Complaints made against Parliamentary and Diplomatic Protection (PaDP) officers from 2020 to 2022
Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.028307
I note you seek access to the following information:
How many Parliamentary and Diplomatic Protection (PaDP) have had complaints against them in the last 3 years (broken down by year)
How many have had more than one complaint against them in the last 3 years (broken down by year)
Whether the Met Police tells Parliament whether PaDP have any complaints against them How many PaDP have had any charges against them in the last 3 years
How many Parliamentary and Diplomatic Protection (PaDP) have had a criminal record in the last 5 years (broken down by year)
How many Parliamentary and Diplomatic Protection (PaDP) officers have had complaints against them in each of the last 3 years, up to and including 2022.
How many PaDP officers have had more than one complaint against them in each of the last 3 years
What information does Parliament request on whether PaDP officers have any current or historic complaints against them
How many PaDP officers have had any charges against them in each of the last 3 years
The total number of PaDP officers currently employed.
Clarification - confirmation you were seeking the following information relating to both complaints by the public and internal conduct matters:
1. How many complaints against PaDP staff/PaDP officers have been made in 2020, 2021 and 2022 (broken down by year)?
2. How many of these individuals had more than one complaint against them during this period?
3. How many PaDP staff/PaDP officers had criminal charges laid against them during this period?
4. How many PaDP staff/PaDP officers received a criminal record in the period 2018-2022 (broken down by year)?
5. What information does the MPS report to Parliament or Parliament request relating to current or historic complaints against PaDP staff/PaDP officers?
6. The total number of PaDP officers currently employed
Decision
I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 24(1) – National Security
Section 31(1)(a) – Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)(3) – Personal Data
Whilst I am unable to provide you staffing information specific to PaDP, I am able to provide you with this data relating to Specialist Operations as a whole.
Reason for decision
Some of the requested information has been exempted from disclosure as The Parliamentary & Diplomatic Command (PaDP) is one of the Commands which comes under the umbrella of Specialist Operations and the Home Office has advised that resource details below that of Specialist Operations are not to be published.
To disclose details of the number of officers employed by PADP, as requested in Question 6, would provide details of policing resources deployed in relation to security and protection operations. This would allow those with a criminal or extremist intent to gain an operational advantage over the MPS and therefore undermine the safeguarding of National Security and compromise our law enforcement functions.
In addition, to provide annual breakdowns of the number of officers arrested or charged, where figures are low, could result in an individual’s identification. This would consitute a breach of data protection and the disclosure of personal information.
Therefore, in light of the above rationale, the following exemptions in the Act have been engaged:
Section 24(1) – National Security - (1) Information which does not fall within section 23(1) is exempt information if exemption from section 1(1)(b) is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security.
Section 31(1)(a) – Law Enforcement – (1) Information which is not exempt information by virtue of section 30 is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice - (a) the prevention or detection of crime,
In considering whether or not this information should be disclosed, I have considered the potential harm that could be caused by disclosure.
FOIA is considered to be a release to the world as, once the information is published, the public authority, in this case the MPS, has no control over what use is made of that information. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, to provide details of resources relating to the protection of specific sites or individuals, would enable those who sought to threaten the safety of protected individuals to identify actual or perceived vulnerabilities in these arrangements.
The disclosure of the requested information to the applicant, and more importantly to those who might wish to cause harm to those in receipt of protection, such as terrorists, criminals and fixated individuals, would therefore be detrimental to those in receipt of protection. Those with the necessary criminal intent, inclination and capacity could use the information to seek to identify 'weak/vulnerable targets' or vulnerabilities to particular kinds of attack. Disclosure of such information also damages the need to ensure protection arrangements remain covert, purely in the interests of operational sensitivity. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, providing staff numbers within PaDP will infer the level of capacity within that unit, which would infer capabilities and could allow those who seek to cause harm to members of the public to gain an understanding of the level of resources within this unit.
It is important to note that the UK does face a serious and sustained threat from violent extremists and this threat is greater in scale and ambition than any of the terrorist threats in the past. Government reports suggest that at any one time the police and security agencies are contending with many terrorist plots, terrorist groups or networks and individuals who are judged to pose a threat to the well-being of the UK and or UK interests. While the plots may not necessarily all be directed at attacks on the protected individuals or sites, the MPS bear in mind that an attack on members of government or significant individuals afforded protection would be of national significance to our country. To provide information regarding protection arrangements for individuals is likely to place them at serious risk due to their prominence across the globe.
In this current environment of an increased threat of terrorist activity, disclosure of information held that could assist an extremist faction would undermine the safeguarding of national security.
