Coronation - Police Deployment of Facial Recognition Devices

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Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.030269

I note you seek access to the following information:

Did police* deploy facial recognition devices in London during the coronation event on Saturday 6th May 2023?

* Use of the term Police not only refers to Metropolitan Police (MP) but any assisting agencies under the operational control of MP during the coronation event.

Clarification for Question One (1):

Question 1: The term 'agencies' is to be interpreted as having the meaning of other police officers and police staff otherwise not employees of the Metropolitan Police Service but who may on the day of the Coronation been under the operational command of the MPS. This would primarily mean mutual aid officers or staff.

1. If such devices were deployed, how many were deployed?

2. Is the deployment of such devices subject to the Regulatory Investigatory Procedures Act?

Clarification for Question Three (3):

Question 3: This should read RIPA ( Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act)
3. What were the time periods of any deployment? For the purposes of clarity, this means the period between commencing with the initial deployment and the withdrawal of the devices e.g. between 07:00hrs - 18:00hrs etc

4. If deployed, how many images were captured during that period?

5. Were any arrests made as a result of those images being captured? If so how many?

6. How long do MP retain said images* and at which point do Police review such images for the purposes of disposal? This refers to all images captured and not only those of suspected persons?

7. Do MP retain or link captured images to any pre-existing photographs of persons previously obtained through PACE procedures? i.e custody photographs

8. Do MP have a MOPI policy and MOPI review process

9. Does MP implement any existing MOPI policy and process?

Clarification for Question One (1) and Three (3):

Question 3: This should read RIPA ( Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act)

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 21 – Information reasonably accessible by other means
Section 31(1)(a) - Law enforcement

Limitation on disclosure (Partial NCND);
Section 23(5) - Information relating to Security Bodies
Section 24(2) - National Security
Section 31(3) - Law enforcement

Reason for decision

In respect of Question One (1), Two (2) ,Six (6), Seven (7), Nine (9) the information already in the public domain (regarding overt use of Facial Recognition technology) and so the following exemption applies as the MPS is not required to reproduce information to answer a FOIA request;

Section 21 – Information reasonably accessible by other means

I have provided a link to public information under the ‘Section 16 - Duty to Advise and Assist’ element of this letter below.

I have today decided to disclose information pertinent to Question Three (3), albeit it within the parameters of reference to only overt use of LFR technology.

Information pertinent to Question Four (4) is exempt by virtue of the following exemption:

Section 31(1)(a) - Law Enforcement - disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice - While we appreciate you will have no ill meaning behind your request, disclosure could be used by those with criminal intent against the MPS or the UK as intelligence in regards to resources and law enforcement products/methodology. It is not in the public interest to disclose operational information that could be used to assist in the planning of future criminal activity, due to an adverse FOIA disclosure.

Disclosure would lead to a loss of confidence in the MPS’ ability to protect the safety of the community (for example, following an adverse FOIA disclosure regarding technology use of law enforcement tactical capabilities).

The risks to individuals are likely to be significant if the information is used by those with the necessary criminal intent to undermine the very purpose information is held (crime detection and prevention).

Extra security measures and policing resources may need to be put into place with the disclosure of this information. This is because of the risk disclosure brings in that it could be used as intelligence by those with the necessary criminal intent to undermine policing tools.

The strongest reason favouring non-disclosure is to not undermine law enforcement tactics, methodology and resources by virtue of an adverse disclosure regarding technology deployment.

On weighing up the competing interests I have determined that the disclosure of the above information would not be in the public interest. I consider that the benefit that would result from the information being disclosed does not outweigh the considerations favouring non-disclosure.

The other information disclosed in the public domain in regards to date of deployment ensures the public interest is met without undermining law enforcement and the safety and security of the community.

I appreciate this is not the decision you would have liked for this part of your request. However this decision has been made on the understanding that the public interest is not what interests the public but is what would be of greater interest to the public as a whole, should the information be disclosed.

In respect of Question Five, information is not held. This question misunderstands LFR technology. Please see section 16 for further advice on this question.

In respect of Question Eight (8) and Ten (10), these questions do not meet the requirements of what is considered a valid request under Section 8 of FOIA. Please see Section 16 for further advice as to how we can assist you with these queries.

Limitation on disclosure (Partial NCND)

In respect of Question One (1), Two (2), Three (3), Four (4), Five (5), Six (6), Seven (7), Eight (8) whilst the MPS deployed Live Facial Recognition Technology at the Coronation, the MPS is also required to engage a partial NCND to all questions for any other information that may or may not be held in relation to the covert use of FR technology (by the MPS or otherwise) as per our policy definition document below;

Other LFR Documents Terminology Overview2

The duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions;

Section 23(5) (Information relating to Security Bodies)
Section 24(2) (National Security)
Section 31(3) (Law enforcement)

In regards to the engagement of the above listed exemptions, please note this response should not be taken as an indication of whether or not further information is held, other than what the MPS have confirmed is and is not held within this response to your questions.

