Security or number of police officers protecting working members of the Royal Family

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.028801

I note you seek access to the following information:

Did the Metropolitan Police have to increase the level of security or the number of police officers protecting working members of the Royal Family in recent weeks as the number of protestors turning up at royal engagements and visits seems to have drastically increased?

If not, is the Metropolitan police planning a review of the security arrangements for royals - and in particular for the King, the Queen Consort and the Prince and Princess of Wales - in the future in relation to these protests and anti-monarchy incidents?

How is the Metropolitan Police planning to handle these protestors?

Also, did the Metropolitan Police notice an increase in the number of protests against the monarchy and its members since September 2022?

Decision

Regarding the other elements of your request, the Metropolitan Police Service can neither confirm nor deny (NCND) that it holds any information relating to actual or planned protection arrangements or the policing of protests as s1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

• Section 24(2) – National Security
• Section 31(3) – Law Enforcement
• Section 38(2) – Health and Safety
• Section 40(5) – Personal Information

Reason for decision

Section 24 - National Security
Section 31 - Law Enforcement
Section 38 - Health and Safety

Whilst the MPS can confirm that protection is provided to the King and the current serving Prime Minister, to confirm or deny that protection is afforded to others or any details of whether protection is provided, or not provided, at specific times or in response to particular events or circumstances could undermine the safeguarding of national security.

FOIA is considered to be a release to the world as once the information is published the public authority, in this case the MPS, has no control over what use is made of that information. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant it could be of use to those who seek to cause harm to any person in receipt of protection for whatever reason. To confirm or deny that the MPS does, or does not, provide protection to specific individuals would enable those who sought to threaten the safety of such individuals to calculate who was most at risk and whom was in receipt of some type of protection.

The effect of this information being available to the applicant, and more importantly those who might wish to cause harm to those in receipt of protection, which could include terrorists, criminals or fixated individuals, would be detrimental to those in receipt of protection.

To ensure that those in receipt of protection are not subject to additional threat and to ensure the safety of the members of the public attending events, where these individuals are present, would require a review and in all likelihood an increase in the number of protection officers employed. This would increase the costs to the public purse.

Those with the necessary criminal intent, inclination and capacity could use the information to gain an operational advantage over the MPS and other forces as the information can indeed be viewed as operational 'intelligence' and operationally sensitive. To confirm or deny that protection is afforded to any other individual, other than those which have been publicly stated by the MPS, would have a negative effect on the safety of those being protected, should the release of information be used and manipulated to try and attack the protected individuals, for example through mapping protection across forces.

It remains the case that the publication of any information relating to an individual or a group of individuals who might or might not receive protection could potentially lead to harm to that individual or group, particularly if that information relates to the security arrangements for that individual(s) or formed any part of a protection package that might or might not be provided. Confirmation or denial of individual protection arrangements damages the need for these to remain covert, purely in the interests of operational sensitivity.

It is important to note that the UK does face a serious and sustained threat from violent extremists and this threat is greater in scale and ambition than any of the terrorist threats in the past. Government reports suggest that at any one time the police and security agencies are contending with many terrorist plots, terrorist groups or networks and individuals who are judged to pose a threat to the well-being of the UK and or UK interests. While the plots may not necessarily all be directed at attacks on the protected individuals, the MPS bear in mind that an attack on members of government or significant individuals afforded protection would be of national significance to our country. To confirm or deny security arrangements in place for individuals is likely to place them at serious risk due to their prominence across the globe.

As previously explained above, in this current environment of an increased threat of terrorist activity, confirming or denying that information is held that could assist an extremist faction would undermine the safeguarding of national security.

The ICO guidance also states ‘safeguarding national security also includes protecting potential targets even if there is no evidence that an attack is imminent…the Commissioner also recognises terrorist can be highly motivated and may go to great lengths to gather intelligence. This means there may be grounds for withholding what seems harmless information on the basis that it may assist terrorists when pieced together with other information they may obtain.’

