Daniel Morgan Independent Panel

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.030340

I note you seek access to the following information:

I note the statement issued today by the Police Service relating to documents that are relevant to the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel: Update: Documents relevant to Daniel Morgan Independent Panel found | Metropolitan Police

Please can you disclose, preferably by PDF, a copy of any communications within the Police Service relating to these documents, that we are told were found in January, particularly looking at why the delay before the assessment began in February and why has it taken so long before we are now hearing about these documents, now in May, three or four months later?

It may be the documents were found in late January and the assessment started in early February and therefore not much delay there but that would mean the assessment apparently has been going on longer and now hearing about this in May is somewhat longer than if the documents were found early January (or even late January) but the assessment started late February - please confirm what date in January the documents were found or confirm dates on any communications that may establish the date, or approximate date, in January they were found. What date in February did the assessment begin?

We are told the assessment has been completed. However the statement from the Assistant Commissioner says "We are working to understand what has taken place and any impact" - why is the Police Service still working to understand what has taken place/the impact if the assessment has already been completed? Why didn't the assessment establish this/what were its terms of reference? Please disclose, preferably by PDF, any communications related to any further assessment being set up to understand what has taken place/any impact or setting in train any further work to understand this. Why only now working to understand what has taken taken/any impact rather than doing so in the assessment started in February? Why wasn't the work to understand what has taken place/any impact started months ago, perhaps in February, even if otherwise than the assessment that started then - the assessment may have looked at what should have been disclosed to the Panel but why couldn't the work to understand what had taken place/the impact be done concurrently with that even if it wasn't in the remit of the assessment that looked, it seems, at what should have been disclosed?

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 30(1) - Investigations
Section 31(1) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(2) - Personal Information

Reason for decision

Before I explain the reasons for the decisions I have made in relation to your request, I thought that it would be helpful if I outline the parameters set out by the Act within which a request for information can be answered. The Act creates a statutory right of access to information held by public authorities. A public authority in receipt of a request must, if permitted, confirm if the requested information is held by that public authority and, if so, then communicate that information to the applicant.

The right of access to information is not without exception and is subject to a number of exemptions which are designed to enable public authorities to withhold information that is not suitable for release. Importantly, the Act is designed to place information into the public domain, that is, once access to information is granted to one person under the Act, it is then considered public information and must be communicated to any individual should a request be received.

Section 30(1)(a) - Investigations - of the Act states that information should be exempt if the question asked refers to information gathered for the purposes of an investigation, where its release would or would be likely to, have an adverse effect upon other investigations or the prosecution of offenders.

Details of the resources allocated to enquiries before their completion provides insight into the scale, nature and methodology applied to such operations. This has the effect of undermining that methodology.

Under the Act we cannot and do not request the motives of any applicant for information. We have no doubt the vast majority of applications under the Act are legitimate and do not have any ulterior motives, however in disclosing information to one applicant we are expressing a willingness to provide it to anyone in the world.

This means that a disclosure to a genuinely interested applicant automatically opens it up for a similar disclosure to anyone, including those who might represent a threat to individuals or any possible criminal and/or civil process.

The MPS does not generally disclose information from investigations except through our Directorate of Media & Communication to the media. This is so potential witnesses are not discouraged to come forward and provide statements in relation to investigations.

The manner in which investigations are conducted is usually kept in strict secrecy so that the tactics and lines of enquiry that are followed do not become public knowledge thereby rendering them useless.

Detailing the resources allocated to a specific area of an investigation will give a clear insight into the nature and scope of any enquiry. Should the public be given such information suspects or potential suspects not yet arrested or interviewed could be alerted to police interest or the extent of police interest. As such while such information may seem innocuous there is the potential for that information to frustrate the operational enquiry team by alerting suspects or giving then prior notice of police activity.

During the course of any investigation enquires are made to secure evidence. These enquires are made for the duration of the case and are based upon proven methods as well as the judgement and experience of the officer(s) in charge of the investigation.

The MPS is reliant upon these techniques to conduct its investigations and the public release of the modus operandi employed during the course of any enquiry could prejudice the ability of the MPS to conduct further, similar investigations. The MPS would not wish to jeopardise the outcome by providing an ongoing commentary.

Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement - is engaged in this case as disclosure under the Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice the prevention and detection of crimes and the apprehension or prosecution of offenders.

To release copies of the communications relating to the finding of documents which relates to an internal review would technically be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain that could enable those with the time, capacity and inclination to try to circumvent or mitigate any reasoning held within the documents and possibly assist them in evading accountability and ultimately justice.

The MPS is reliant upon the techniques used during reviews and investigations, the public release of any methods employed would prejudice the ability of the MPS to conduct policing of any similar investigations.

The disclosure of this information, to the public by the MPS would undermine individuals' confidence in helping the MPS and would furthermore impact on the trust of witnesses in making statements in the future.

Release would have the effect of compromising law enforcement processes and would also hinder the ability of the MPS to fulfil its primary aim of enforcing the law and protecting the public. Any intelligence contained within documents is in use by investigating Officers any release of information could harm our ability to conduct that assessment and reduce our ability to conduct future investigations.

The Met and MOPAC were asked by the IOPC to update our previous DMIP conduct reviews following the discovery of the documents. The Met has now done so and passed our review to the IOPC. If all and any communication were disclosed, this would undermine any ongoing internal or external process related to the finding of these documents. Care must be taken to not compromise any strand of an investigation or cause any undue harm to any people or families involved.

The MPS has a duty to protect both witnesses and suspects of criminal investigations and the integrity of tried and tested investigative techniques used now and for future criminal investigations. Therefore, I consider that considerations favouring non-disclosure of the requested information far outweighs the considerations favouring disclosure.

The disclosure of this information to the public by the MPS would undermine individuals' confidence in helping the MPS with investigations. Anything that undermines this would have a detrimental effect, reducing the quality of information the MPS receives and consequently compromising the effectiveness of any investigation.

The disclosure of this information to the public by the MPS would inhibit the flow of free and frank discussion, sharing of advice and best practices for investigations between police services. Anything that undermines this would have a detrimental effect on the thoroughness, efficiency and effectiveness of police investigations and ultimately the apprehension and prosecution of offenders.
I consider that considerations favouring non-disclosure of the requested information far outweighs the considerations favouring disclosure.

Section 40(2)(3)&(4) - Personal Information - of the Act states that information should be exempt if the question asked constitutes a request for personal information which is not the requestors.

These exemption are relevant as part of the Met’s response to the discovery of these documents we informed the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) and MOPAC who have statutory responsibilities in relation to potential conduct considerations.

As part of this the IOPC asked MOPAC and the Met to update our previous conduct reviews in relation to the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel. The Met has since done this and provided our update to the IOPC. We await their considerations.

Details of an investigation could cause an individual to be identified and is therefore exempted in this case. Section 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018 confirms that information which relates to an identified or identifiable living individual is Personal Data.

The Freedom of Information Act provides an exemption for Personal Data and this is known as the section 40 exemption. Some of the information sought under your Freedom of Information request includes the following which we consider to be Personal Data

• A copy of any communications, if disclosed, would identify an individual.

Where the request is seeking access to third party personal data the section 40(2) exemption may be engaged.

In order to apply the Section 40(2) exemption the disclosure of the requested information must satisfy either the first, second or third conditions as defined by subsections 3A, 3B and 4A of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (as amended by
Section 58 of the Data Protection Act 2018).

The first condition ensures that the exemption would apply in circumstances where the disclosure of the information would breach any of the Data Protection Act 2018 principles. There are six Data Protection principles set out in the 2018 act and these can be found at section 34.

In this instance I have decided that the disclosure of the Personal Data would be incompatible with the first Data Protection principle which states that the processing (in this case the disclosure) of the data must be both lawful and fair.

When this exemption is applied, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure.

When considering identifiability it should be assumed that the MPS are not looking just at the means reasonably likely to be used by the ordinary person in the street, but also the means that are likely to be used by a determined person with a particular reason to want to identify individuals.

Identified’ does not necessarily mean ‘named’. It can be enough to be able to establish a reliable connection between particular information and a known individual.’

