MEPO 38/153 - Helena COZZONIS

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.027579

I note you seek access to the following information:

Please release this TNA file

MEPO 38/153 - Helena Cozzonis (Spanish): claim to be the wife of the Prince of Wales.

It is of historical importance, now almost 100 years and fits Public Interest test.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 31(1)(a) – Law Enforcement
Section 40(2) and (3) – Personal Information

Reason for decision

To disclose information which has been gathered during the course of police enquiries, which includes documentation where the contents cannot clearly be identified, how intelligence was received, as well as details relating to security arrangements, could hinder the prevention and detection of crime. This would therefore prejudice the MPS‘s law enforcement functions and as such, Section 31(1)(a) of the Act is engaged.

Section 31 - Law Enforcement - FOIA is considered to be a release to the world as once the information is published the public authority in this case the MPS has no control over what use is made of that information.

In relation to this request, to disclose intelligence gathered during the course of police enquiries, for which some of the contents cannot clearly be translated and how some information has been received could be harmful to current and future investigations, as it would allow members of the public to define the general steps taken in relation to law enforcement, in that they would be able to identify the type of tactics employed by the MPS. There remains the possibility that the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS may be compromised by releasing information relating to our operational tactics. There are significant risks associated with providing information in relation to any aspects of a police operation, whether it be historical or current, as to provide such details would reveal how information is garnered, which would provide criminals of today with an insight to how the police operate, and people who wish to harm the citizens of London with the opportunity of disrupting police activity.

This could be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public and might require the MPS to actually have to increase the amount of officers available to them thus increasing the cost to the public purse.

In addition, to provide details of any security measures in place during this time would allow the general public to identify any similar arrangements that may be relevant today in regards to our Royal Family.

Release would have the effect of compromising law enforcement tactics as disclosing the methods employed to mitigate the risk of criminal activity would hinder the prevention and detection of crime. More crime would be committed and individuals would be placed at risk.

Disclosure would technically be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain, especially where the full contents of each documentation is unknown. This would enable those with the time, capacity and inclination to try and map strategies used by the MPS.

The MPS is reliant upon the techniques used during operations and investigations and the public release of the modus operandi employed during these operations would prejudice the ability of the MPS to conduct policing of similar operations.
Additionally MPS resources and its ability to operate effectively and efficiently would directly be affected as this information could be manipulated by those with criminal intent to operate in those areas.

I consider that the benefit that would result from the information being disclosed does not outweigh not disclosing information relating to investigative tactics employed by the MPS and the duties of some of its officers. To disclose how the police conducted their enquiries (i.e. gathered information and recorded intelligence) would allow criminals an insight into police investigations and ultimately how to evade prosecution. Additionally, disclosure of security arrangements may allow those whose purpose it is to cause harm to have a better understanding of how the police operate.

In addition, to release details of residential addresses which are still in existence today, would breach the right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Similarly, any personal correspondence for which we are unable to determine the full contents may contain details which would identify a living person. Therefore, it is for these reasons that Section 40(2)(3) of the Act also applies.

Section 40 - Personal Information - of the Act, Public Authorities are able to withhold information where its release would reveal personal information relating to any living individual and breach the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA). I have applied this exemption in that details of certain current residential addresses would constitute personal data which, if released, would be in breach of the rights provided by the DPA.

The six principles of the DPA govern the way in which data controllers must manage personal data. Under principle one of the DPA, personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully. I consider that the release of current residential addresses constitutes personal data. The release of this information would be unfair as the person(s) concerned would have no reasonable expectation that the MPS would make this information publicly available. In addition, to disclose personal correspondence, the contents of which cannot be fully translated, may contain the name of a living individual(s) and as such, is subject to exemption to ensure that individual rights are not breached.

In reaching my decision, I have, in each case, given due regard to the condition at Article 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(e) of the GDPR. Condition one of the GDPR requires that consideration is given to whether consent for disclosure has been given whilst Condition six requires that consideration is given to performance of a public task in the public interest.

This exemption is both absolute and class based. When this exemption is applied, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to consider whether release of information is in the public interest or demonstrate what harm would result from disclosure.

Disclosure

Please find below readacted documentation relating to MEPO file 38/153. These total 7 pdfs.