Based on this definition national security encompasses a wide spectrum and it is our duty to protect the people within the UK. Public safety is of paramount importance to the policing purpose and must be taken into account in deciding whether to disclose any requested information.

Confirming or denying any policing arrangements which refer to the personal protection of specific individuals would render security measures less effective. Personal protection is provided by the MPS to a number of people where it is in the national interest or where intelligence (information) suggests protection is necessary. Specific protection arrangements are applied in order to safeguard national security by ensuring that appropriate safety and security is provided to key figures such as the King and the Prime Minister. The disclosure of any other information would ultimately increase the risk of harm to those afforded personal protection and to the general public within their vicinity.

Persons/groups would be able to ascertain which individuals the MPS considers to be currently at most risk, and therefore which threats or campaigns to undermine UK security the police believe to be most pertinent.

Confirming or denying that any information is held in relation to the security or protection of individuals would lead to law enforcement tactics being compromised which would ultimately hinder the prevention and detection of crime. Security arrangements and tactics are re-used and have been monitored by criminal groups, fixated individuals and terrorists. Protection is provided in a number of forms after careful evaluation of the threat and risks posed to those individuals by operational experts in this field of policing. It therefore follows that anything that would negate the benefits of that protection would place individuals at risk. This would be the individuals receiving protection, the police officers providing the protection and any member of the public in the vicinity of the principal.

To confirm or deny that an individual was, or was not, in receipt of protection would allow those who were so inclined to seek to identify perceived vulnerabilities in protection arrangements for particular individuals or at particular times or locations. This would again place the individual and officers at risk in the event that they were targeted by criminals/terrorists.

Confirming or denying that information is held in relation to the protection of any individual would have the effect of increasing the threat to those individuals who are in receipt of protection and, in addition, to those who do not receive protection and might therefore appear to be soft targets. The risks to individuals are significant as evidenced and there would be a loss of confidence in the police service to protect the well-being of the community. Furthermore, if an individual/group decides to counter the protection arrangements and target an individual, members of the public within the vicinity could be exposed to either physical or psychological harm.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police service will not divulge whether information is or is not held if to do so would place the safety of any individual in receipt of protection at risk or undermine National Security. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by a potential attack on a member of the Royal family, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of police operations in the highly sensitive area of personal protection.

The public interest is defined not as what the public might find interesting but there must be some tangible benefit to the public in the disclosure of the interest. In this case, where the request is about protection arrangements for specific individuals, the net result of publishing that information would be that plans may need to be changed to ensure that the threat level was effectively challenged.

I have determined that to confirm or deny that we hold the requested information would not be in the public interest. The MPS considers that the benefit that would result from the information being disclosed does not outweigh the harm arising from disclosing information relating to protection arrangements.

No inference can be drawn from this refusal that information is or is not held.

Section 40(5A)&(5B)(a)(i ) – Personal Information - Section 40 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 is designed to address information that is covered by the Data Protection Act 2018.

Under section 40(5), the MPS is not required to comply with the requirements of section 1(1) (a) i.e. the duty to inform the applicant whether or not the information is held.

In most cases Personal Data is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act as I will explain below.

To confirm or deny whether personal information exists could publicly reveal information about an identifiable individual or individuals, thereby breaching the right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act (DPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2018.

Where an individual is requesting his or her own personal data the information is
always exempt. Such information can be requested under other legislation.

Where an individual is requesting third party personal data the MPS must ensure that any action taken adheres to the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 and the GDPR. To clarify, the Freedom of Information Act only allows disclosure of personal data if that disclosure would be compliant with the principles for processing personal data. These principles are outlined under section 34 of the DPA 2018 and under Article 5 of the GDPR.

Section 40 is a class based absolute exemption and there is no requirement to consider the public interest in this case. Confirming or denying whether any information is held would reveal information about identifiable individuals and therefore breach the Data Protection Act.

Disclosure

I can confirm that the MPS has not recorded a noticeable increase in protests against the monarchy and its members since September 2022.