Question 1 - Please can you disclose, preferably by PDF, a copy of any communications within the Police Service relating to these documents.
Question 4 - Please disclose, preferably by PDF, any communications related to any further assessment being set up to understand what has taken place/any impact or setting in train any further work to understand this.

The MPS refuses access to the first part of question 1 and question 4, by virtue of the following exemptions.

Section 30(1) - Investigations
Section 31(1) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(2) - Personal Information

Disclosure

Re response In relation to the following highlighted questions:

Please can you disclose, preferably by PDF, a copy of any communications within the Police Service relating to these documents, that we are told were found in January, particularly looking at why the delay before the assessment began in February and why has it taken so long before we are now hearing about these documents, now in May, three or four months later?

It may be the documents were found in late January and the assessment started in early February and therefore not much delay there but that would mean the assessment apparently has been going on longer and now hearing about this in May is somewhat longer than if the documents were found early January (or even late January) but the assessment started late February - please confirm what date in January the documents were found or confirm dates on any communications that may establish the date, or approximate date, in January they were found. What date in February did the assessment begin?

We are told the assessment has been completed. However the statement from the Assistant Commissioner says "We are working to understand what has taken place and any impact" - why is the Police Service still working to understand what has taken place/the impact if the assessment has already been completed? Why didn't the assessment establish this/what were its terms of reference?

Please disclose, preferably by PDF, any communications related to any further assessment being set up to understand what has taken place/any impact or setting in train any further work to understand this. Why only now working to understand what has taken taken/any impact rather than doing so in the assessment started in February? Why wasn't the work to understand what has taken place/any impact started months ago, perhaps in February, even if otherwise than the assessment that started then - the assessment may have looked at what should have been disclosed to the Panel but why couldn't the work to understand what had taken place/the impact be done concurrently with that even if it wasn't in the remit of the assessment that looked, it seems, at what should have been disclosed?

MPS Response:
On the 10 May the Met provide a public update that documents relevant to the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel (DMIP) and subsequent inspection by HMICFRS were discovered by the Met in January.

Ahead of the public update the Met informed those with a statutory role in the oversight of the Met including the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC), the Home Office, the Independent Office of Police Conduct (IOPC) and His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) allowing them to consider any next steps ahead of the Met’s public update. The Met also informed the family of Daniel Morgan and Baroness O’Loan, the Chair of DMIP.

The paperwork was found in a locked cabinet that had not been used for a number of years on the Management Board floor at New Scotland Yard in January.
The Met undertook a careful assessment of the documents to consider whether any should have been disclosed. This assessment began in mid-February. We identified:
• A total of 95 pages of material (37 documents) have been initially identified that would have been disclosed under a protocol agreed with the Panel.
• In addition, we also identified a further 71 pages (23 documents) that would have been provided to HMICFRS as part of their subsequent inspection.

Our assessment is that there are no evidential documents that relate to criminal investigations into the murder.

While the Met was able to make an initial assessment we also recognised the Panel, IOPC, HMICFRS, MOPAC and the Daniel Morgan family would need to make their own assessments of the significance of the documents.

We invited and have since welcomed representatives of the Daniel Morgan Family, Baroness O’Loan and HMICFRS to review the documents in full. We have also provided copies of the documents in full to the IOPC and MOPAC to allow them to fulfil their statutory role in relation to considering conduct matters.

HMICFRS attended the Met on 15 and 16 May and HMI Matt Parr wrote to the Home Secretary on 24 May with the outcome of their Review of the documents. The outcome of that Review is noted in the Government’s response to the DMIP report published on the 15 June 2023 which states:

“The recent discovery of undisclosed documentation by the Metropolitan Police relating to the case was extremely concerning. I am aware that HMICFRS has since undertaken an independent assessment of the material and found that the documents would not have impacted the findings of its inspection. HMICFRS has, however, recommended improvements to the force’s provision of effective storage for property, which will need to be addressed to prevent this from being repeated. In addition, I await the outcome of enquiries being undertaken by the Independent Office for Police Conduct into whether the discovery will result in any disciplinary matters for individual officers.”
We fully acknowledge how unacceptable and deeply regrettable this situation I and we have apologises to the family of Daniel Morgan and to Baroness O’Loan.