Correspondence/communications between Commissioner Cressida Dick and Mayor of London from 14 January to 14 February 2022
Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.023334
I note you seek access to the following information:
I would like to request copies of all correspondence and communications between the office of Sadiq Khan, Mayor of London, and the office of Cressida Dick, Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, between 14 January – 14 February.
I define "correspondence and communications" as including (but not limited to) the following:
- Emails (and their attachments)
- Letters
- Memos
- Briefings
- Research documents
- Notes taken during telephone conversations
- Minutes taken during meetings”
Following receipt of your request, I have conducted searches to locate information relevant to your request. These searches located 18 records that are relevant to your request for information. These documents can be summarised as follows:
1 - 18 January 2022 - Email chain between the Mayor’s Office and the Commissioner’s Private Office.
2 - 19 January 2022 - Readout: Trilateral meeting between the former Home Secretary, the Mayor of London and the former MPS Commissioner.
3 - 21 January 2022 - Letter from the former MPS Commissioner to the Mayor of London.
4 - 26 January 2022 - Email chain between the Mayor’s Office and the Commissioner’s Private Office.
5 - 26 January 2022 - Readout: Former MPS Commissioner with the Mayor of London.
6 - 27 January 2022 - Letter from the former MPS Commissioner to the former Home Secretary and Mayor of London.
7 - 28 January 2022 - Letter from the former MPS Commissioner to the Mayor of London.
8 - 6 February 2022 - Operation Hotton strategic briefing email chain.
8.1 - 6 February 2022 - Operation Hotton strategic briefing.
8.2 - 6 February 2022 - Operation Hotton strategic briefing spreadsheet.
9 - 4 February 2022 - Letter from the former MPS Commissioner to the Mayor of London.
10 - 6 February 2022 to 9th of February 2022 - Operation Hotton strategic briefing timeline email.
10.1 - 6 February 2022 to the 9th of February 2022 - Operation Hotton strategic briefing timeline.
11 - 9 February 2022 - Email chain between the Mayor’s Office and the Commissioner’s Private Office.
12 - 10 February 2022 - Email chain from the Commissioner’s Chief of Staff to MOPAC and other MPS staff members.
13 - 10 February 2022 - Letter from the former MPS Commissioner to the Mayor of London.
11 - 11 February 2022 - Letter from the former MPS Commissioner to the Mayor of London.
12 - 12 February 2022 - Report by Robin Wilkinson (former MPS Chief of Corporate Services)
Decision
I have disclosed record 15 in full. Records 1-8.1 and 9-14 have been released in redacted format, that is, I have removed information that is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act). I have refused to release document 8.2 in its entirety.
Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 23(1) – Information Supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters
Section 24(1) – National Security
Section 31(1)(a) – Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)&(3) – Personal Information
Reason for decision
Section 23 and Section 24 - Having considered the requested records for release, I have determined that some of the information you have requested should be withheld under either section 23(1) or section 24(1) of the Act. Some of the information you have requested could be exempt under section 23(1) of the Act, which relates to the bodies specified in section 23(3) of the Act, although it is also possible that the information relates to none of these bodies. Sections 23(1) and 24(1) are being cited in the alternative as it is not appropriate, in the circumstances of the case, to say which of the two exemptions is actually engaged so as not to undermine national security or reveal the extent of any involvement, or not, of the bodies specified at section 23(3). Section 23 is an absolute exemption and the MPS is not required to consider whether the public interest favours disclosure of this information. Any information that is not exempt from disclosure under section 23(1) could be exempt under section 24(1) of the Act, which exempts information from disclosure if its exemption is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security. For the reasons given above under section 23, we cannot say which of the two exemptions is actually engaged, and to the extent to which section 24(1) is engaged.”
In favour of release, there is a general presumption under the Act in favour of making as much information as possible available to the public to enable informed debate. However, as explained to you above, to provide any further explanation for the application of this exemption would potentially involve the disclosure of information which itself would be exempt under this section of the Act, and I am satisfied that the criteria of section 17(4) has been met.
I am therefore content that the information in scope of your request falls within the exemptions provided for at either section 23 or alternatively section 24 of the Act but this should give no indication as to which of the exemptions is actually engaged.
Section 31(1)(a) - Law Enforcement - Section 31(1)(a) of the Act provides that any information is exempt if its disclosure under the Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice the prevention or detection of crime.
I have claimed this exemption in that the requested records contain the contact details to members of staff at the MPS and the MOPAC. This information, if released, would provide persons intent on disrupting the work of the MPS and the MOPAC, with information that would assist them in this endeavour.
Disruption to the Work of Senior Members of Staff - The release of the contact details to members of staff, would provide persons intent on disrupting the work of the MPS and/or the MOPAC, with information that would assist them to do so. In this regard, a person within this intent would be likely to use this information to make inappropriate contact with members of staff and/or send them vast amounts of unsolicited correspondence. This would disrupt the work of these members of staff and cause disruption to the work of the MPS and the MOPAC, hindering their ability to both prevent and detect crime.
Meeting Rooms - The release of locations where the Commissioner and other senior leaders regularly meet within NSY, would provide persons whose purpose is to harm senior police officers and public officials, with information that may assist them to do so.
I accept that there is a public interest in transparency when any request is made for police information. The public interest favouring release must be balanced against any associated risk and/or prejudice that would be caused through disclosure.
Having carefully considered this, I have found that the public release and publication of the contact details of members of staff at the MPS and the MOPAC, would provide persons intent on disrupting the work of the MPS and/or the MOPAC, with information that would assist them in this endeavour. The public release of the locations where the Commissioner and other senior leaders regularly meet within NSY would also provide persons, whose purpose is to harm senior police officers and public officials, with information that may assist them to do so. Given this and the fact that the removal of this information does not detract from the quality of the records disclosed, I have found that the release of this information is not in the public interest.
Section 40(2)&(3) - Personal Information - of the Act provides that any information to which a request for information relates, is exempt information if the first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) is satisfied. The first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) states that personal information is exempt if its disclosure would contravene any of the data protection principles. If the disclosure of the requested personal data would not contravene the data protection principles, the disclosure must also not contravene Sections 3A(b) and 3B of the Act.
There are six principles that are set out in Article 5(1)(a) of the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) that dictate when the processing of personal data is lawful. The first principle requires that any processing of personal data must be lawful, fair and transparent. Under Article 6(1)(of) of the GDPR, the disclosure of personal data is considered to be lawful if:
a. There is a legitimate interest in the disclosure of that personal data.
b. The disclosure of the personal data is necessary to meet that legitimate interest.
c. The disclosure would not cause unwarranted harm to the data subject.
Signature of Former MPS Commissioner Dame Cressida Dick - The requested records contain the signature of former MPS Commissioner Dame Cressida Dick. Having considered the legitimate interest test in respect of this personal data, I have found that:
a. The disclosure of the signature of former MPS Commissioner Dame Cressida Dick would demonstrate that she, in her role as Commissioner, endorsed the letters to the Mayor of London Mr Sadiq Khan.
b. Signatures are a unique personal identifier that are used by individuals in all aspects of their personal lives. The disclosure of the signature of former MPS Commissioner Dame Cressida Dick, is not necessary to meet the legitimate interest identified at point a, as the place in which this signature was present, is evident within the disclosed record. It is accordingly clear that the signature of MPS Commissioner Dame Cressida Dick was present within the requested letters.
Names of Members of Staff - The requested records contains the names of persons holding the rank of Superintendent and below and Band A and below. The records also contain the names of persons employed at the MOPAC holding similar ranks. Having considered the legitimate interest test in respect of this personal data, I have found that:
a. The employees holding the rank of Superintendent and below, Band A and below and equivalent ranks at the MOPAC, are unlikely to expect their names to be published in response to this Freedom of Information Act request. Given their roles and level of responsibility within the MPS and the MOPAC, I have not identified a legitimate interest that would be satisfied in disclosing their personal data in response to this request for information.
Personal Criminal Offence Data - The requested records contain operational updates about criminal investigations from which living persons can be identified. Having considered the legitimate interest test in respect of this personal data, I have found that:
a. The Information Commissioner (the ombudsman for the Act) guidance on the release of personal criminal offence data under the Act states:
‘Due to its sensitivity, the conditions for processing criminal offence data are very restrictive and generally concern specific, stated purposes. Consequently, only two are relevant to allow you to lawfully disclose under FOIA or the EIR. They are similar to those identified above for special category data. These are:
• consent from the data subject; or
• the processing relates to personal data which has clearly been made public by the individual concerned.
If a relevant condition cannot be met, you must not disclose the information as disclosure would be unlawful and therefore in contravention of principle (a).’
The conditions required to release personal criminal offence data are not present in this case. The release of the requested personal data does not accordingly satisfy a legitimate interest and cannot be disclosed under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
Misconduct Information in Respect of Operation Hotton - The requested records contain the personal data of police officers that were investigated as a part of the Operation Hotton. Operation Hotton was a series of linked investigations carried out by the IOPC into the conduct of MPS police officers. Having considered the legitimate interest test in respect of this personal data, I have found that:
a. At the conclusion of the Operation Hotton investigation, the IOPC published an extensive report detailing the scope of the investigation and its findings. The employees and former employees investigated as a part of Operation Hotton are accordingly, unlikely to anticipate or expect the MPS to publish further information about them under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, given the extensive nature of the material published by the IOPC. Given this and the fact that the public interest in transparency has already be satisfied through the IOPC’s published material, I have not identified a legitimate interest that would be satisfied in disclosing the located personal data in response to this request for information.
It is of note that the Operation Hotton material subject of this request has largely been published by the IOPC in a different format. A link to this information has been provided in this notice.
Document 8.2 - Operation Hotton Strategic Briefing Spreadsheet - Document 8.2 is a spreadsheet containing the following personal data of each officer subject of Operation Hotton.
1. Name of each officer / pseudonym
2. Strand
3. Allegation
4. Standard of Professional Behaviour breached
5. IOPCs recommendation
6. DPS Appropriate Authority determination
7. What happened next
8. Final outcome
9. Other information
This spreadsheet consists exclusively of personal criminal offence data and misconduct data. This document has been withheld in its entirety for this reason.
It is of note that the Operation Hotton material subject of this request has largely been published by the IOPC in a different format. A link to this information has been provided in this notice.
The provision to refuse access to information under Section 40(2)(a)(b) and (3A)(a) of the Act is both absolute and class based. When this exemption is claimed, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to demonstrate what that harm may be in refusing access to information.
Disclosure
Please find below redacted information pursuant to your request above.
INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN Documents 8, 8.1, 8.2, 10 and 10.1 concern Operation Hotton. Operation Hotton was a series of nine linked investigations carried out by the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) into the conduct of MPS police officers. In disclosing documents 8, 8.1, 8.2, 10 and 10.1, I have removed information that relates to the conduct of each officer subject of this operation.
This information has however, largely been published in a slightly different format by the IOPC. I have provided a link to this published information below.
IOPC Website: Operation Hotton Learning Report