes.