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Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.028767
I note you seek access to the following information:
Number of investigations between the years of 2010-2022 done by the Counter Terrorism Command
Number of deployments between the years of 2010-2022 by the Mets EOD team
I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:
Sections 24(1) – National Security and
Sections 31(1)(a)(b) – Law Enforcement
Reason for decision
To provide the number of investigations undertaken by CTC would reveal the focus of force-level activity, enabling threat levels and counter-terrorism (CT) activity to be mapped across the country, if similar requests were received by other forces. This would allow those with a criminal or extremist intent to gain an operational advantage over the MPS, and other forces, and therefore undermine the safeguarding of National Security and compromise our law enforcement functions
Section 24(1) - National Security & Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement
In considering whether or not the MPS should release the information requested I have considered the potential harm that could be caused by such a disclosure.
A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under the Act, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, by providing data on investigations conducted by CTC would provide valuable intelligence to terrorists and/or extremists on CT activity by a specific police force.
Modern day policing is intelligence led and this is particularly pertinent with regards to both law enforcement and national security. The public expect police forces to use all powers and tactics available to them to prevent and detect crime or disorder and maintain public safety.
The prevention and detection of crime is the foundation upon which policing is built and the threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK faces a sustained threat from violent terrorists and extremists. Since 2006 the UK Government have published the threat level based upon current intelligence, with various changes to these levels during this time. The current UK threat level from international terrorism, based on intelligence, is assessed as ‘substantial which means that a terrorist attack is likely.
Therefore, in consideration of the ramifications of these threat levels, it would not be wise to provide the requested information as this would undermine individual forces policing capabilities, which consequently would be detrimental to their ability to deal with the on-going terrorist threat we face. By providing the number of investigations conducted by an individual force would allow comparison between forces across the country and enable terrorists to build a picture of what resources are in place and where they are deployed. It is felt that disclosure of this information would prejudice the effectiveness of the national counter terrorism effort and would allow inferences to be drawn about force level counter-terrorism activity and identify vulnerability around the country.
There are significant risks associated with the release of such information as this may provide those seeking to commit terrorist acts with an advantage over the MPS and other forces. Disclosure could have a negative effect on the MPS’s ability to provide the necessary service required should the release of information be used and manipulated by those who are intent on carrying out terrorist/extremist activities. To disclose the requested information would therefore provide them with an opportunity of disrupting police activity.
This could be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public and might require the MPS to actually have to increase the amount of officers available to them thus increasing the cost to the public purse.
To provide policing arrangements of this nature would render security measures less effective. The risk of harm to the public would be elevated if areas of the UK which appear vulnerable were identified, which would also provide the opportunity for terrorist planning. Ongoing or future operations to protect the security and infrastructure of the UK would be compromised as terrorists could map the level of counter-terrorist activity across the country, providing them with the knowledge of individual force capability as well as valuable knowledge concerning the vulnerability of individual force areas.
To disclose data on CTC investigations could compromise law enforcement tactics, which would hinder this Police force’s ability to prevent and detect terrorist crimes. The threat of terrorism will increase, if similar data were released under FOIA by other forces allowing for comparisons. This would lead to more crimes being committed as a result of terrorists gaining knowledge about the perceived capabilities of individual forces and therefore the public will be placed at a greater risk. A fear of crime will be realised, as terrorists identify areas to be less police focused and therefore vulnerable and target and exploit these areas, resulting in the public being in fear of more terrorist activity occurring. Alternatively, any areas where investigations were deemed to be high, could lead terrorists to move their cells to other areas in order to continue their operations and avoid detection.
There would be an impact on police resources by the MPS disclosing the number of investigations conducted by CTC, as vulnerable forces may need to increase their resources to reassure and protect the surrounding community.
The Home Office regularly publishes data in relation to terrorism arrests and charges.
The security of the country is of paramount importance and the police will not divulge any information that would place the safety of an individual at risk, undermine national security or law enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing, and in this case providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by terrorist activity, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of police investigations and operations in the highly sensitive subject of terrorism.
Disclosure of the requested data would indicate levels of policing activity at force level, which could allow individuals to exploit what may be considered as less active or resourced areas, by assessing patterns of police activity and deployments over time, ultimately to avoid detection. To provide this information would be a reveal of the intelligence picture concerning suspected terrorist activity, thereby undermining the operational integrity of police activities. This will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on our law enforcement functions for current and future investigations, which will therefore undermine the safeguarding of national security.
As much as there is a public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of national security this will be overridden in exceptional circumstances. Police force’s capabilities of combating terrorism are sensitive issues of intelligence value to the terrorist and therefore it is our opinion that for these issues the balancing test for disclosure of this data is not made out.
Disclosure
In regards to the second part of your request, unfortunately data is not held covering the period 2010 - 2011.
However, it has been advised that between the years 2012 – 2022 there were a total of 5,333 EOD deployments.