Police's special branch reports on Jawaharlal Nehru

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Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.030113

I note you seek access to the following information:

I would like to access the following historical document pertaining to the Metropolitan Police's special branch reports on Jawaharlal Nehru: MEPO 38/106 which were originally filed as 320/IND/576

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement
Sections 23(1) - Information supplied by, or concerning, certain security bodies Section 24(1) - National Security
Section 27(1)(a)(b)(c)(d)(3) - International Relations
Section 40(2)(3) – Personal Information

Reason for decision

Information has been exempted as it relates to how the police conducted their enquiries and how information was gathered and recorded. The disclosure of which would allow those with a criminal intent to prejudice law enforcement and therefore Section 31(1)(a)(b) of the Act applies.

The joint application of Sections 23(1) and 24(1) in the alternative prevents disclosure of information that would undermine national security or reveal the extent of any involvement of the security bodies by the disclosure of these records.

In addition, Section 27(1)(a)(b)(c)(d)(3) is engaged as to disclose the sharing of information with an overseas State is likely to undermine international relations.

Finally, the names of individuals who might have been of interest to the police has been exempted by virtue of Section 40(2)(3) as it relates to personal information, the disclosure of which would breach the right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

Section 23 - Information supplied by, or concerning, certain security bodies and Section 24 - National Security

Section 23(1) and Section 24(1) exemptions can be applied together by a public authority in order to withhold information that provides information that would undermine national security or reveal the extent of any involvement of the security bodies by the disclosure of these records. Applying these two exemptions in the alternative means that either one or both of the exemptions applies to information contained within the document, however, it would be inappropriate to confirm which in fact applies.

Public safety is of paramount importance to the policing purpose and must be taken into account in deciding whether to disclose the information or not and therefore I find it is not in the public interest to release the requested information.

To disclose the requested information would allow interested parties to gain an upper hand and awareness of policing decisions used to safeguard national security. As you may be aware, disclosure under FOIA is a release to the public at large. This file concerns a high profile figure in Indian politics, therefore, to disclose information, which although occurred over 80 years ago could disrupt community relations with the police. By disclosing this information could potentially result in its misuse, proving detrimental to national security.

In this current environment, where there is a possibility of increased threat of terrorist or extremist activity, providing any details that could assist any terrorist or extremist faction would undermine the safeguarding of national security.

The public interest is not what interests the public but what will be of greater good if released to the community as a whole. It is not in the public interest to disclose information that may compromise the service's ability to accomplish one of its core functions of national security.

To release any policing arrangements of this nature would render Security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to either specific individuals, including those who are visiting the UK or the general public as a whole.

The strongest reason favouring disclosure is this would allow the general public to be aware of the decisions made to protect the safety of a very important individual to the UK.

The strongest reason favouring non-disclosure is to do so would allow those with a criminal intent to gain an awareness of policing decisions, therefore rendering them ineffective. This would dramatically weaken the MPS’s ability to safeguard national security in the fight against terrorism and extremism whether on a local, national or international scale.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police service will not divulge whether information is held if to do so would place the safety of an individual or people at risk or undermine National Security. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by various groups or individuals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police investigations and operations in the highly sensitive area. Whilst there is a public interest in keeping everyone informed about security measures, there is also a duty to ensure public safety.

Section 27 - International Relations - It would not be in the public interest to disclose information that may compromise the UK Government’s relationship with another State.

The British Government develops and maintains a robust relationship with other nation states which can promote mutual interest in trade, defence, environmental issues, human rights and the fight against terrorism and international crime.

There is also the prospect that should we disclose the details of the liaison which has taken place with a foreign government, which was detrimental to this government’s relationship with one country, other states or international organisations, would reconsider their affinity with the UK. This would consequently affect the UK's international abilities relating to its overseas citizens, consular and commercial interests and could lead to a lack of trust and undermine law enforcement agreements in the future.

It could also influence the sharing of information provided during the course of political and diplomatic exchanges.

To release details of any tactics or processes employed by the MPS may hinder the relationship with the countries that might have provided assistance.

