Covert Human Intelligence Source data since 2015

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.029665

I note you seek access to the following information:

Using the latest available data and going back to 2015, please provide a year-by-year breakdown of the following:

(a) Total number of registered informants for each individual year, of this total number of registered informants how many were:

(b) Paid Informants
(c) Unpaid informants
(d) Active Participants

And for each year where the Data response for (b) has been given, please provide:

(e) The total figure for all monies paid to informants each individual year since 2015

Decision

Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) places two duties on public authorities. Unless exemptions apply, the first duty at S1(1)(a) is to confirm or deny whether the information specified in a request is held. The second duty at S1(1)(b) is to disclose information that has been confirmed as being held.

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

The MPS neither confirms nor denies (NCND) that it holds information relevant to this request by virtue of the following exemptions:

• Section 23(5) - Information supplied by, or concerning, certain Security Bodies;
• Section 24(2) - National Security
• Section 30(2) - Investigations and proceedings conducted by public authorities
• Section 31(3) - Law Enforcement

Reason for decision

Note:
Since the advent of RIPA we do not use the term informant, it is misleading and confusing, the correct term is a Covert Human Intelligence Source (CHIS).

Evidence of Harm in complying with Section 1(1)(a) - to confirm or not whether information is or isn't held

The public expect police forces and other law enforcement agencies to use all powers and tactics available to prevent and detect crime or disorder and maintain public safety. There are a number of covert tactics available and the use of informants (CHIS) is one of them. Used correctly, in line with the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act legislation, it is a proportionate, lawful and ethical tactic which provides an effective means of obtaining evidence and intelligence.

There is considerable harm attributed to the confirmation or denial of any information in relation to police receiving information from confidential sources. Such information would not exist had covert human intelligence sources (CHIS) not been required to participate in the effective investigation of criminal matters. The information is only held because it is obtained and recorded by the force for the purpose of its functions in relation to criminal investigations.
In this case, and irrespective of whether any information relating to this request is or isn’t held, confirmation or denial is likely to reduce the flow of information to the Police Service and intelligence agencies and would have a substantial prejudicial impact on the ability of such authorities to collect reliable and accurate intelligence. Furthermore:

- Law enforcement bodies would become dependent on more costly and time consuming methods of collecting intelligence.

- The disclosure of the requested information would damage national security through discouraging current national security CHIS from cooperating with the police service, or preventing the recruitment of national security CHIS in the future.

In response to your request of questions a, b, c and d above.

Section 23(5) - Information supplied by, or concerning, certain Security Bodies
& Section 24(2) - National Security - Disclosure of informants data could impact on the recruitment and retention of CHIS in general, due to the perception of (rather than the actual) risk of identification. The disclosure of the requested information would damage national security through discouraging current national security CHIS from cooperating with the police service, or preventing the recruitment of national security CHIS in the future – regardless of whether the area in question actually currently runs CHIS reporting on serious crime, terrorist or other threats.

Other organisations outside the police service are also widely engaged in utilising and rewarding informants in a number of ways, and therefore by confirming or denying that any information exists relevant to the request would harm the close relationship that exists with such organisations, where trust and confidence in this specific area has been built up in the exchange of information and financial assistance during the Criminal Justice process.

To confirm or deny whether the MPS hold any information would allow inferences to be made about CHIS used and the nature and extent of national security related activities which may or may not take place in a given area. This could enable terrorist groups to take steps to avoid detection, and as such, confirmation or denial would be damaging to national security.

By confirming or denying any policing arrangements of this nature have occurred would render national security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.

Section 30(2) - Investigations and proceedings conducted by public authorities - The Police Service is tasked with protecting the community we serve and solving crime and there is a public interest argument in ensuring we are open and transparent with regard to policing investigations and operations. Disclosure of the information requested could identify informant activity within a force area. Over a period of time, if several disclosures were made, individuals could analyse the information and identify any sudden peaks or troughs in informant activity. This would hinder the prevention and detection of crime and also prejudice the forces ability to maintain confidential sources. Consequently the forces’ future law enforcement capabilities would be affected.

It may be viewed by those not involved in the management of informants that a statistical number in itself is unlikely to cause any such adverse effects. However, the subject has to be viewed more as a whole. Those determined to identify informants will use small pieces of information to build a more complete picture and it is the cumulative effect of information disclosures that the Police Service feel could lead to this.

Section 31(3) - Law Enforcement - The confirmation or denial that information is held across the country would undermine policing across the country. Understanding which forces across the country may or may not hold information would identify areas where forces are more or less likely to deploy a CHIS, and under what circumstances, to investigate these types of crimes. This would undermine future investigations as confirming information is held, if held, would make it difficult for forces to recruit CHIS in the future. Confirming details about CHIS who are allocated within investigations would provide granular detail regarding deployments which could lead to an increased chance of identification. This would undermine the police services ability to recruit and retain CHIS.

There is information within the public domain confirming that police use covert human intelligence sources to assist them with investigations and the effective delivery of law enforcement. However, as has been mentioned informants play a vital role in assisting the police, and is based very much on relationships built on trust and the expectation of complete confidentiality that the MPS would never disclose information which would compromise our tactics.
It is therefore our opinion that the balance lies in favour of non-disclosure of the information.

This should not be taken as conclusive evidence that any information that would meet your request exists or does not exist.

Disclosure

The total figure for all monies paid to informants each individual year since 2015.

I have disclosed the located information for you.

Please see below information pursuant to your request above.

Total annual MPS spend to gather information for the last 8 years.
2015/16	769,049.00
2016/17	795,830.00
2017/18	879,676.00
2018/19	970,248.00
2019/20	1,064,570.00
2020/21	871,000.00
2021/22	1,100,300.00
2022/23	1,041,442.60

INFORMATION -

The duty to confirm or deny

The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) guidance titled ‘When to refuse to confirm or deny information is held’ states :

‘In certain circumstances, even confirming or denying that requested information is held can reveal information that falls under an exemption. A public authority may be able to use an exemption to refuse to confirm whether or not it holds information, if either confirming or denying would reveal exempt information in itself.

A neither confirm nor deny response is more likely to be needed for very specific requests than for more general or wide ranging requests.

It can be important to use a neither confirm nor deny response consistently, every time a certain type of information is requested, regardless of whether the information is actually held or not. For this reason public authorities need to be alert to the possibility of receiving future requests for the same type of information when handling very specific or detailed requests.’

‘There are situations where a public authority will need to use the neither confirm nor deny response consistently over a series of separate requests, regardless of whether it holds the requested information. This is to prevent refusing to confirm or deny being taken as an indication of whether information is held. Before complying with section 1(1)(a), public authorities should consider both whether any harm would arise from confirming that information is held and whether harm would arise from stating that no information is held. Otherwise, if the same (or same type of) requests were made on several occasions, a changing response could reveal whether information was held.’

The ICO guidance further states:

‘The exact wording of the request for information is an important consideration when deciding whether a public authority should confirm or deny if it holds the requested information. The more specific the request, the more likely it is that a public authority will need to give a neither confirm nor deny response.’

DUTY TO ADVISE AND ASSIST

Under Section 16 of the Act, there is a duty to advise and assist those making requests for information. In accordance with this duty.

With reference to question “a” above, the total number of CHIS for each individual year. This figure (for the whole of the UK) is published by The Investigatory Powers Commissioner's (IPCO) in their annual report each year.