Use of Palantir Technologies Software

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.027525

I note you seek access to the following information:

I'm writing to to ask that you please disclose to me if your constabulary has, at any point in the last 5 years, purchased or trialled software by Palantir Technologies, either direct from the government or crown commercial services, or via a third party entity (for instance, Capgemini).

I'll note that Palantir policing software is currently listed as able to purchase on the government webpage, and that previously the Police trialled them as far back as 2010 as part of a consortium agreement between Cheshire, Norfolk, Suffolk, the Met, and Northamptonshire as part of the Multi-Force Shared Services
- which ran on a programme joint built by Oracle and Palantir on a software that was called (outside of the MFSS) T-Police - this software was purchased through Capgemini, and again the Met in 2012 used them during the London Olympics.
The Met also trialled them between 2014-15 as one of three vendors providing "predictive policing" solutions, and as late as 2020 the force listed Palantir on it's ICT digital spend for "policing the capital".

So if their software in any capacity has been used by police from 2017 to present this is the information I would like please.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some information to you.

In addition, and irrespective of what other information may or may not be held relating to any possible use of Palantir technology since July 2021, this request also requires the MPS to Neither Confirm nor Deny whether it holds any further information. This is because the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions;

• Section 24(2) National Security
• Section 31(3) Law Enforcement

This response therefore serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act).

Reason for decision

Please note this response should not be taken as an indication of whether or not the further information is held, other than what the MPS have confirmed is held within this response for your questions.

Confirming or denying whether any other information is held in relation, for example to any possible MPS use of Palantir technology would potentially show individuals what the capacity, tactical abilities and capabilities of the MPS are. Disclosure under FOIA would allow individuals to target specific areas of the UK to conduct possibly criminal/terrorist activities or activities that undermine the role of the police.

Please note this response should not be taken as an indication of whether or not information in relation to the MPS’S use of Palantir technology is held or not.

Neither Confirm Nor Deny

Section 24(2) National Security and Section 31(3) Law Enforcement - Section 1 of the Act places two duties on public authorities. Unless exemptions apply, the first duty at Section 1(1)(a) is to confirm or deny whether the information specified in a request is held. The second duty at Section 1(1)(b) is to disclose information that has been confirmed as being held. Where exemptions are relied upon Section 17 of the Act requires that we provide the applicant with a notice which:
a) states that fact;
b) specifies the exemption(s) in question and
c) states (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption(s) apply.

The MPS needs to be alert to requests for certain types of information, and there is a need for consistency when neither confirming nor denying whether information is held in order to protect policing information.

To confirm or deny whether any other information relating to the use of a particular investigative tool is held would harm the integrity of sensitive policing tactics used to prevent and detect crime and safeguard national security.

Any disclosure under FOI is a release to the public at large. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, confirming or denying if a particular policing tool of this type (in this case Palantir Technologies) is used by the Met as part of an investigative process is different from confirming if, in principle, commercial tools generally are used to assist with searches against information that may be found online.

It is well established that police forces use publically available data in order to counteract criminal behaviour. It has been previously documented in the media that many terrorist incidents have been thwarted due to intelligence gained by these means. However, given the sensitive areas in which tools of this type may be used and the Met’s role in counter-terror investigations, to disclose if any particular tools are used would allow criminals and other adversaries to focus on evaluating the particular capabilities of a particular tool, With this knowledge it would allow criminals and other adversaries to take steps to counteract a specific tool – be it adjusting how they interact and present themselves to take advantage of any weaknesses or gaps in capability they identify. At a simple level, if a policing tool doesn’t search ‘X ‘social media site or was unable to identify ‘Y’ format of images and criminals can establish this, they will exploit this position. The Met’s more sophisticated adversaries may be able to go further and take more proactive measures to undermine the tool and/or its provider, and a specific confirmation allows efforts to be focused accordingly.

This detrimental effect is increased if the request is made to several different law enforcement bodies. In addition to the local criminal fraternity now being better informed, those intent on organised crime throughout the UK will be able to ‘map’ where the use of certain tools are or are not deployed. This can be useful information to those committing crimes. It would have the likelihood of identifying location-specific operations which would ultimately compromise police tactics, operations and future prosecutions as criminals could counteract the measures used against them.

Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both National Security and Law Enforcement.

Accordingly, in a position taken in common with other law enforcement agencies, confirming or denying if the Met uses Palantir Technologies would lead to an increase of harm to covert investigations and compromise law enforcement. This outweighs the benefits to disclosure, not least as disclosure would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public. Therefore it is our opinion that for these issues the balance test favours neither confirming nor denying that information is held.

If it exists, the disclosure of this information to the public by the MPS would Undermine the integrity of police investigations and operations and in maintaining confidence in the MPS.

The effective delivery of operational law enforcement is of paramount importance to the MPS in their duty to ensure that the prevention and detection of crime is carried out and the effective apprehension or prosecution of offenders is maintained.
Therefore it is our opinion that for these issues the balance test favours neither confirming nor denying that information is held.

Please note this response does not confirm or deny that the MPS holds the information that you have requested.

Disclosure

So if their software in any capacity has been used by police from 2017 to present this is the information

Between 2017 and July 2021 the MPS can confirm it did not have a contract or relationship with Palantir.