When deciding to neither confirming nor deny whether any other information is held a key consideration are the possible detriment that the release of that information may have on future uses of LFR. For example, confirming if information is held may adversely impact possible covert use of facial recognition technology (whether or not used in this case) as it would potentially inform individuals in relation to the capacity, tactical abilities and capabilities of the MPS or other bodies in this field.

Disclosure under FOIA may create a situation in which individuals are able to discern MPS (and the wider Police) surveillance capabilities and use this information to allow individuals to target specific areas of the UK or to conduct certain activities (including possible criminal/terrorist activities or other activities that undermine the role of the police) where they perceive the risk of effective surveillance to be weakest.

Please note this response should not be taken as an indication of whether or not information in relation to the covert use of facial recognition is held or not. Please note that the absence of further disclosable information should not be taken as a confirmation that any further information exists or not.

Section 24(2) (National Security) and Section 31(3)(Law Enforcement) NCND - Any disclosure under FOIA is a release to the public at large. Whilst not questioning the motives behind this specific request, confirming or denying that any information relating to the any possible covert practices or use regarding facial recognition would provide the public with details regarding the capacity, tactical abilities and capabilities of the MPS or other bodies, allowing them to target specific areas of the UK to conduct/undertake possible criminal/terrorist activities.

Confirming or denying the specific circumstances in which the Police Service may or may not deploy the use of facial recognition would be likely to lead to an increase of harm to covert investigations and compromise law enforcement. This would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. Since 2006, the UK Government has published the threat level, based upon current intelligence and that threat has remained at the second highest level ‘severe’, except for two short periods during August 2006, June and July 2007, and more recently in May and June last year following the Manchester and London terrorist attacks, when it was raised to the highest threat, ‘critical’. The UK continues to face a sustained threat from violent extremists and terrorists and the current threat level is set at ‘substantial’.

It is well established that police services use covert tactics and surveillance to gain intelligence in order to counteract criminal or law enforcement undermining behaviour. It has been previously documented in the media that many incidents have been thwarted due to intelligence gained by these means.

Confirming or denying whether any information is or isn’t held relating to the covert use of facial recognition technology would limit operational capabilities as individuals (including criminals/terrorist) would gain a greater understanding of the police’s methods and techniques, enabling offenders to take steps to counter them. It may also suggest the limitations of police capabilities in this area, which may further encourage criminal/terrorist activity by exposing potential vulnerabilities.

This detrimental effect is increased if the request is made to several different law enforcement bodies. In addition to the local criminal fraternity now being better informed, those intent on organised crime throughout the UK will be able to ‘map’ where the use of certain tactics may or may not be deployed. This can be useful information to those committing (or those intent on committing or planning) crime. It would have the likelihood of identifying location-specific operations which would ultimately compromise police tactics, operations and future prosecutions as criminals could counteract the measures used against them.

Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both National Security and Law Enforcement.

Please note this response should therefore not be taken to as an indication of whether or not the further information is held, other than what the MPS have confirmed is or is not held within this response for your questions.

The MPS is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. The security of the country is of paramount importance and the MPS will not divulge whether any other information is or is not held if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk or undermine National Security.

There is a public interest in the transparency of policing, providing assurance that the MPS is appropriately and effectively engaging with any threat from individuals including criminals. However, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both National Security and the integrity of the police in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of National Security. This will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.

To confirm or deny whether the MPS hold any additional information would allow inferences to be made about the nature and extent of national security related activities which may or may not take place. This could enable terrorist groups to take steps to avoid detection, and as such, confirmation or denial would be damaging to national security. By confirming or denying any policing arrangements of this nature would render national security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure on the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.

The strongest reason favouring confirming or denying if further information is held is taking into account there is a public interest in detailed reasoning for how and why this technology is used to allow the public to be better informed about considered possible policing risks within the community.

The strongest reason favouring nether confirming nor denying whether additional information is held is to ensure law enforcement capabilities to protect national security are not undermined in any way, whether additional information in this case is held or not.

Section 31(3) NCND – Law Enforcement - By confirming or denying whether any further information is held would mean that LFR law enforcement tactics would be compromised which would hinder the prevention and detection of crime.

Security arrangements and law enforcement tactics (not just in regards to LFR) are often reused and have been monitored by criminal groups, fixated individuals and terrorists. These security arrangements and tactics would need to be reviewed which would require more resources and would add to the cost to the public purse if an adverse FOIA disclosure undermined any possible operational methodology/work, specifically in LFR activity.

The MPS is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. The ability to protect uphold and protect law enforcement capabilities within the country is of paramount importance and the MPS will not divulge whether any other information is or is not held if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk or undermine law enforcement capabilities due to adverse disclosure.

Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing, providing assurance that the MPS is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat from criminals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding law enforcement methodology and capabilities, as well as the integrity of the police in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced when using LFR.

The strongest reason favouring confirming whether additional information is held or not is to provide information to the public at large about the surveillance measures which may or may not be deployed.

The strongest reason favouring neither confirming nor denying whether additional information is held is to ensure law enforcement capabilities and methodology (whether or not used in this instance) are not undermined by an adverse confirmation or denial under FOIA.

On weighing up the competing interests, the MPS finds that the public interest favours neither confirming nor denying whether any additional information is held by virtue of this exemption. This decision has been made on the basis that the public interest is not what interests the public, but is what would be of greater good to the community if the information were confirmed or denied as held.

