Correspondence regarding postponement of Digga D O2 Academy concert

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.026935

I note you seek access to the following information:

I write seeking information about the postponement of a Digga D concert at Brixton's O2 Academy, which was due to take place on Thursday 13 October 2022.

I am requesting the following:

1. Copies of all correspondence regarding Digga D (aka Rhys Herbert) between Lambeth police and venue operators at the Brixton O2 Academy in the four weeks preceding the announcement of the event's postponement (on 7 October 2022)
2. Copies of all correspondence regarding Digga D (aka Rhys Herbert) between Westminster police and venue operators at the Brixton O2 Academy in the four weeks preceding the announcement of the event's postponement (on 7 October 2022)
3. Copies of all correspondence regarding Digga D (aka Rhys Herbert) between Lambeth council and Lambeth police in the four weeks preceding the announcement of the event's postponement (on 7 October 2022)

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)(3) - Personal Data

I have disclosed the located information to you in the documents attachment. Please note, some data within the attached documents is redacted. I have redacted the names of MPS officers and staff from external organisations, so as not to contravene Data Protection principles. I have also redacted data that would identify policing tactics and operational procedures pertaining to large scale events.

Reason for decision

Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement - allows public authorities to withhold information if it is likely to or would prejudice ‘The prevention or detection of crime’ and ‘The apprehension or prosecution of offenders’.

Providing offenders knowledge to help evade law enforcement - The release of all the requested data would lead to law enforcement being undermined. The MPS is reliant upon all manner of techniques to inform our decisions on whether an event may pose a risk to the public. It is not in the public interest to reveal the specifics of our concerns. Arguably, knowledge of what forms our assessments could equip those with malicious intent, to build up a picture of what we do and do not look at. This would provide offenders with knowledge that would assist them to evade law enforcement which would encourage more crime to take place, placing the public at an increased risk.

Contact details of MPS staff and Brixton O2 Academy staff - The redaction of MPS and O2 Academy staff contact details does not reduce the value or quality of the rest of the data. You have requested copies of all correspondence between the MPS and ‘Brixton O2 Academy in the four weeks preceding the announcement of the event's postponement (on 7th October 2022)’

You have been provided with parts of that communication that does not include the contact details of staff. Person’s intent on disrupting the work of specific individuals within a MPS, would use these details to frustrate the work of the police and named personnel from external organisations. This is incredibly significant as staff from external organisations liaise with the police on a regular basis. Therefore, if the MPS were to disclose their details this would make them less likely to correspond with the MPS in the future. Which could in turn could affect the prevention and detection of crime at their events.

I have found that there is a clear public interest in providing a greater understanding of what the MPS’s role is in assisting external organisations during events. The MPS want to be as open and transparent as possible and therefore it is imperative that the appropriate information is made available to the public. This should not however, hinder the core functions of the MPS, which is the prevention or detection of crime and the apprehension or prosecution of offenders.

I have presented a compelling argument that the release of the emails and letter without redaction will infact do this. There is a no doubt that providing the public with a deeper understanding of policing is a good thing. It shows the challenges that the MPS face and how these complexities inform decision making. This must be weighed up against the risk that the data that I release could compromise relationships with external organisations, which in turn would not prevent crime or help detect crime but rather encourage it, which in turn negatively affects the MPS’s law enforcement function. It is my assessment that the release of the emails and letter without redaction would do this and therefore certain parts of the emails and document have been redacted by virtue of Section 31(1)(a)(b).

Section 40(2)(3) - Personal data - When this exemption is claimed, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. Section 40(3A)(a) states that public authorities will not disclose information which constitutes personal data and if the disclosure would contravene any of the Data Protection principles.

To disclose the emails and letter without redaction would publicly reveal information about an individual or individuals which would contravene Data Protection principles. The Data Protection Act 2018 defines personal data as any information relating to an identified or identifiable living individual. There are six data protection principles set out in section 34 of the DPA 2018 and under Article 5(1)(a) of the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR). The first principle requires personal data to be processed in a ‘lawful and fair’ manner. The basis for determining what constitutes lawful and fair is outlined under section 35 of the DPA. Under section 35(2) it states:

- the data subject has given consent to the processing for that purpose, or
- the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out for that purpose by a competent authority.

It is important to note that we do not have the consent of the data subjects and the release of the data will not be used for a law enforcement process.

Under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR, the disclosure of personal data is considered to be lawful if:

- There is a legitimate interest in the disclosure of that personal data.
- The disclosure of the personal data is necessary to meet that legitimate interest.
- The disclosure would not cause unwarranted harm to the data subject.

Having considered your request, I have found that the emails and the letter contain a range of personal data, in relation to police staff and external personnel. By means of a legitimate interest test I have considered the release of the personal data, and I have found that:

The names of Staff members -
- Disclosing the names of MPS staff would provide greater detail into the communications between the MPS and the Brixton O2 Academy. The public may have a general interest in finding out who has been involved in such communications with an organisation that hold large scale events.
- The legitimate interest in transparency would be further satisfied through the release of this information.
- Some of the police officers who were part of the email trail hold the rank of Detective Sergeant and below. Officers of that rank would not therefore, reasonably expect their names to be published in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. In this regard, the public release of their personal data would be unexpected, unfair and distressing to the data subject(s) and could lead to unwanted and unsolicited intrusion from the media and/or others interested in the specifics of their role in policing.

The names of external personnel -
- Disclosing the names of external personnel would identify exactly who the MPS has communicated with from the Brixton O2 Academy, in relation to the event.
- The legitimate interest in transparency would be further satisfied through the release of this information.
- Policing London relies on the trust and confidence. The MPS often work with external organisations. In the course of such communications, emails and other recorded information can be generated. Now whilst high ranking MPS officers would expect to be named in relation to FOIA requests, external personnel have a legitimate expectation that the MPS would not publicly release and publish their names in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. The MPS must consider how we process personal data and without their explicit consent, the sharing of their personal data would be harmful, and cause alarm and distress to the data subjects. I therefore find it justified to withhold the names of external staff that are contained within the emails and letter.

Disclosure

Please find below redacted information pursuant to your request above.