The effective conduct of international relations depends upon maintaining trust and confidence between Governments. To release information, supplied in confidence about any individual from another country through liaisons with another country would undermine relations between the UK and others. If the United Kingdom does not maintain this trust and confidence, its ability to protect and promote UK interests through international relations will be hampered. The disclosure of information detailing our relationship with other countries could potentially damage the bilateral relationship between the UK and other states. This would reduce the UK government's ability to protect and promote UK interests through its relations with those other states.

To disclose the requested information could hinder and undermine the partnership approach between Countries in respect of law enforcement and international cooperation.

The strongest reason favouring disclosure would be transparency.
By disclosing whether the MPS has liaised with an overseas organisation or another country and the extent of this would give the general public an insight into how international policing operates when there is a visiting foreign dignitary or representatives at a royal event and how this had been conducted.

The strongest reason favouring non-disclosure is by providing details of the MPS’s liaisons with another State could ultimately undermine law enforcement partnership approach in the future. Similarly, to disclose the UK’s relationship with another country would or would be likely to prejudice international relations and this would not be in the public interest, as we need to protect the interests of the United Kingdom abroad.

Section 31 - Law Enforcement - FOIA is considered to be a release to the world as once the information is published the public authority, in this case the MPS, has no control over what use is made of that information.

To disclose information which relates to policing operations conducted whilst Jawaharlal Nehru was visiting the United Kingdom, as a prominent dignitary at the time could be harmful to current and future investigations. It would allow members of the public to define the general steps taken in relation to law enforcement, in that they would be able to identify the type of tactics and processes used by the MPS.

There remains the possibility that the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS may be compromised by the releasing information relating to tactics and policing operations. There are significant risks associated with providing information in relation to police tactics employed, whether it be historical or current, as to provide such details would reveal how enquiries are conducted, which would provide criminals of today with an insight to how the police operate, and people who wish to harm the citizens of London with the opportunity of disrupting police activity.
This could be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public and might require the MPS to actually have to increase the amount of officers available to them thus increasing the cost to the public purse.

Release would have the effect of compromising law enforcement tactics as by disclosing the methods being employed to mitigate the risk of a terrorist or criminal incident etc. would hinder the prevention and detection of crime. More crime would be committed and individuals would be placed at risk.

Disclosure would technically be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain which would enable those with the time, capacity and inclination to try and map strategies used by the MPS.

The MPS is reliant upon the techniques used during small and large scale operations and the public release of the modus operandi employed during these operations would prejudice the ability of the MPS to conduct policing of similar operations.

Additionally, MPS resources and its ability to operate effectively and efficiently would directly be affected as this information, could be manipulated by those with criminal intent to operate in those areas.

I consider that the benefit that would result from the information being disclosed does not outweigh not disclosing information relating to policing operations employed during the visit of Jawaharlal Nehru.

To disclose how the police conducted their enquiries and gathered intelligence would allow criminals of today an insight into the police investigative process and ultimately how to evade prosecution, as well as the basis of how the police formulate their protection strategy, which could place any visiting dignitary at risk.

Section 40 - Personal Information - Under Section 40(2) and (3) of the Act, Public Authorities can withhold information where its release would identify any living individual and breach the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA). I have applied this exemption in that some of the names of individuals which are contained within the documentation would constitute personal data which, if released, would be in breach of the rights provided by the DPA.

The six principles of the DPA govern the way in which data controllers must manage personal data. Under principle one of the DPA, personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully. I consider that the release of these individuals’ names that are recorded within the requested documentation constitutes personal data. The release of this information would be unfair as the persons concerned would have no reasonable expectation that the MPS would make this information publicly available.
In reaching my decision, I have, in each case, given due regard to the condition at Article 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(e) of the GDPR. Condition one of the GDPR requires that consideration is given to whether consent for disclosure has been given whilst Condition six requires that consideration is given to performance of a public task in the public interest.

Having considered both conditions, I have established that no consent is present or would likely be received to release this information.

This exemption is both absolute and class based. When this exemption is applied, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to consider whether release of information is in the public interest or demonstrate what harm would result from disclosure.

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