Disclosure

Q3 - Is the deployment of such devices subject to the Regulatory Investigatory Procedures Act?

In respect of Question Three (3) the legal framework to deploying LFR is published in the below which makes reference to RIPA;

Standard Operating Procedure for the overt deployment of Live Facial Recognition Technology

In respect of the use of overt LFR technology, deployment of overt LFR is not subject to RIPA 2000, although mention is made in the above document that care should be taken not to use the technology in a manner that would be become Directed Surveillance (Part 2 RIPA).

Please note the partial NCND referred to above applies to any other information which may be held relevant to this question.

Section 16 - Duty to Advise and Assist

Q1 - Did police* deploy facial recognition devices in London during the coronation event on Saturday 6th May 2023?

On 4 May, the MPS tweeted the following confirmation of use of LFR at the Coronation:

https://twitter.com/MetPoliceEvents/status/1654091059947876355

Below is additional confirmation of the intention to use Facial Recognition Technology at the Coronation;

The Coronation of His Majesty The King and Her Majesty The Queen Consort | Metropolitan Police

The MPS additionally routinely publishes the location of their LFR deployments on their website;

LFR Deployment Grid (met.police.uk)

Q2 - If such devices were deployed, how many were deployed?

To assist with this question please see our publicly available overt LFR Deployment Grid Log which shows the number of assets (in this case three deployments of assets) used on the date of the Coronation (06/05/2023). The MPS routinely publishes the location of their LFR deployments on this website;

LFR Deployment Grid (met.police.uk)

Q5 - If deployed, how many images were captured during that period?

In respect of Question Five, information is not held as this question it misunderstands the technology. This is because LFR is a video stream and is not a ‘capturing of images’.

In this regard, the below published LFR deployment log grid discloses the estimated number of people that walked through the zone of recognition which may be of interest to you;

LFR Deployment Grid (met.police.uk)

Q6 - Were any arrests made as a result of those images being captured? If so how many?

The MPS refers you to the below deployment grid which provides arrests undertaken after use of overt LFR deployment;

LFR Deployment Grid (met.police.uk)

Q7 - How long do MP retain said images* and at which point do Police review such images for the purposes of disposal? This refers to all images captured and not only those of suspected persons?

The MPS refers you to the MPS retention position within our Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA), Legal Mandate and Appropriate Policy Document for sensitive data processing within Live Facial Recognition deployments documents:

Directorate of Legal Services (met.police.uk)

Lfr-legal-mandate-v.3.0-web.pdf (met.police.uk)

Appropriate-policy-document.pdf (met.police.uk)

Q8 - Do MP retain or link captured images to any pre-existing photographs of persons previously obtained through PACE procedures? i.e custody photographs

Section 1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) outlines a right to be informed whether a public authority holds information of the description specified in the request, and if such information is held, to have that information communicated to them.

The premise of your request asks the MPS to account for a potential MPS activity rather than focusing on recorded information and making requests against it. This is a request for action, rather than recorded information held at the time of your request. As per Section 8 of the Act, an FOIA request is only valid when information is capable of being used for subsequent reference. This request is therefore not considered valid as the MPS is not required to provide context or opinion to answer a FOIA request.

The MPS can advise outside the remit of the Act that where an arrest is made, policing will consider what other information it holds as may be relevant, necessary and proportionate to pursue an investigation.

Q9 - Do MP have a MOPI policy and MOPI review process

We direct you to the links which references RRD positions in policy documents which feature MoPI compliance which can all be accessed via our LFR page below;

Live Facial Recognition | Metropolitan Police

The MPS also work to the College of Policing (CoP) MoPI guidelines below;

Management of police information | College of Policing

The MPS refers you to the publicly available Records Management Policy Toolkit - Management of Policing Information (MoPI) Group Table to inform records Review Retention and Disposal (RRD);

Met HQ - Portfolio & Planning - Records Management Policy Toolkit

The MPS would also like to refer you to our Privacy Notice, which may be of interest to you;

https://www.met.police.uk/hyg/fpnm/privacy/

Q10 - Does MP implement any existing MOPI policy and process?

As per Section 8 of the Act, an FOIA request is only valid when information is capable of being used for subsequent reference. This request is therefore not considered valid as the MPS is not required to provide context or opinion to answer a FOIA request.

We direct you to the links provided for Question Ten (1) above which references Retention in our policy which feature MoPI compliance which can all be accessed via our LFR page below;

Live Facial Recognition | Metropolitan Police

The MPS also work to the College of Policing (CoP) MoPI guidelines below;

Management of police information | College of Policing

The MPS refers you to the publicly available Records Management Policy Toolkit - Management of Policing Information (MoPI) Group Table to inform records Review Retention and Disposal (RRD);

Met HQ - Portfolio & Planning - Records Management Policy Toolkit

The MPS would also like to refer you to our Privacy Notice, which may be of interest to you;
https://www.met.police.uk/hyg/fpnm/privacy/

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Coronation - Police Deployment of Facial Recognition Devices

Decision