Providing information relating to what resources are allocated to the protection of particular sites would render security measures less effective. In addition, personal protection is provided by the MPS to a number of people where it is in the national interest or where intelligence (information) suggests protection is necessary. Specific protection arrangements are applied in order to safeguard national security by ensuring that appropriate safety and security is provided to key figures such as the King and the Prime Minister. The disclosure of any other information would ultimately increase the risk of harm to those afforded personal protection and to the general public within their vicinity.
Providing the requested information would reveal operational information that would lead to law enforcement tactics being compromised, which would ultimately hinder the MPS’s law enforcement role. It can be argued that there are significant risks associated with providing this information, since they may reveal the relative vulnerability of what we may be trying to protect.
The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police service will not divulge information that would place the safety of individuals in receipt of protection at risk or undermine National Security. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively managing its resources, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of police operations in the highly sensitive area of the protection of sites of national importance.
The public interest is defined not as what the public might find interesting but there must be some tangible benefit to the public in the disclosure of the interest. In this case, where the request is about resources deployed in relation to protection and security arrangements, the net result of publishing that information would be that a review would need to be conducted to ensure that the threat level was effectively challenged, which would require additional resources to be provided.
After weighing up the competing interests I have determined that the disclosure of the above information would not be in the public interest. I consider that the benefit that would result from the information being disclosed does not outweigh the considerations favouring non-disclosure.
Section 40(2)(3) – Personal information - Under Section 40(2) and (3) of the Act, Public Authorities are able to withhold information where its release would reveal personal information relating to any living individual and breach the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA). I have applied this exemption in that providing figures for arrests and charges, where counts are low, would result in the identification of specific individuals and would therefore constitute personal data which, if released, would be in breach of the rights provided by the DPA.
The six principles of the DPA govern the way in which data controllers must manage personal data. Under principle one of the DPA, personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully. I consider that the release of this information would constitute personal data and would be unfair as the person(s) concerned would have no reasonable expectation that the MPS would make this information publicly available.
In reaching my decision, I have, in each case, given due regard to the condition at Article 6(1) (a) and 6(1) (e) of the GDPR. Condition one of the GDPR requires that consideration is given to whether consent for disclosure has been given whilst Condition six requires that consideration is given to performance of a public task in the public interest.
This exemption is both absolute and class based. When this exemption is applied, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to consider whether release of information is in the public interest or demonstrate what harm would result from disclosure.
Disclosure
Please see the attached spreadsheet for the requested data for Questions 1-2.
Please note the following points on the Guidance tab of this document regarding the information provided:
• PADP employees have been identified where their Unit at the time of complaint has been recorded as Parliamentary & Diplomatic Protection Unit. This means that whilst the complaint is shown against a PaDP officer, they may not have been a PaDP officer at the time of the alleged conduct due to multiple factors such as delayed reporting or officers transferring to different units within the MPS.
• As an employee can have one case but with multiple allegations recorded against them, Question 1 is a count of all allegations, while Question 2 is a count of unique employees
Regarding Question 5, although there is no formal requirement for information to be shared with Parliament relating to complaints against PaDP employees, the MPS deals with these matters on a case by case basis. We regularly work with the Parliamentary authorities to provide assurances on our processes around misconduct and officers that are deployed on the Parliamentary estate.
In relation to Questions 3 and 4, I am able to advise as a gesture of goodwill outside of the Act, that the following press lines have been issued by the MPS relating to two individuals who were arrested and/or convicted during the period specified in your request.
The following contains relevant information from press lines that were approved on 30/09/2021:
A former Metropolitan Police Service officer was sentenced to a whole-life prison term today for the murder of Sarah Everard.
Wayne Couzens, 48 (20.12.72) appeared at the Old Bailey on the 29 and 30 September where the court heard how he kidnapped, raped and murdered Sarah.
He pleaded guilty to murder on Friday, 9 July. The previous month he admitted kidnapping and raping Sarah.
They were not known to each other.
Couzens was arrested on Tuesday, 9 March, over the disappearance of Sarah in Clapham, south west London.
Wayne Couzens transferred into the Met from the Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC) in September 2018. His first posting was to South Area, serving initially in a Safer Neighbourhood Team, before joining a response team covering the Bromley area in February 2019.
He then moved to the Parliamentary and Diplomatic Protection Command in February 2020 where his primary role was to patrol diplomatic premises, mainly embassies.
Regarding Question 6, I am also able to advise as a gesture of goodwill outside of the Act, that the MPS publishes Workforce Data that may be relevant to your request. Table 1.2 of this data shows the number of officers employed in Specialists Operations, which includes PaDP. This information can be viewed at the following link:
As at 31 January 2023 the total Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) number of officers in Specialist Operations was 3,971.93.