Creation of false social media personas by MPS officers

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.028707

I note you seek access to the following information:

ACPO guidance on Online Research and Investigation states: “The creation of a false [social media] persona should be agreed by a Detective Inspector (Intelligence or Covert Policing) or equivalent.

Each agency should maintain a register of all such profiles created and used in the force/agency. This register should be maintained centrally and periodically reviewed taking into account the necessity and proportionality of maintaining and using each registered persona. A log, recording the time, date, user and the policing purpose, should be maintained for each use of a false persona.”

I’m seeking:
1. The number of authorisations granted for the creation of false social media personas by MPS officers in each calendar year from 2018 to 2022 (inclusive).
2. A list of column headings contained in the Met Police false social media persona register and, if applicable, row headings.
3. A list of options for entering data under each specific column heading and/or row heading in the MPS social media persona register.
4. The number of entries in the MPS social media persona register, broken down by platform (including but not necessarily limited to Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp, Twitter, Instagram, TikTok, Snapchat, Telegram, Pinterest, Reddit, LinkedIn, Tinder, Bumble, and Hinge.)
5. A list of column headings contained in the MPS log recording the use of false social media personas and, if applicable, row headings.
6. A list of options for entering data under each specific column heading and/or row heading in the MPS log recording the use of false social media personas.
7. The number of entries in the MPS log recording the use of false social media personas, broken down by platform (including but not necessarily limited to Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp, Twitter, Instagram, TikTok, Snapchat, Telegram, Pinterest, Reddit, LinkedIn, Tinder, Bumble, and Hinge.)

Decision

Searches failed to locate information relevant to question 3 and 6 of your request. This is because there is not a list of options.

Q3 - A list of options for entering data under each specific column heading and/or row heading in the MPS social media persona register.

Q6 - A list of options for entering data under each specific column heading and/or row heading in the MPS log recording the use of false social media personas.

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 31 (Law Enforcement)

Reason for decision

For questions 1, 4, 5 and 7

Q1 - The number of authorisations granted for the creation of false social media personas by MPS officers in each calendar year from 2018 to 2022 (inclusive).

Q4 - The number of entries in the MPS social media persona register, broken down by platform (including but not necessarily limited to Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp, Twitter, Instagram, TikTok, Snapchat, Telegram, Pinterest, Reddit, LinkedIn, Tinder, Bumble, and Hinge.)

Q5 - A list of column headings contained in the MPS log recording the use of false social media personas and, if applicable, row headings.

Q7 - The number of entries in the MPS log recording the use of false social media personas, broken down by platform (including but not necessarily limited to Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp, Twitter, Instagram, TikTok, Snapchat, Telegram, Pinterest, Reddit, LinkedIn, Tinder, Bumble, and Hinge.)

Section 31(1) )(a)(b) - Section 31 - Law enforcement - Any disclosure under FOI is a disclosure to the world and not just to the individual making the request. To disclose specific details of the number of communications data authorisations specifically with regard to creation of social media accounts for investigative use to gather intelligence would undermine the smooth delivery of operational law enforcement.

Modern-day policing is intelligence led and this is particularly pertinent with regard to law enforcement. The public expect police forces to use all powers and tactics available to them to prevent and detect crime or disorder and maintain public safety.

By revealing tactical detail, such as the specific information within this request, would undoubtedly cause serious harm to any investigations and intelligence gathering exercises which may have focussed on the use of social media as a law enforcement tool, would compromise the prevention or detection of crime and the apprehension or prosecution of offenders. Although some of the information may be historical, inasmuch as the timeframe of the request goes back to 2019, publication of communications data authorisations is only ever published at force level, for all authorisations which fall under ‘communications data’. Although it is publicly avowed that the Police Service use social media as an investigative tool, disclosing statistical data relating to social media accounts used by the police for investigative purposes would provide an awareness to offenders and may alert them of such activity enabling them to close down their social media accounts, avoid apprehension and potentially recreate other social media profiles via the dark web which would enable their offending to continue placing the safety of their victims at further risk.

When the current or future law enforcement role of the force may be compromised by the release of information, the effectiveness of the force will be reduced. In this case, for the reasons outlined in the evidenced harm, the effectiveness of current and future covert operations where social media is used by the police to target criminals may be compromised.

If specific tactical capability is disclosed which would make is easier for offenders to avoid apprehension, there would be a need for frontline policing to be taken away from other areas of policing in order to monitor the criminality of such offenders.
The personal safety of individuals is of paramount importance to the Police Service and must be considered in respect of every release. As stated within the harm a disclosure under Freedom of Information is a release to the world and any disclosure which compromises an individual(s) health and safety is not in the public interest.

In this case, there is an argument for disclosure, inasmuch as the public have a right to know that the pose use of social media as a tool is in line with current legislative frameworks but this must be balanced against the negative impact these disclosures can make. It can be argued in this case, that the former is already catered by the Police Service, inasmuch as an Investigatory Powers Commissioner publishes communications data authorisations as a whole.

However, what has been established in this case is the fact that disclosure would have an adverse effect on the tactical investigative/intelligence gathering capability of the MPS when carrying out social media covert operations. This negative outweighs any tangible community benefit and therefore the balance does not favour disclosure at this time.

Disclosure

Q2 - A list of column headings contained in the Met Police false social media persona register and, if applicable, row headings.

Please see the column headings below:
There are 10 columns. –
• Website.
• Year Joined.
• User name.
• Email Address used.
• Password.
• Date of Birth Used.
• Creator.
• Authorising Officer.
• Active Y/N.
• Phone Number Used to Set Up

Section 16 – Duty to advise and assist

Q1 - The number of authorisations granted for the creation of false social media personas by MPS officers in each calendar year from 2018 to 2022 (inclusive).

As a gesture of goodwill outside of FOI legislation, please be advised that the overall number of communications data applications made/authorised by organisation is published from 2017 by the IPCO, an example can be found within the Annual Report 2019.